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ABSTRACT 
 
Given the pervasive nature of service failures and their harmful consequences, it is 
important to understand how customers react to them. This doctoral dissertation addresses some 
of the customers’ cognitive, emotional, and behavioral reactions to service failures. More 
specifically, it investigates customers’ causal attributions, appraisals, and perceived control as 
cognitive reactions, as well as a wide range of emotional (e.g., regret, anger, disappointment, 
etc.) and behavioral reactions (e.g., switch, complaint, negative word-of-mouth, and others). 
This dissertation presents three different researches within the scope of customers’ reactions to 
service failure. The first research introduces the temporal model of perceived control from 
psychology to service research and compares its explanatory power for customer emotional and 
behavioral reactions with the ones of the widely used causal attribution and appraisal models. 
Three surveys and one experiment are conducted. The results show that for some customers’ 
reactions (e.g., regret and switch), the temporal model of perceived control has explanatory 
power over and above the traditionally used causal attribution and appraisal models. This 
research also shows that the temporal model of perceived control may be combined with the 
causal attribution and appraisal models to achieve higher explanatory power. The second 
research investigates whether failed co-produced services lead to more internal or external 
causal attribution (i.e., whether the blame is attributed to the customer or the service provider) 
and how it affects customers’ regret, disappointment, and dissatisfaction. Two experiments are 
conducted. The results indicate that failed co-produced services lead to more internal 
attributions than failed services that were not co-produced. Failed co-produced services also 
lead to lower levels of disappointment and dissatisfaction without elevating customer’s regret 
level. The results also show that in case of causal uncertainty (i.e., when the customer is not 
sure about who caused the failure), customers who co-produced experience the same high level 
of regret of customers who have caused the failure, contradicting the literature that states that 
causal uncertainty leads to reduced emotional intensity. The third research investigates whether 
customers’ thought speed affects causal locus attribution for services failures as well as 
customers’ emotional and behavioral reactions. Four experiments are conducted. The results 
suggest that customers who think faster make more external attributions for service failures 
(i.e., attribute more blame to the service provider) than customers who think slower. It seems 
that thought speed has no effect on customers’ emotional and behavioral reactions though. 
According to the results, the induced differences in thought speed tend to be short-lived. 
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Overall, these three researches offer insights into some of the things that customers think, how 
do they feel and act in response to service failures. Theoretical and managerial implications are 
discussed at the end of each research and recapitulated in the conclusions chapter. 
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RESUMO 
 
Devido à natureza onipresente das falhas de serviço e suas consequências nocivas, é 
importante compreender como os clientes reagem a elas. Esta tese de doutorado explora 
algumas das reações cognitivas, emocionais e comportamentais dos clientes em relação a falhas 
de serviço. De maneira mais específica, a tese investiga atribuições causais, avaliações e 
controle percebido dos clientes como reações cognitivas, assim como uma ampla variedade de 
reações emocionais (p.ex., arrependimento, raiva, decepção, etc.) e comportamentais (p.ex., 
troca, reclamação, boca-a-boca negativo, entre outros). Esta tese apresenta três diferentes 
pesquisas dentro do escopo de reações do cliente a falhas de serviço. A primeira pesquisa traz 
o modelo temporal de controle percebido da psicologia para a área de serviços e compara o seu 
poder de explicar reações emocionais e comportamentais do cliente com o poder explanatório 
dos modelos de atribuição e de avaliação amplamente utilizados. Três surveys e um 
experimento são realizados. Os resultados mostram que, para algumas reações dos clientes 
(p.ex., arrependimento e troca), o modelo temporal de controle percebido tem poder 
explanatório superior ao poder dos modelos de atribuição causal e de avaliação 
tradicionalmente utilizados. Esta pesquisa também demonstra que o modelo temporal de 
controle percebido pode ser combinado aos modelos de atribuição causal e de avaliação para 
atingir maior poder explanatório. A segunda pesquisa investiga se falhas em serviços 
coproduzidos levam a uma atribuição causal mais interna ou externa (i.e., se a culpa é atribuída 
ao cliente ou ao prestador de serviço) e como isto afeta arrependimento, decepção e insatisfação 
do cliente. Dois experimentos são realizados. Os resultados indicam que falhas em serviços 
coproduzidos levam a uma atribuição mais interna que falhas em serviços não coproduzidos. 
Falhas em serviços coproduzidos também resultam em menores níveis de decepção e 
insatisfação sem elevar o nível de arrependimento do cliente. Os resultados também apontam 
que, em caso de incerteza causal (i.e., quando o cliente não está seguro sobre quem causou a 
falha), clientes que coproduzem sentem o mesmo alto nível de arrependimento de clientes que 
causaram a falha, contradizendo a literatura que afirma que incerteza causal leva à redução da 
intensidade emocional. A terceira pesquisa investiga se a velocidade do pensamento dos 
clientes afeta a atribuição de lócus causal para falhas de serviço bem como as reações 
emocionais e comportamentais dos clientes. Quatro experimentos são conduzidos. Os 
resultados sugerem que clientes que pensam mais rápido fazem atribuições causais mais 
externas que clientes que pensam mais devagar. Aparentemente, a velocidade do pensamento 
 
8 
 
não tem efeito nas reações emocionais e comportamentais dos clientes. De acordo com os 
resultados, as diferenças de velocidade de pensamento que foram induzidas tendem a ter curta 
duração. Em geral, estas três pesquisas oferecem insights sobre algumas das coisas que os 
clientes pensam, como eles se sentem e agem em resposta a falhas de serviço. Implicações 
teóricas e gerenciais são discutidas ao final de cada pesquisa e sintetizadas no capítulo de 
conclusões. 
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SAMENVATTING 
 
Gezien de grote impact en schadelijke gevolgen van service blunders, is het belangrijk 
om te begrijpen hoe klanten hierop reageren. Dit proefschrift behandelt enkele van de 
cognitieve, emotionele en gedragsmatige reacties die klanten kunnen vertonen na dergelijke 
service blunders. Meer specifiek worden klanten hun causale attributies, beoordelingen en 
gepercipieerde controle als cognitieve reacties onderzocht, evenals diverse emotionele (bv. 
spijt, woede, teleurstelling, enz.) en gedragsmatige reacties (bv. veranderen van dienstverlener, 
indienen van een klacht, verspreiden van negatieve mond-tot-mond reclame, enz.).  
Dit proefschrift omvat drie verschillende onderzoeken in het kader van klantenreacties 
op service blunders. Het eerste onderzoek introduceert het tijdsgebonden model van 
gepercipieerde controle (‘the temporal model of perceived control’) vanuit psychologisch naar 
service onderzoek en vergelijkt de verklaringskracht ervan wat betreft emotionele en 
gedragsmatige reacties met deze van het frequent gebruikte causale attributiemodel en 
beoordelingsmodel (‘appraisal model’). Drie enquêtes en één experiment worden uitgevoerd. 
De resultaten tonen aan dat voor sommige klantreacties (bv. spijt en veranderen van 
dienstverlener), het tijdsgebonden model van gepercipieerde controle meer verklaringskracht 
heeft dan het traditioneel gebruikte causale attributiemodel en beoordelingsmodel. Dit 
onderzoek toont ook aan dat door het combineren van de drie modellen een hogere 
verklaringskracht kan bekomen worden.     
Het tweede onderzoek gaat na of blunders begaan bij gezamenlijk geproduceerde 
diensten (‘co-production services’) tot meer interne of externe causale attributie leiden (d.w.z., 
of de schuld bij de klant dan wel bij de dienstverlener gelegd wordt) en hoe dit klanten hun 
gevoelens van spijt, teleurstelling, en ontevredenheid beïnvloedt. Twee experimenten worden 
uitgevoerd. De resultaten geven aan dat blunders in een service die gezamenlijk geproduceerd 
werd tot meer interne attributies leiden dan blunders in een service die niet gezamenlijk tot 
stand kwam. Blunders in een gezamenlijk geproduceerde service leiden ook tot minder 
teleurstelling en kleinere ontevredenheid zonder dat de klanten meer spijt ervaren. De resultaten 
tonen verder ook aan dat, in geval van causale onzekerheid (d.w.z., wanneer de klant niet zeker 
is wie de blunder veroorzaakt heeft), klanten die een service mee tot stand gebracht hebben 
evenveel spijt ervaren dan klanten die de blunder veroorzaakt hebben. Dit resultaat is in 
tegenstelling met de literatuur die veronderstelt dat causale onzekerheid een lagere emotionele 
intensiteit teweeg brengt. 
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Het derde onderzoek gaat na of de snelheid waarmee klanten hun gedachten vormen 
(‘thought speed’) een invloed heeft op causale attributies, emotionele en gedragsmatige reacties 
naar aanleiding van een service blunder. Vier experimenten worden uitgevoerd. De resultaten 
suggereren dat klanten die sneller denken meer externe atttributies maken voor service blunders 
(d.w.z., ze leggen meer schuld bij de dienstverlener) dan klanten die trager denken. Snelheid 
van denken lijkt echter geen effect te hebben op klanten hun emotionele en gedragsmatige 
reacties. De resultaten wijzen ook aan dat de opgewekte verschillen in snelheid van denken van 
korte duur zijn.  
Over het geheel genomen, bieden de drie onderzoeken bijkomende inzichten in bepaalde 
dingen die klanten denken, hoe ze zich voelen en hoe ze reageren ten gevolge van een service 
blunder. Theoretische en praktische implicaties worden aan het einde van elk onderzoek 
bediscussieerd en gerecapituleerd in het hoofdstuk ‘Conclusies’. 
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1 ON THE STRUCTURE OF THIS DISSERTATION  
 
The current dissertation is the outcome of a joint doctorate of the author at the Federal 
University of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil) and Ghent University (Belgium). According to the 
cooperation agreement for this joint doctorate, the doctoral dissertation must combine the 
content and structure usually required by each of the universities (e.g., chapters’ structure and 
amount of studies). This combination of structures result in a document slightly different from 
the ones usually evaluated by each member of the examination board. In spite of the different 
structure, there is a strong commitment to present a relevant theoretical contribution based on 
sound literature reviews and empirical investigations. 
Doctoral dissertations from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul usually have 
one research question, one general goal, and a few specific goals in the introduction chapter. 
The other chapters contain theoretical background, empirical studies, and discussion to answer 
such research question and goals. The entire dissertation addresses the same investigation in 
extreme depth, whereas the doctoral dissertations from the Ghent University usually deal with 
more investigations, subdivided in articles. Each article represents one chapter of the 
dissertation and has its own goals, theoretical background, empirical studies, and discussion.  
The present dissertation combines both universities model: it adopts the article structure 
from the Ghent University, but the first article has a more extensive theoretical background, 
similar to other dissertations from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, while the 
second and third articles are not as extensive as the first, more in line with the tradition of the 
Ghent University. The three articles consist of investigations about the general topic of service 
failures. Each one of these articles constitutes one chapter of the dissertation and is composed 
of a literature review and empirical studies. The dissertation is written in English, following the 
American Psychological Association (APA) referencing style.   
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2 INTRODUCTION 
 
This introductory chapter is organized as follows. First, the common theoretical 
framework for the three articles/chapters is introduced: service failures and attribution theory. 
Then, each one of the chapters is explained.  
 
 
2.1 SERVICE AND FAILURES 
 
The services sector accounts for the major part of the world’s gross domestic product – 
over 70% in most stablished economies (Bitner, 2014). The services sector and service research 
are considered of great importance to the success of business and to the welfare of society 
(Bitner, 2014). Service has grown so much in importance that it has been considered as the 
fundamental unit of exchange for any offer in the Service-Dominant Logic (Vargo & Lusch, 
2004). This means that even when buying a physical good such as a computer, customers are 
in fact acquiring applied knowledge and skills (i.e., service) (Lusch, Vargo, & O’Brien, 2007).  
Rather than focusing on service as the fundamental unit of exchange as done in the 
Service-Dominant Logic, the current dissertation focuses on services like those that compose 
the so called service sector (e.g., retail, restaurants, hospitals, etc.). Of special interest are those 
services that result in failure. According to Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978), failure 
refers to not obtaining a desired outcome. Thus, service failure refers to not obtaining a desired 
outcome from a service.  
Failures are a reality in the service industry and by no means can their occurrence be 
fully prevented (Joireman, Grégoire, Devezer, & Tripp, 2013). The large amount of customer 
complaints on websites such as consumeraffairs.com (USA), reclameaqui.com.br (Brazil), and 
other similar websites indicate that service failures are very common. Although service failures 
are not as certain as death and taxes, every one of us has already faced service failures or has 
close friends/relatives who faced it. This shows that service failures are almost inevitable for 
customers. Some of these failures lead customers to get angry with the service provider, 
ruminate about the failure, and seek revenge (Grégoire, Laufer, & Tripp, 2010; Strizhakova, 
Tsarenko, & Ruth, 2012).  
The very nature of services make them susceptible to failures. For instance, most 
services are heterogeneous because their performance varies from provider to provider and from 
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customer to customer (Parasuraman, Zeithmal, & Berry, 1985). This heterogeneity or 
variability may lead to failures since a standard outcome is hard to get. Also, production and 
consumption are inseparable in most services (i.e., production and consumption occur 
simultaneously) (Lovelock & Gummesson, 2004; Parasuraman et al., 1985). Therefore, it is 
difficult to check the service quality and correct potential mistakes before its delivery.  
The concept of service failure is closely related to dissatisfaction, which derives from 
negative expectancy disconfirmation (e.g., when service performance is worse than expected) 
(Anderson, 1973). A dissatisfied customer may experience negative emotions such as regret, 
disappointment, anger and so forth (Cho & Song, 2012; Joireman et al., 2013; Zeelenberg & 
Pieters, 2004). Customer dissatisfaction and the negative emotions associated with it may lead 
to a variety of behavioral reactions, such as complaining to the responsible for the failure (e.g., 
service firm, retailer, manufacturer, etc.), engaging in negative word-of-mouth, complaining to 
a third party (e.g., newspapers, legal agencies), engaging in retaliatory behavior (i.e., actions to 
punish a firm), switching from service provider, and doing nothing at all (Cho & Song, 2012; 
Joireman et al., 2013; Singh, 1988; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004).  
Customers may consider service failures to be stressful. Duhachek (2005), Moschis 
(2007), and Stephens and Gwinner (1998) argue for a stress subjective view. According to these 
authors, the same service failure (e.g., a rude treatment by a service employee or a lapse in 
service) may be stressful to some customers but not stressful to others. According to Cohen, 
Kamarck, and Mermelstein's (1983) perceived stress scale, stress is associated with irritating 
life hassles, feeling upset about something that happened unexpectedly, feeling unable to 
control important things, feeling nervous and angry because of things outside one’s control, 
feeling unable to overcome difficulties, etc. Similarly, in a service context, stressful situations 
could be those that make customers feel irritated, powerless, nervous, and angry. This implies 
a fairly high negative arousal that is not necessarily present in all service failures. Customers 
have several ways to cope with stress, such as complain, defer buying or shopping, seeking 
social support, venting rage, controlling one’s feelings, among others (Moschis, 2007). 
Both stressful and non-stressful service failures are worth of investigation as they may 
engender negative emotional and behavioral customer reactions. It is important to understand 
other factors that may affect such customer reactions in order to get a more complete picture of 
the consequences of service failures. For instance, customer complaint behavior may offer firms 
a chance to gather information and respond to a failure – a second chance for firms to get it 
right (Prim & Pras, 1999) – but it may also turn product and brand evaluations more negative 
when customers blame themselves for a failure (Dunn & Dahl, 2012). Such product and brand 
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negative evaluations come from a need to reestablish customers’ self-worth, shifting blame 
from internal to external sources (Dunn & Dahl, 2012).  This example illustrates how important 
it is for firms to understand the factors that lead to customer emotional and behavioral reactions 
after a service failure as well as how such factors work and what are their consequences. 
Besides emotional and behavioral reactions, service failures also lead to cognitive 
reactions such as causal attributions, appraisals, and perceived control. In fact, the expected 
order of customer response after service dissatisfaction is cognitive reactions affecting 
emotional reactions which, in turn, lead to behavioral reactions (Hui & Bateson, 1991; Lazarus, 
1991b; Rompay, Galetzka, Pruyn, & Garcia, 2008; Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993; 
Weiner, 2000). 
This dissertation investigates customers’ cognitive, emotional, and behavioral reactions 
to service failures. In particular, we analyze the potential effects of co-production and thought 
speed on customers’ cognitive reactions (i.e., causal attributions) to service failures, and the 
effects of cognitive reactions (i.e., causal attributions, appraisals, and perceived control) on 
customers’ emotional and behavioral reactions to service failures. Besides service failures, 
another topic present throughout the current dissertation is causal attributions. Next section 
provides a literature review on attributions, while appraisals and perceived control will be 
addressed in chapter 3. 
 
 
2.2 ATTRIBUTION THEORY 
 
Attribution theory refers to the attributed cause of an event, state, or result, focusing on 
three causality properties: causal locus, causal controllability, and causal stability (Weiner, 
2000, 2010). Causal locus refers to the cause being located inside or outside the agent, which 
in the context of service failures means the cause being attributed to the customer or the service 
provider, for example. Causal controllability refers to the cause being volitional or not, which 
in the case of service failures may be associated with the customer’s  or company’s ability of 
having prevented the cause of the failure, while causal stability refers to the cause being 
considered stable or unstable (Folkes, 1984; Weiner, 2000, 2010). Such causal properties affect 
customer emotional and behavioral reactions as shown in Figure 1 (Weiner, 2000, 2010). 
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Figure 1 – Causal Attribution Model  
 
 
According to Weiner (2000), the search for attributions is more frequent after a failure 
than after a success. Therefore, attribution theory may be helpful to understand and predict 
customer reactions to service failures.  
Regarding an internal causal locus – that is, when the customer attributes to him/herself 
the cause of a failure – emotions like guilt, embarrassment, shame, and regret can be 
experienced (Weiner, 2000, 2010; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & der Pligt, 1998). When 
the customer is dissatisfied with a product he/she has chosen, this customer may feel guilty and 
regretful if the cause is attributed to an internal and controllable factor, such as a bad choice 
due to lack of attention or effort. On the other hand, the customer may feel embarrassed and 
ashamed when the cause is attributed to an internal and uncontrollable factor, such as the lack 
of ability to choose between a good and a bad choice (Weiner, 2000, 2010). 
An external causal locus – when the customer attributes the cause of a failure to a 
company or employee – combined with causal controllability can lead to the experience of 
anger. If a customer buys a cereal of which s/he dislikes the taste, this customer may be 
dissatisfied and even frustrated, but it is not likely that he or she would be angry with the cereal 
producer since there was neither intention to harm the customer nor negligence. However, if a 
customer finds a bug in the cereal, this customer is likely to feel angry with the cereal producer 
due to its negligence (Weiner, 2000). So, anger is associated with external controllable negative 
outcomes, while frustration is associated with external uncontrollable negative outcomes 
(Bougie, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2003; Folkes, 1984; Weiner, 2000). 
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Causal stability, in turn, refers to future expectations about (dis)satisfaction with a 
product. A stable attribution for the cause of a failure leads to a decrease of the likelihood of 
future satisfaction, which can be associated with fear, which, in turn, may affect customer 
behavior (e.g., choice and recommendation) (Weiner, 2000).  
Causal attributions are one type of cognitive reactions to service failures. Customer 
perceived control and appraisals are the two other cognitive reactions that will be investigated 
in this dissertation (but only in chapter 3). Next section gives some details about the contents 
of each article of this dissertation, explaining the novelty and relevance of each investigation. 
 
 
2.3 DISSERTATION OUTLINE AND JUSTIFICATION FOR EACH ARTICLE 
 
The current dissertation is divided into three different articles within the scope of 
customers’ reactions to service failures. Each article is detailed in a different chapter. Each 
article addresses investigations that are relevant and novel in some aspect. 
In chapter 3, “The Role of Perceived Control, Causal Attributions, and Appraisals in 
Stressful Service Experiences,” there is an investigation regarding whether the temporal model 
of perceived control introduced by Frazier et al. (2011, 2012) is relevant in the context of 
stressful service episodes. The model was originally developed to get a better understanding of 
people’s responses in extreme stressful life events (e.g., relationship conflicts and 
bereavement), but it has not been tested in a service context. According to the authors, people’s 
perceptions that they could have done something to prevent a stressful event (past control), that 
they can control their own emotions and thoughts about it right now (present control), that they 
can prevent it from happening again (future control), and that such situation is unlikely to 
reoccur (future likelihood) are important determinants of distress. Three surveys were 
conducted to test whether this model has additional explanatory power regarding customer 
emotional and behavioral reactions after a stressful service experience when compared to the 
typically used attribution (Weiner, 1985; 2000) and appraisal models (Lazarus, 1991b; Smith 
et al., 1993). Also, one experiment was conducted to test the influence of perceived past control 
on emotional and behavioral reactions when causal locus attribution is external. 
The novel aspect of this chapter is the use of a model of perceived control that has not 
been used in customer behavior or services marketing research yet, and its comparison to the 
widely used attribution and appraisal models. Just like attributions and appraisals, perceived 
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control refers to cognitions about something (e.g., an event, an undesired outcome, or a stressful 
situation) which, in turn, lead to emotional and behavioral reactions (Hui & Bateson, 1991; 
Rompay et al., 2008). 
However, unlike the attribution model, the temporal model of perceived control 
provides a deeper understanding about the role played by customers regarding service failures. 
For example, asking whether one could have prevented or will be able to prevent an event (i.e., 
past and future perceived control, respectively), is different than asking who caused an event or 
whether the cause is controllable by someone (i.e., causal locus and controllability attributions). 
Most of research on service failures focus on external attributions (service provider’s fault) and 
whether service providers could have prevented the failure (e.g., Folkes, Koletsky, & Graham, 
1987; Hess, Ganesan, & Klein, 2003, 2007; Huang, Lin, & Wen, 2010; Taylor, 1994; Wirtz & 
Mattila, 2004), neglecting the role of customers in such failure.  
The appraisal model allows for the investigation of customers’ role in a service failure 
because it examines self-accountability (whether the customer was responsible for the failure) 
and problem-focused coping potential (whether the customer can act to make the situation 
better). However, the temporal model of perceived control distinguishes itself from the 
appraisal model as the former allows for a focus on customers’ role not only in the past (when 
the service failure occurred) but also in the present and future. These differences compared to 
the attribution and appraisal models make the investigation of the temporal model relevant. It 
consists of a different way of looking to service failures, different cognitive reactions that may 
influence customers’ emotional and behavioral reactions. More importantly, though, there is no 
need to choose among the use of the temporal model, attribution, or appraisal models. The 
temporal model may be used together with attributions or appraisals because they measure 
different (and complementary) cognitions. 
In chapter 4, “Co-Production and Causal Locus Attribution”, there is an investigation 
about the effects of co-production on causal locus attribution following service failures. Co-
production is defined as customer participation in production activities that generates a result 
to be consumed (Etgar, 2008). So far, the literature on whether customers who co-produce will 
make more external (i.e., blame others) or internal (i.e., blame themselves) attributions after 
service failures is contradictory and inconclusive. For instance, findings that a high level of co-
production leads to more internal attributions than a lower level of co-production (Heidenreich, 
Wittkowski, Handrich, & Falk, 2015) contradict findings from Jong-Kuk, Min-Sook, Mi-Ok, 
and Mi-Ri (2010). Therefore, study 1 investigates the influence of co-production on customer 
causal locus attribution. Because people may be uncertain about causal attributions (Choi & 
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Mattila, 2008; Weary & Jacobson, 1997) and it may be hard to attribute a failure to the service 
provider or the customer in some situations, study 2 investigates the influence of uncertain locus 
attribution (as well as internal and external attributions) on regret, disappointment, and 
dissatisfaction. 
The novel aspect is that previous research addressing the influence of co-production on 
causal locus attribution (i.e., Heidenreich et al., 2015; Jong-Kuk et al., 2010; Yen, Gwinner, & 
Su, 2004) has neither addressed the influence of co-production on regret nor has examined the 
effects of uncertain causal locus attribution. The relevant aspect is that recent service literature 
calls for the understanding of how different emotions emerge in co-production contexts (Fliess, 
Dyck, & Schmelter, 2014). Also, because co-production is ubiquitous, understanding 
customers' attribution process may help academics and practitioners to predict customers' 
reactions to service failures (Jong-Kuk et al., 2010). This chapter adds to the scarce amount of 
empirical studies on the subject.  
In chapter 5, “Thought Speed and Causal Locus Attribution”, the potential effect of 
thought speed on causal locus attribution after service failures is examined. Sometimes people 
may feel that their thoughts are moving faster (or slower) than usual. This suggests that people 
experience differences in thought speed (Pronin, Jacobs, & Wegner, 2008). Research has shown 
that fast thought speed may induce positive affect and self-esteem (Pronin et al., 2008; Pronin 
& Jacobs, 2008; Pronin & Wegner, 2006). A literature review shows that fast thought speed 
could be either positively or negatively related to external causal attributions. In fact, since the 
effects of thought speed may be short-lived (Pronin, 2013), it is also possible that thought speed 
may have no effect on causal locus attribution at all. Four experiments were conducted to test 
such potential effect. 
The novel aspect of this chapter is combining thought speed to investigations about 
causal locus attribution. No other research about such potential effect of thought speed was 
found in the literature. The relevance rests on the fact that thought speed can be influenced by 
external stimuli like Pronin and colleagues did in many experimental studies (e.g., Chandler & 
Pronin, 2012; Pronin et al., 2008; Pronin & Wegner, 2006). Therefore, discovering whether 
thought speed may influence causal locus attributions has managerial implications: if there is 
such effect, service providers could use external stimuli to speed up or slow down thoughts to 
influence causal attributions. There are also theoretical implications: understanding how 
thought speed may affect customer reactions to service failure. Since the effect of thought speed 
might be short-lived (Pronin, 2013), this investigation also allows to check whether the 
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influence of external stimuli on thought speed lasts after a disturbance –something that has not 
been investigated. 
Figure 2 illustrates what chapters 3, 4, and 5 have in common: they all investigate causal 
attributions under service failure contexts. It also clarifies the differences among the empirical 
chapters. 
 
Figure 2 – Theoretical framework of chapters 3, 4, and 5. 
 
 
Chapter 6, “Conclusions”, brings final comments about each chapter and the dissertation 
as a whole. 
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3 THE ROLE OF PERCEIVED CONTROL, CAUSAL ATTRIBUTIONS, AND 
APPRAISALS IN STRESSFUL SERVICE FAILURES 
 
When people face an undesired outcome, their cognitive reactions like thinking about 
who is the one to blame for such outcome and whether they could have prevented it affect their 
emotional and behavioral reactions (Frazier et al., 2011; Weiner, 2000). The purpose of this 
chapter is to compare three different cognitive models and their power to explain emotional and 
behavioral reactions after a stressful service failure. The three models are: causal attribution 
model, from attribution theory (Weiner, 1985), appraisal model, from emotion theory (Lazarus, 
1991b), and the temporal model of perceived control (Frazier et al., 2011, 2012). 
Attribution theory has been used to explain emotional and behavioral response after 
consumption episodes, specially failure episodes (Folkes, 1984; Weiner, 2000). According to 
this theory, causal attributions affect emotions and expectancies which, in turn, are presumed 
to guide motivated behavior (Weiner, 1985). Attribution theory is not the only approach to link 
the structure of thinking to emotional and behavioral reactions. Lazarus and colleagues’ 
emotion theory relates appraisals about a stressful event to the experience of certain emotions 
and the consequent engagement in coping strategies. The coping strategy is not the end of the 
process for the authors, as coping may lead to reappraisals and change emotions (Folkman & 
Lazarus, 1988; Lazarus, 1991a). Both attribution and emotion theory show a cognition-
emotion-behavior path. The same type of path has been confirmed in studies involving 
perceived control in consumer behavior literature, showing that customer perceived control 
leads to more pleasurable purchase and service experiences and, consequently, to approach 
behavior (Hui & Bateson, 1991; Rompay et al., 2008). 
Attribution, appraisal, and perceived control are three different cognitive reactions that 
impact emotional and behavioral reactions. This research tests these different cognitive 
reactions and compares their power to predict customer response after a stressful service 
episode. The purpose is to check whether the temporal model of perceived control developed 
by Frazier et al. (2011, 2012) – which has not been used in the context of service failures and 
consumer behavior – could have explanatory power over and above the more traditional models 
of attributions and appraisals. Stressful service failures were chosen as the context of the 
investigation because the temporal model was developed to understand people’s reactions to 
stressful life events such as relationship conflicts, bereavement, final exams, etc. Besides 
comparing these three models, further studies are conducted to test causal effects of past control 
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(i.e., a part of the temporal model) on customer reactions. The purpose of these different studies 
is to investigate the potential contribution of the temporal model of perceived control to 
understand customer reactions after stressful service experiences.  
The proposed investigation has theoretical and managerial relevance. From a theoretical 
perspective, it tests an approach that has not been used so far to explain customer emotion and 
behavior reactions (i.e., the temporal model of perceived control) and compares its explanatory 
power to other models that have been traditionally used in the context of customer behavior. 
The results that emerge from the examination of such novel model may signal other researchers 
whether it is worth using it in future investigations about customer reactions to failures. From 
a managerial perspective, it may be easier for service providers to influence customer perceived 
control than customers’ attributions and appraisals. For instance, perceived control may be 
influenced by co-production, choice, and information (Chan, Yim, & Lam, 2010; Pacheco, 
Lunardo, & dos Santos, 2013; Skinner, 1996), factors that a firm can manage. But attributions 
and appraisals may be more associated with individuals’ cognitive style (see Peterson et al., 
1982 for a measure of individuals’ attributional style) than with external factors that a firm can 
manage. In this sense, it is managerially relevant to understand whether the temporal model of 
perceived control may influence customer emotional and behavioral reactions.  
Since attribution theory has already been discussed in the introductory chapter, the next 
section explains appraisals from the emotion theory. By understanding the most traditional 
attribution and appraisal models first, it will be easier to provide explanations of the temporal 
model of perceived control and compare these three models. 
 
 
3.1 EMOTION THEORY – THE ROLE OF APPRAISALS  
 
“Cognitive appraisal is a process through which the person evaluates whether a 
particular encounter with the environment is relevant to his or her well-being, and if so, in what 
ways” (Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis, & Gruen, 1986, p. 992). Much of the 
seminal studies about appraisals were developed along with stress, coping, and emotional 
theory (e.g., Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, et al., 1986; Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen, & 
Delongis, 1986; Folkman & Lazarus, 1988), showing how appraisals may affect emotions and 
the use of coping strategies. Thus, cognitive appraisals serve to understand customer emotional 
and behavioral reactions (Watson & Spence, 2007), especially in face of an undesired outcome.   
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Lazarus (1991a) explains the difference between knowledge and appraisal. According 
to him, knowledge is “what a person believes about the way the world works in general and in 
a specific context”, while appraisal is “an evaluation of the significance of knowledge about 
what is happening for our personal well-being” (Lazarus, 1991a, p. 354). He stresses this 
difference and alerts that only what we judge relevant to our goals and well-being generates 
emotions, so, appraisal rather than mere knowledge is the responsible for triggering emotions. 
He states that attribution theory is mainly based on knowledge while appraisals are implicit, 
which limits its ability to explain and predict cultural and individual differences when it comes 
to the consequences of attribution (knowledge). An attribution or knowledge about causation 
may be relevant and meaningful for one person’s well-being, but not for another’s, which may 
engender certain emotions in the first case that will not be experienced in the second. 
Such notion that appraisals are better emotion predictors than attributions was tested by 
Smith et al. (1993), who demonstrated that happiness, hope, anger, guilt, fear, and sadness were 
more related to appraisals than to attributions. In fact, these authors provided evidence that 
appraisal mediates the relationship between attribution and emotional response. The authors 
argue that besides the knowledge about causation that comes from attributions, appraisals such 
as whether a person cares about what is happening, whether it is something good or bad for 
him/her, whether a person can do something about it, and whether a person can accept it are 
necessary to generate emotions. 
There is no consensus about the number, name or categories of appraisals (Watson & 
Spence, 2007), so we chose to work with names and categories also used by Lazarus and 
colleagues. Thus, appraisals can be divided into two categories: primary and secondary 
appraisals. Primary appraisal is an evaluation of whether someone has anything at stake in a 
situation, while secondary appraisal is an evaluation of whether there is something to do to 
overcome or prevent such situation (Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen, et al., 1986). Lazarus (1991b) 
explains there are three primary appraisals: goal relevance, goal congruence or incongruence, 
and goal content. Goal relevance refers to whether there is anything at stake. Goal congruence 
or incongruence refers to whether the situation is appraised as harmful or beneficial. Goal 
content (or type of ego-involvement) refers to the kind of goal at stake (e.g., preservation or 
enhancement of one's ego identity or a moral value). 
There are also three secondary appraisals: blame or credit (directed at oneself or 
another), coping potential, and future expectations. There are some considerations to be made 
about blame or credit: whether there is someone that should be responsible for the harm, threat, 
or benefit, whether this person had control over the damage or benefit, and whether this blame 
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or credit is directed to oneself or to another person. Coping potential refers to the possibility of 
influencing the person-environment relationship for the better. Future expectations refer to 
expectations about things working out better or worse in the future (Lazarus, 1991b). 
Smith et al. (1993) used a slightly different model for primary and secondary appraisal 
when compared to the one described by Lazarus (1991b), but it keeps quite the same idea of 
Lazarus and colleagues’ previous works (e.g., Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, et al., 1986; 
Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen, et al., 1986; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). The model used by Smith et 
al. (1993) has two primary appraisals and four secondary appraisals. The primary appraisals are 
motivational relevance, which refers to the importance for one’s goals – the same as goal 
relevance described by Lazarus (1991b) – and motivational congruence, which refers to 
consistency or inconsistency regarding one’s goals – the same as goal congruence. 
The secondary appraisals considered by Smith et al. (1993) are accountability, problem-
focused coping potential, emotion-focused coping potential, and future expectancy. 
Accountability refers to who or what should receive credit or blame. Accountability differs 
from causal locus since the former necessarily involves attribution of responsibility and the 
latter does not. But although Smith et al. (1993) highlight this difference between accountability 
and causal locus, there are some studies where either causal locus (e.g., Dabholkar & Spaid, 
2012; Hui & Toffoli, 2002) or causal controllability (e.g., Russell, 1982) is measured by asking 
the extent to which someone is responsible for the situation. Some studies also mention 
responsibility attribution (e.g., Au, Hui, & Leung, 2001; Pittman & Pittman, 1980), which 
seems to incorporate both causal locus and controllability (Tsiros, Mittal, & Ross, 2004). This 
suggests that the extent to which attributions encompass responsibility is not completely clear.  
According to Smith et al. (1993), problem-focused coping potential refers to the ability 
of acting directly on the situation to make it better, while emotion-focused coping potential 
refers to psychological adjustment (i.e., to alter interpretations to feel better about the situation). 
Future expectancies refer to future actual or psychological changes that can make things better 
or worse. 
As stated by Smith et al. (1993) and Smith and Lazarus (1993), the combination of 
appraisal components form core relational themes that produce different emotions. Guilt is a 
result of self-blame (i.e., a core relational theme), which is appraised as motivationally relevant, 
motivationally incongruent, and self-accountability. Anger is a result of other-blame, appraised 
as motivationally relevant, motivationally incongruent, and other-accountability. Fear is 
produced by danger or threat, it is motivationally relevant, motivationally incongruent, and low 
or uncertain emotion-focused coping potential.  
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Smith et al. (1993) explain that their study tests attributions and appraisals of a group of 
emotions from which only anger and guilt have been explicitly modeled by Weiner and 
colleagues in terms of causal attributions. The authors explain, then, that their study was not a 
comparison between the model they presented and Weiner and colleagues’ model, but rather a 
general examination of attributions and appraisals. Attributions and appraisals are interrelated. 
They are different cognitive processes, but one does not rule out the other, since attributions are 
one step for making appraisals (Lazarus, 1991a; Smith et al., 1993). Figure 3 illustrates the 
influence of appraisals on emotions, keeping a cognition-emotion-behavior path similar to 
attribution theory. 
 
Figure 3 – Appraisal model  
 
 
 
3.2 TEMPORAL MODEL OF PERCEIVED CONTROL 
 
Perceived control may be defined as the belief one can determine one’s own internal 
state, behavior, environment, and achieve desired outcomes (Wallston, Wallston, Smith, & 
Dobbins, 1987). According to Skinner (1996), the most fundamental distinction found in 
control literature is the one between perceived and actual control. Actual control refers to 
objective control conditions present in a situation while perceived control is a person’s belief 
about the amount of control available. Perceived control is subjective, so a person may believe 
that s/he has more or less control than s/he actually has. 
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Perceived control, instead of actual control, seems to determine people’s responses 
(Burger, 1989), affecting emotions and behaviors regardless of actual control conditions 
(Skinner, 1996). Geer, Davison, and Gatchel (1970) found evidence that perceived control 
affects people’s reactions to aversive stimuli (i.e., shocks) in a positive way even in the absence 
of actual control. Perceived control has been associated with positive consequences for people’s 
life such as weaker decline in health (Gerstorf, Röcke, & Lachman, 2010), and less 
psychological distress in cancer patients (Bárez, Blasco, Fernández-Castro, & Viladrich, 2009). 
Nevertheless, perceived control has also been related to negative consequences such as decrease 
in life satisfaction when associated with low actual control (Heidemeier & Göritz, 2013), and 
greater concern about self-presentation and anxiety (Burger, 1989). 
Frazier, Berman, and Steward (2001) and Frazier et al. (2011, 2012) analyzed perceived 
control in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) contexts and stressful events not related to 
PTSD. The authors developed a temporal model which divides perceived control in past, 
present, and future control. Past control was illustrated with the question “could I have 
prevented this?” Present control with the question “what can I do now?” Future control with 
the question “can I keep this from happening again?” 
Even though Frazier and colleagues’ temporal model is newer than other models and 
typologies largely used in control literature, such as Averill's (1973) behavioral, cognitive, and 
decisional control, Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder's (1982) primary and secondary control, 
Rotter's (1966) internal and external locus of control, and so on, this temporal model has been 
cited and used in other studies (Frazier, 2003; Frazier et al., 2011, 2012; Sirois, Davis, & 
Morgan, 2006; Walsh & Bruce, 2011). Also, this model is grounded in the temporal aspect of 
perceived control, which is not a brand new aspect. Wallston et al. (1987) have argued that 
studies should consider the perceived control temporal dimension. Skinner (1996) and 
Thompson (1981) also identify the perceived control temporal dimension in control literature 
when they cite retrospective (past related) and prospective control (future related). 
Frazier et al. (2001) analyzed studies that fit the perceived control temporal dimension. 
Past control was positively related to distress in some of these studies, but unrelated in others. 
Present control was associated with better adjustment and fewer PTSD symptoms. Future 
control was also associated with better adjustment, but this result was inconsistent across the 
studies and may depend on objective controllability. The authors explain that thinking an event 
is controllable by you when in fact it is not, may make you feel worse about it. Another 
explanation for the inconsistency in the results regarding future control may be the perceived 
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future likelihood of the recurrence of an event, as Frazier et al. (2012) found evidence that the 
latter could be a better distress predictor than future control itself. 
In their empirical study, Frazier et al. (2011) found evidence confirming most of what 
Frazier et al. (2001) have found in other studies. Results showed present control was associated 
with lower distress levels. In the context of objective uncontrollable events (e.g., death of a 
family member), past and future control were associated with higher distress levels. 
Nonetheless, in the context of objective controllable and inevitable events (e.g., final exam), 
future control was associated with positive results (i.e., higher grades), what reinforces the 
suggestion that future control consequences may depend on objective controllability of an 
event. 
Results from Sirois et al. (2006) converge with results described by Frazier et al. (2011, 
2001). The former authors investigated the perceived control impact on psychological well-
being of people with tinnitus (i.e., people who hear sounds in the absence of external stimuli). 
They found evidence of a negative relationship between past control and psychological well-
being and a positive relationship between present control and psychological well-being. 
Future control consequences are showed in results from Houston's (1972) study, which 
was not analyzed by Frazier et al. (2001). In Houston’s (1972) study, perceived control was 
manipulated by informing a group of participants they could avoid shocks by not making 
mistakes on a task while telling the other group there was no way they could avoid shocks 
during the same task. This is similar to Frazier and colleagues’ definition of future control. 
Participants who could not avoid the shocks’ occurrence reported higher anxiety levels, but less 
psychological arousal (measured through heart beats) than participants who could avoid the 
shocks. 
  
 
3.3 TEMPORAL MODEL OF PERCEIVED CONTROL VERSUS ATTRIBUTION MODEL 
 
In order to compare the temporal model of perceived control with the attribution model 
and its explanatory power, it is important to highlight differences and similarities between the 
two models. As already stated in the introduction chapter, attribution theory refers to the 
attributed cause of an event, state, or result, focusing on three causality properties: causal locus, 
causal stability, and causal controllability (Weiner, 2000, 2010). Causal locus refers to the cause 
being located inside or outside the agent, causal stability refers to the cause being considered 
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stable or unstable, while causal controllability refers to the cause being volitional or not (Folkes, 
1984; Weiner, 2000, 2010). These causal properties affect customers’ emotional and behavioral 
reactions (Weiner, 2000, 2010). 
Attribution theory holds a temporal dimension since attributions are made regarding 
something that has already happened, which means they are related to past events. Such causal 
attributions are referred to as retrospective control by Thompson (1981). Also, causal stability 
refers to a future expectation, in other words, it refers to an expectation about the probability of 
an event happening again. Attribution theory’s researchers argue that interpretations of what 
happened in the past will determine what will be done in the future (Folkes, 1984, Weiner, 
2010). Even so, attribution theory does not have the same temporal structure as the one from 
Frazier and colleagues’ model. Attribution theory does not consider actual emotions derived 
from a stressful event (present control) and even though it includes cognitions about past and 
future, it does this in a different way than is done in Frazier and colleagues’ temporal model. 
While attribution theory approaches causal locus, considering who was the responsible 
for a failure, the temporal model does not question who caused the stressful event. The temporal 
model through its past control concept measures the perceived possibility of having prevented 
the stressful event occurrence. In other words, attribution theory asks “Who caused x?” While 
the temporal model asks “Could I have prevented x?” 
Besides, the temporal model does not consider the causal stability and causal 
controllability properties as the attribution theory does, but it considers a person’s control 
perceptions over stressful events, his/her current emotions, and perceived future likelihood.  
 
 
3.4 TEMPORAL MODEL OF PERCEIVED CONTROL VERSUS APPRAISAL MODEL 
 
There are also some similarities and differences between the temporal model of 
perceived control and the appraisal model from Emotion Theory. For instance, appraisals also 
account for a temporal perspective. Self- and other-accountability appraisals refer to the past as 
they represent a judgment about who was responsible for an event or outcome that has already 
happened. Problem- and emotion-focused coping potential appraisals may refer to the present 
since they are personal evaluations about one’s current ability to cope by either acting upon the 
problem or changing one’s own cognitions to feel better. Future expectancies appraisals refer 
to the future while motivational relevance and motivational congruence could refer to past, 
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present, or future, depending whether the situation has already impacted, is currently impacting, 
or is expected to impact personal goals. 
Appraisals’ temporal perspective is different from the one of perceived control though. 
The questions posed by appraisals and perceived control are not the same. Past control does not 
ask who is the responsible for an event, as accountability does, but rather if oneself could have 
prevented it. Present control does not ask whether one is able to change interpretations, desires, 
or beliefs about a situation to feel better, as emotion-focused coping potential does, but rather 
whether one can control one´s current emotions and thoughts about a situation. Although both 
definitions look quite similar, there has been no significant correlation between these two 
variables in the studies conducted to compare these models (studies that will be presented later 
in this chapter). Neither future control nor future likelihood addresses future changes that can 
make the situation more or less consistent with one’s goals as future expectancies do. Instead, 
future control measures if one perceives oneself able to prevent the situation from happening 
again while future likelihood measures if the situation is (un)likely to reoccur.  
Causal locus attribution and accountability appraisals seem to dichotomize causal locus 
and responsibility: the blame is either on oneself or on another person/thing. This either/or 
approach can be expanded by using the temporal model of perceived control. Imagine that 
people can report high past control even when they think the company is the one to blame (e.g., 
“the company was wrong on doing that, but I could have prevented the terrible outcome if I had 
done this”). This makes the temporal model of perceived control a handy resource to analyze 
stressful situations differently than attributions and appraisals do. 
Perhaps one of the best contributions of the temporal model of perceived control as 
compared with the attribution and appraisal models is to provide the opportunity to investigate 
the individual’s role when he is neither the cause (external causal attribution) nor the 
responsible (other-accountability appraisal) for a stressful situation. Even in such situations, 
individuals may ruminate about their control to prevent (either in the past or in the future) an 
undesirable outcome. 
Next section shows how perceived control has been studied in consumer behavior 
literature. 
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3.5 PERCEIVED CONTROL IN CONSUMER BEHAVIOR LITERATURE 
 
A great number of studies about perceived control in consumer behavior literature 
measures perceptions of control over a situation that has already occurred or that is being 
presented in the form of a scenario (e.g., Hui & Bateson, 1991; Hui & Toffoli, 2002; Rompay 
et al., 2008). This form of investigating perceived control may be comparable with past control. 
But most of these studies do not measure perceived control over the occurrence of a stressful 
event, so, they do not measure past control in the exact same way Frazier et al. (2011, 2012, 
2001) did. Even though, analyzing studies about customer perceived control may help to 
understand the role of perceived control in consumer behavior. 
Hui and Bateson (1991) tested perceived control as a mediator of the density-pleasure 
and choice-pleasure relationships. These authors described a third person service encounter, 
manipulating the possibility of avoiding a crowded service environment. Participants who 
reported greater perceived control also reported greater pleasure with the experience and, 
consequently, showed approach behavior. 
Rompay et al. (2008) tested a model similar to the one of Hui and Bateson (1991), with 
perceived control as a mediator of the relationship between two density types and pleasure. 
Perceived control over a described situation was measured. Rompay et al.’s (2008) results were 
similar to those found by Hui and Bateson (1991): positive effect of perceived control on 
pleasure and positive effect of pleasure on approach behavior. 
In Bolkan, Goodboy, and Daly's (2010) study, customers were encouraged to write a 
complaint letter to an organization. These authors measured perceived control of customers 
who received a letter in response to their complaints, using as a measure for perceived control 
the impact those customers perceived to have over the organization. The authors found evidence 
that perceived control is positively related to satisfaction with the response letter and intention 
to do business with such organizations in the future. 
In Chang's (2008) study, there was also evidence of a positive relationship between 
perceived control and satisfaction. The author simulated a service failure and gave participants 
the opportunity to choose among three service recovery options. This author explains that the 
possibility to choose has increased the sense of control and satisfaction with the service 
recovery and the service general experience. Pacheco et al. (2013) also found a positive 
relationship between perceived control and satisfaction when testing a model in which 
perceived control mediated the co-production and satisfaction relationship. 
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Dabholkar and Sheng (2009) manipulated situations of download delays in a Web site, 
measuring perceived control over its use. These authors identified a positive effect of perceived 
control on attitude towards the Web site and intention to use it. Dellaert and Dabholkar (2009) 
found a similar effect of perceived control over intention to use mass customization Web sites. 
Hui and Toffoli (2002) conducted a survey using the critical incident technique to 
investigate perceived control over a performed service and its effects on customer causal 
attributions. These authors showed that customers with higher perceived control level tended 
to make more internal than external attributions (i.e., attribute more to him or herself the cause 
of an incident than to the service company) compared to those customers with lower perceived 
control level. 
Among all studies cited in this section, only Hui and Bateson’s (1991) study presented 
the opportunity to avoid the occurrence of a potentially stressful event, following the past 
control logic from Frazier et al. (2011, 2012, 2001). Hui and Bateson (1991) told participants 
they could avoid a crowded service environment by leaving it and returning another time for 
the service encounter. Nevertheless, they did not tell participants they had this opportunity but 
missed it by not avoiding the crowded service encounter, as it would be the case if the authors 
had tried to apply the exact past control concept of Frazier and colleagues.  
Among the studies cited in this section, the one of Bolkan et al. (2010) was the closest 
to a present control investigation (i.e., investigation about current emotional reactions derived 
from a stressful event that have occurred). The complaint letter written by customers may be 
considered a way of dealing with consequences of a stressful event. The authors, though, 
measured perceived control over the organization instead of measuring perceived control over 
current thoughts and emotions derived from the stressful event, moving away from what Frazier 
et al. (2011, 2012, 2001) consider to be present control. According to these latter authors, 
present control was the only component of the temporal model that was not associated with 
control over the occurrence of the stressful event itself, but was associated with the 
consequences of the event instead. 
We did not find any study that taps into the future control from Frazier and colleagues’ 
temporal model. In other words, no study about customer perceived control over future 
recurrence of a stressful event was found. 
Next section discusses the impact of the cognitions we have been addressing so far (i.e., 
attributions, appraisals, and perceived control) on customer emotional reactions to service 
failures. The reactions following attributions and appraisals have been already addressed in 
other studies, but the reactions according to this temporal model of perceived control have not. 
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3.6 CUSTOMER EMOTIONAL REACTIONS 
 
There are different concepts associated with individuals’ emotional reactions, such as 
affect, mood, feelings, sentiments, and emotions. The literature is inconsistent in terms of 
definitions for these concepts and precise boundaries among them (Bagozzi, Gopinath, & Nyer, 
1999; Wiles & Cornwell, 1991). Sometimes feelings and emotions are even used as synonyms 
(Wiles & Cornwell, 1991) 
Emotions may be seen as an affective reaction to a specific cause (e.g., a person or 
situation) (Pieters & Van Raaij, 1988), but there is no consensus about a precise definition of 
emotions (Frijda, 1988). Due to this difficulty to define emotions, some authors seek to explain 
their main features (Richins, 1997). According to Clore, Ortony, and Foss (1987) and Ortony, 
Clore, and Foss (1987), emotions refer to internal mental conditions (as opposed to external 
nonmental/physical conditions), predominantly focused on affect (as opposed to cognition and 
behavior). Emotions arise from thoughts/attributions (Weiner, 2010) or cognitive appraisals of 
events and often result in actions (behavioral reactions) to affirm or cope with them (Bagozzi 
et al., 1999). 
Feelings are conceptually similar to emotions, but less intense (Aaker, Stayman, & 
Vézina, 1988). From a list of 31 feelings that could be elicited by advertising presented by 
Aaker et al. (1988), some of them are the same words referred to by other authors as emotions. 
For instance, Aaker et al. (1988) mention “fear” and “anxious” as feelings, while “fear” and 
“anxiety” are mentioned by Richins (2013) as emotions. Likewise, “irritated” is a feeling 
mentioned by Aaker et al. (1988) and also one of the items used by Richins (1997) to measure 
the emotion of anger. 
Another word related to feelings and emotions is the word sentiments. According to 
Frijda, Mesquita, Sonnemans, and Van Goozen (1991), the structures of emotions and 
sentiments are very similar, that is the reason why some terms are used by both – and probably 
this is also the case for emotions and feelings. The authors explain that it is difficult to define 
the duration of emotions. It could last hours, days or even months (with interruptions). But, it 
has a duration component that is not so present in the case of sentiments. Sentiments are 
relatively more enduring, they are emotional dispositions (Frijda et al., 1991). In a study 
measuring emotions and sentiments before and after a stimulus, Prado, Souza, Ribeiro, and 
Santos (2007) found more variation in emotions, corroborating the notion that sentiments are 
less intense and last longer than emotions.  
40 
 
Mood is also related to emotions. As in the case of sentiments, mood is also considered 
to be less intense and lasts longer than emotions (Bagozzi et al., 1999; Pieters & Van Raaij, 
1988; Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008). Contrary to emotions and 
sentiments, which are responses to a specific object (e.g., person or situation), mood is a 
relatively continuous state without a specified object (Frijda et al., 1991). 
Another concept related to emotion is affect. Affect is a generic term functioning as an 
umbrella for more specific terms such as emotions and mood, among others (Bagozzi et al., 
1999; Pieters & Van Raaij, 1988; Wiles & Cornwell, 1991; Zeelenberg et al., 2008). The main 
feature of affect is valence (positive vs. negative) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; 
Zeelenberg et al., 2008). Emotions are affective phenomena because they can be categorized 
into positive or negative (Zeelenberg et al., 2008). Positive affect refers to the extent to which 
one feels enthusiastic while negative affect refers to a variety of aversive mood states such as 
anger, guilt, fear, etc. (Watson et al., 1988). One of the items used by Watson et al. (1988) to 
measure negative affect is the word “irritable”, which is similar to the word “irritated” 
mentioned by Aaker et al. (1988) as a feeling and used by Richins (1997) to measure the 
emotion of anger. This shows how difficult it is to distinguish and measure these different 
concepts when conducting empirical studies.  
This chapter accounts for specific customer affective reactions following service failure. 
In other words, the present investigation refers to negative emotional reactions from customers 
in face of service failures. Emotions influence individuals’ actions and are crucial for decision 
making (Bagozzi et al., 1999; Zeelenberg et al., 2008), that is why they are so important for 
customer behavior and service management studies. 
When customers face service failures, negative emotions (rather than positive emotions) 
are prone to be evoked. Negative emotions usually are experienced when a person’s current 
state is worse than initially expected (Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000). 
Such emotions are usually affected by causal attributions (Weiner, 2010) and appraisals (Smith 
et al., 1993) made by individuals. But it was already mentioned that perceived control may 
affect people’s emotional reactions as well (Hui & Bateson, 1991; Rompay et al., 2008).  
From a plethora of negative emotions that customers may experience, this literature 
review will focus on two: regret and anger (although other emotions such as disappointment, 
guilt, and fear will be part of the empirical studies as well). The reason for focusing on only 
two emotions during the literature review is to provide the readers with a glance about how the 
temporal model of perceived control may affect customers’ emotions. But the “how” is not the 
focus of this chapter. The purpose of this article is to check “if” the model affects customers’ 
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emotions, comparing the magnitude of its effects with the effects of attributions and appraisals 
– which will be done in studies 1A, 1B, and 1C – and check whether the model of perceived 
control may be combined with attributions to investigate service failures – which will be done 
in study 2.  
Regret and anger were chosen over guilt, disappointment, and fear to be part of this 
section for three reasons: First, because of the relevance of these emotions. Regret is the 
negative emotion most frequently experienced (Saffrey, Summerville, & Roese, 2008; 
Shimanoff, 1984). Besides, regret (together with disappointment) is the emotion most closely 
related to decision making (i.e., prototypical decision-related emotion) (Martinez, Zeelenberg, 
& Rijsman, 2011; Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002). Anger, in turn, is deemed to be the dominant 
emotional reaction following service dissatisfaction, better predicting post-purchase behavior 
than any other negative affective state (Kalamas, Laroche, & Makdessian, 2008). Second, 
because these two emotions appear to be the most likely emotional consequences from the 
temporal model of perceived control we want to test. The potential link between this model and 
these two emotions will be explored in this section. Third, because one of them is more self-
focused (regret) while the other is more other-focused (anger). This enables to cover a broader 
aspect of how the model may affect emotional reactions compared to using only self-focused 
or other-focused emotions. 
Regret is a self-blame emotion derived from the comparison of a current situation to one 
that would have been better had the agent decided differently in the past (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 
2007). This comparison of a current situation with what might have been is known as 
counterfactual thinking (Zeelenberg et al., 1998). Anger is an other-focused emotion 
represented by a strong feeling of displeasure, hostility, and desire to attack the source of anger 
(Bonifield & Cole, 2007), often associated with aggressiveness (Averill, 1983). 
Weiner (2010) associates guilt and regret with internal controllable attributions while 
Smith et al. (1993) associates guilt to motivationally relevant, motivationally incongruent, and 
self-accountability appraisals. Even though Smith and colleagues do not explain which would 
be the appraisal patterns for regret, we may infer that it would be the same patters mentioned 
for guilt. We may infer such thing because both emotions imply self-blame (Smith et al., 1993; 
Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), being very similar to each other except for the fact that guilt is 
predominantly experienced in situations of interpersonal harm (negative outcomes for others), 
while regret is experienced in both interpersonal and intrapersonal harm (negative outcomes for 
the self) situations (Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 2008). Since we are concerned with negative 
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outcomes for the self (i.e., service failures), we keep focused on influences on regret rather than 
guilt. 
Considering that regret is associated with an internal controllable cause for a failure 
(Weiner, 2010), self-accountability (Smith et al., 1993), and is experienced when a person 
thinks his/her situation would be better if he/she had taken different decisions in the past 
(Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), it is logical to infer that the more a person thinks he/she could 
have prevented a stressful consumption experience from happening (high past control), the 
more regret this person will experience. So, customers who perceived they could have 
prevented a service failure tend to experience regret.  
While regret is associated with internal controllable attributions, anger is associated with 
external controllable attributions (Bougie et al., 2003; Folkes, 1984; Weiner, 2000). Besides 
being associated with a situation controllable by others, anger is positively related to customers’ 
belief that the firm tried to maximize its own interests and took advantage of the customer 
(Joireman et al., 2013). So, a customer who perceives a company to have control over a stressful 
situation should experience anger.  
However, customer’s own perceived control could have some influence on the extent to 
which s/he blames the service company. According to the results from Hui and Toffoli (2002), 
the more customers perceive to have control over a service encounter, the less these customers 
will be inclined to make company-focused causal attributions. Weiner (1995) argues that 
responsibility is closely related to control. According to the author, a driver may cause a car 
accident because he or she had a heart attack (something the driver cannot control). In such 
case, we may attribute the cause of the accident to the driver but we cannot say he/she is 
responsible for the accident since he or she had no control over it. Caouette, Wohl, and Peetz 
(2012) consider this close relationship between responsibility and control by stating that the 
higher the control a person perceives to have over his or her actions, the more responsible he or 
she feels. These authors also found evidence supporting this control-responsibility relationship. 
Based on Caouette et al.'s (2012) study, customer perceived past control over stressful 
service failures should lead to perceived personal responsibility over it and, according to Hui 
and Toffoli (2002), such control could also attenuate responsibility attributed to the service 
company. So, customers whose perceived past control over a stressful service is high could 
attribute less responsibility to the service company, experiencing less anger toward the 
company.  
Since present control refers to control over current impacts from a stressful event that 
has already happened (Frazier et al., 2011, 2001), present control could be negatively related to 
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negative emotions derived from a stressful service failure. Therefore, the higher a customer’s 
perceived present control, the less intense the negative emotions experienced by this customer 
should be. A similar negative relationship between present control and distress was reported by 
Frazier et al. (2011, 2001).  
Concerning perceived future control, it has not been proven to affect people’s emotion 
reactions directly, but rather to affect future likelihood, which in turn would affect emotional 
reactions (Frazier et al., 2012). Perceived future control is negatively related to perceived future 
likelihood of an event recurrence, which in turn is positively related to distress (Frazier et al., 
2012). It means that the more a person perceives he or she can prevent an event from happening 
again, the smaller should be the perceived future likelihood of its recurrence. And the more 
likely the recurrence of a stressful event, the more distress a person should experience. The 
same relationship may be expected in stressful service contexts.  
 
 
3.7 CUSTOMER BEHAVIORAL REACTIONS 
 
Both experienced and anticipated emotions – future emotions that one expects to 
experience – may influence customer behavior (Zeelenberg et al., 2000). The investigations 
conducted in this chapter focus on experienced emotions as they refer to emotional reactions to 
a stressful service episode that already happened. 
The experience of regret and anger may lead to a variety of customer behavioral 
reactions. Regret may lead to switch behavior (Cho & Song, 2012; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 1999). 
Anger may lead to desire for revenge, complaint and negative word-of-mouth behaviors 
(Bougie et al., 2003; Grégoire et al., 2010; Joireman et al., 2013; Weiner, 2000). 
Although customer behavioral reactions are very important to service marketing and 
consumer behavior literature, no hypotheses regarding such reactions were formulated. This is 
because the impact of emotions such as regret and anger on behavioral reactions  have been 
widely investigated in previous studies (e.g., Bougie et al., 2003; Cho & Song, 2012; Grégoire 
et al., 2010; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 1999, 2004). But besides investigating the influence of the 
three cognitive models (perceived control, attributions, and appraisals) on emotions, the studies 
in this chapter also check for potential direct influences of the cognitive models on customer 
behavioral reactions. Next sections explore the studies conducted to investigate the impact of 
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the temporal model of perceived control on emotional and behavioral reactions as well as to 
compare this model with the traditionally used attribution and appraisal models. 
 
 
3.8 STUDY 1 
 
Study 1 investigates whether the temporal model of perceived control is relevant for 
stressful service encounters by investigating the explanatory power of attributions, appraisals, 
and perceived control for customer emotional and behavioral responses. Study 1 is divided into 
studies 1A, 1B, and 1C. There are few differences among these studies regarding sample and 
measures. 
 
 
3.8.1 Study 1A: Procedure  
 
A survey was conducted with participants from an online panel of the Ghent University, 
who were asked to remember and describe a stressful service episode they had experienced. 
Total sample size was 62 (87% women, Mage=29.86, SDage=12.39) after deleting respondents 
that showed at least one of the following characteristics: 
 Incorrect answer for the attention question (1 respondent). In this attention 
question, participants were told to choose option number 2;  
 Described situations unrelated to service failure (1 respondent); 
 Described situations that were not stressful (19 respondents). Stress was 
measured with a 7-point scale (1 = not at all to 7 = very strongly) in which 4 
was the neutral point. All the situations rated below 5 were considered to be not 
stressful and were deleted.1  
                                                 
 
1 The reason for using only stressful situations (i.e., situations rated as 5, 6, or 7 in the stress scale) is because the 
temporal model of perceived control was specifically developed to understand individuals’ response to these 
situations. One could use only situations rated as 7 in the stress scale, which would represent extreme stressful 
situations. We chose to use situations equal or above 5 because we wanted to keep the context of stressful situations 
without the necessity of working only with extreme stress. Frazier and colleagues do not restrict the use of their 
scale to extreme stress. 
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After the service failure description, participants filled out several scales intended to 
measure the temporal model of perceived control, attributions, appraisals, and emotional and 
behavioral reactions. These scales are presented in table 1, in the same order they were asked 
in the questionnaire. 
 
Table 1 – Measures from study 1A 
Name of the variable, Cronbach 
alpha or correlation, source 
Item(s) 
Regret, α=.73, Yi and Baumgartner 
(2004) 
1) Regretful 
2) Should have known better 
3) Should have made a different choice 
Anger, α=.84, Yi and Baumgartner 
(2004) 
1) Angry 
2) Mad 
3) Furious 
Guilt 1) Guilty 
Fear 1) Fearful 
Actual complaining behavior 1) I have complained to the company 
Complaining intention, Zeithaml, 
Berry, and Parasuraman (1996) 
1) It is likely that I will complaint to the company’s employees if I 
experience another problem with the company’s services in the future 
Actual switch behavior 1) I switched to another service provider after the event 
Switch intention, Zeithaml et al. 
(1996) 
1) I will do less business with this company in the next few years 
Actual negative word-of-mouth 
(NWOM) behavior, α=.82, 
Joireman et al. (2013) 
1) I spread negative word-of-mouth about the firm 
2) I denigrated the firm to my friends 
3) When my friends were looking for a similar product or service, I told 
them not to buy from this firm 
Negative word-of-mouth (NWOM) 
intention, α=.82, Schoefer and 
Diamantopoulos (2008) 
1) It is likely that I will tell others about the negative service I received 
2) It is likely that I will warn friends and relatives not to buy from this 
company 
3) It is likely that I complain to friends and relatives about this company 
Desire for revenge, α=.94, 
Joireman et al. (2013) 
Because of this incident… 
1) I wanted to punish the firm in some way 
2) I wanted to cause inconvenience to the firm 
3) I wanted to get even with the service firm 
4) I wanted to make the service firm get what it deserved 
5) I wanted to make them pay for the poor service 
Causal locus attribution, α=.71, 
Russell (1982) 
The cause is something… 
1) That reflects an aspect of yourself / That does not reflect an aspect of 
yourself 
2) Inside of you / Outside of you 
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3) Something about you / Something about others 
Causal stability attribution, α=.612, 
Russell (1982) 
The cause is something… 
1) Permanent / Temporary. 
2) Stable over time / variable over time 
3) Unchangeable / Changeable 
Causal controllability attribution, 
α=.203, Russell (1982) 
The cause is something… 
1) Controllable by you or other people / Uncontrollable by you or other 
people 
2) Intended by you or other people / Unintended by you or other people 
3) No one is responsible / Someone is responsible  
Motivational (Goal) relevance 
appraisal4 
1) To what extent does the situation touch your goals and concerns 
Motivational (Goal) congruence 
appraisal, r=.69 
1) To what extent do you consider the situation consistent with your 
goals 
2) To what extent do you consider the situation something good for your 
goals 
Self-accountability appraisal, 
Smith et al. (1993) 
1) To what extent do you consider yourself responsible for this situation 
Other-accountability appraisal, 
Smith et al. (1993) 
1) To what extent do you consider someone else responsible for this 
situation 
Problem-focused coping potential 
appraisal 
1) To what extent do you consider yourself able to act directly upon the 
situation to make it better 
Emotion-focused coping potential 
appraisal 
1) To what extent do you consider yourself able to change 
interpretations, desires, or beliefs about the situation to feel better 
Future expectancies appraisal 1) Indicate your expectancies about future changes that can make the 
situation more or less consistent with your goals 
Past control, α=.80, Frazier et al. 
(2011) 
1) I could have done something to prevent this event from happening 
2) There is nothing I could have done to prevent this event from 
occurring (R) 
3) This event happened because of something I did or didn’t do 
4) I didn’t have any control over the event occurring (R) 
                                                 
 
2 The Cronbach Alpha increases to .69 by deleting the third item, but we chose to keep all three items for analysis 
because we do not think that a change from .61 to .69 is big enough to justify the exclusion of one item.  
3 The Cronbach Alpha did not increase by deleting one of the items. Due to the extremely low Cronbach Alpha 
and the fact that each item seems to measure a different thing (i.e., controllability, intention, and responsibility), 
only the first item of causal controllability attribution was used in the statistical analysis.  
4 Except for self- and other-accountability appraisals, the items used by Smith et al. (1993) and Smith and Lazarus 
(1993) to measure appraisals were not disclosed. For this reason, all the appraisals from this study (except for self- 
and other-accountability appraisals) were created based on Smith and colleagues’ definitions of each appraisal and 
followed the same amount of items used by the authors in their study. 
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5) I couldn’t have prevented it (R) 
Present control, α=.72, Frazier et 
al. (2011) 
1) There isn’t much I can do to help myself feel better about the event 
(R) 
2) How I deal with this event now is under my control 
3) I don’t have much control over my emotional reactions to the event 
(R) 
4) When I am upset about the event, I can find a way to feel better 
5) I have control over my day-to-day reactions to this event 
6) There isn’t much I can do to keep the event from affecting me (R) 
7) I have control over how I think about the event 
8) My reaction to the event is not under my control (R) 
Future control, α=.83, Frazier et al. 
(2011) 
1) I can do things to make sure I will not experience a similar event in 
the future 
2) There is nothing I can do to prevent a similar event from happening 
again (R) 
3) I have no control over whether a similar event happens to me again 
(R) 
4) There are things I can do to reduce the risk that a similar event will 
happen again 
Future likelihood, α=.93, Frazier et 
al. (2012) 
1) I fully expect something similar to happen to me again 
2) I will not experience something like this again (R) 
3) I’m sure something similar will happen to me again 
4) I don’t expect something like this to happen to me again (R) 
5) I don’t believe I will ever experience this sort of thing again (R) 
Obs. Scales were translated into Dutch (participant’s native language) by specialists (i.e., marketing professor and 
PhD students) who were native Dutch speakers fluent in English. 
 
Smith et al. (1993) measured appraisals and core relational themes, using both measures 
in their regression analyses to compare with attributions. They compared attributions vs. 
appraisals, attributions vs. core relational themes, and attributions vs. appraisals plus core 
relational themes. According to these authors, appraisals form core relational themes which in 
turn affect emotions. We chose to measure only appraisals for two reasons: 1) Core relational 
themes represent the pattern of answer to the appraisal questions (Smith et al., 1993). For 
instance, the core relational theme of other-blame is measured by items such as “Someone else 
is to blame for the bad situation I'm in” and is composed by appraisals that refer to other-
accountability and are motivationally relevant and incongruent. So, the core relational theme is 
measured by at least three items, but it represents some appraisals, which are also measured by 
other items. Thus, it seems redundant to measure both. 2) Appraisals and attributions are more 
similar to each other than the core relational themes and attributions are. Thus, we chose to use 
only appraisals (rather than appraisals and core relational themes) in our studies. 
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3.8.2 Study 1A: Results 
 
The situation that was deleted for being unrelated to a service failure consisted of a 
question about companies listed on the stock exchange. The service failures described involved 
banks, bike repair shops, retail stores, hairdressers, health professionals (i.e., dentists and 
physicians), health insurance companies, telephone companies, internet companies, energy 
companies, cleaning service, public transport, among others. Some examples of the failures are 
rude treatment, long waiting time, poor service, and unfulfilled promises.  
Multiple regression analyses containing past, present, and future control and future 
likelihood as independent variables (IVs) were conducted to every possible dependent variable 
(DV) in this study (i.e., all the emotions and behaviors measured in the study). The same was 
done with attributions as IVs and with appraisals as IVs. This is also how Smith et al. (1993) 
compared attributions and appraisals in their study. 
Before proceeding to the main results of such analyses, indicators of collinearity were 
examined. Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (2005) claim that the first indicator of 
collinearity is the presence of high correlations (r>.90) among the IVs. The highest correlation 
for the temporal model of perceived control was the one between past and future control (r=.80). 
The other correlations for this model were below .30. Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for 
the temporal model of perceived control. Correlations among locus, stability, and controllability 
attributions were below .20 while correlations among the seven appraisals were below .50. 
 
Table 2 – Correlation matrix: temporal model of perceived control (study 1A) 
 Past Control Present Control Future Control Future Likelihood 
  Past Control 1.00 .16 .80*** -.14 
Present Control .16 1.00 .15 -.01 
Future Control .80*** .15 1.00 -.28* 
Future Likelihood -.14 -.01 -.28* 1.00 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 
Other indicators of collinearity are low tolerance values (.10) and high variance inflation 
factor values (VIF>10). Tolerance values for past and future control were .36 and .33 
respectively, while VIF values were below 3. Tolerance values for future likelihood and present 
control were above .90 while VIF values were below 2. According to the reference values 
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suggested by Hair et al. (2005), there is no evidence of collinearity for the IVs of the temporal 
model of perceived control. Tolerance values for attributions were above .90 while VIF values 
were below 2. Tolerance values for appraisals were above .50 while VIF values were below 2. 
Therefore, no evidence of collinearity for attributions and appraisals either. 
The correlations between the temporal model of perceived control and (a) the attribution 
model and (b) the appraisal model are presented in tables 3 and 4 respectively. The highest 
correlation among components of perceived control and attributions was between past control 
and causal locus attribution (r=-.45). The highest correlation among components of perceived 
control and appraisals was between past control and self-accountability (r=.57). The fact that 
the components of the temporal model of perceived control are not highly correlated with 
attributions and appraisals reinforces the idea that this model is different from what has already 
been used in consumer behavior literature. 
 
Table 3 – Correlation matrix: temporal model of perceived control and attribution model (study 1A) 
 Past Control Present Control Future Control Future Likelihood 
  Locus -.45*** .02 -.30* .06 
Stability .04 -.11 .02 .01 
Controllability -.07 -.05 .12 -.18 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 
Table 4 – Correlation matrix: temporal model of perceived control and appraisal model (study 1A) 
 Past Control Present Control Future Control Future Likelihood 
  Relevance -.12 -.02 -.15 .28* 
  Congruence .09 -.14 .20 -.14 
  
Self-accountability .57*** .04 .50*** -.04 
Other-accountability -.30** -.22 -.27* -.04 
Problem-focused coping 
potential 
.10 -.16 .25 -.27* 
Emotion-focused coping 
potential 
.27* .13 .21 .02 
Future expectancies .15 .12 .14 -.44*** 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 
Multiple regression analyses showed that, according to expectations, the temporal 
model of perceived control was significantly related to the experience of regret (R²=.33, p<.001) 
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and anger (R²=.22, p<.01). Tables 5 and 6 show the regression coefficients for regret and anger 
as functions of perceived control. 
  
Table 5 – Regret as a function of perceived control (study 1A) 
 β SE t p 
 
Past Control .47 .23 2.61 .012 
Present Control -.02 .22 -.20 .842 
Future Control .14 .22 .74 .461 
Future Likelihood .07 .13 .65 .521 
 
 
Table 6 – Anger as a function of perceived control (study 1A) 
 β SE t p 
 
Past Control -.34 .19 -1.73 .089 
Present Control -.41 .18 -3.44 .001 
Future Control .38 .18 1.89 .064 
Future Likelihood .11 .11 .90 .373 
 
Table 7 compares the explanatory power of each cognitive model (temporal model of 
perceived control, attribution model, and appraisal model) in the same way Smith et al. 1993 
compared attributions and appraisals. In the first three numerical columns of the table, R² was 
transformed into percentages (i.e., R² values were multiplied by 100), representing percentages 
of each emotion variance explained by the three cognitive models. The last two columns show 
the extra percentage of emotion variance explained when the components of the temporal model 
of perceived control are added as additional IVs on the multiple regression analyses containing 
attributions and appraisals as IVs. It is important to notice that these last two columns show just 
the extra explanation (i.e., the unique contribution of perceived control) when adding perceived 
control first to the attributions and then to the appraisals. It was computed as follows: R² from 
regression with both the temporal model of perceived control and attribution (or appraisal) 
model minus the R² from the regression only with attribution (or appraisal) model. The result 
was multiplied by 100.  
When regressing each emotion, we used all the four components from the temporal 
model of perceived control (i.e., past control, present control, future control, and future 
likelihood) as independent variables (k=4). Similar, we regressed each emotion on all the three 
attributions (locus, stability, and controllability, k=3). But when regressing emotions on 
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appraisals, just the three appraisals related to each emotion were used as independent variables: 
congruence, relevance, and self-accountability in case of regret and guilt; congruence, 
relevance, and other-accountability in case of anger; congruence, relevance, and emotion-
focused coping potential in case of fear. This was the same procedure adopted by Smith et al. 
(1993).  
 
Table 7 – Emotions explanation by each of the cognitive models (study 1A) 
  
% emotion variance explained by each 
approach (R² x 100) 
Extra % emotion variance 
explained from adding: 
Emotion 
Perceived 
control        
(k=4) 
Attributions 
(k=3) 
Appraisals  
(k=3) 
Perceived 
control to 
Attributions 
Perceived 
Control to 
Appraisals 
Regret 33*** 11 26*** 26** 13*** 
Anger 22** 2 18** 22* 20*** 
Guilt 13 12 33*** 9 3** 
Fear 8 20** 12* 6* 8 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  
k corresponds to the number of independent variables used in the multiple regression analyses.  
 
Based on table 7, the temporal model of perceived control may be much better than the 
attribution model to explain regret and anger. While perceived control explained 33% of regret 
variance (p<.001), attributions explained 11% of regret variance (p>.05). When adding 
perceived control to attributions, the explanation of regret more than triples, increasing from 
11% to 37%, which means an increase of 236%. This last number is not the one we are 
interested in. Appraisals explained 26% of regret variance, which was similar in significance 
(p<.001) to the variance explained by the temporal model. The extra 13% of variance explained 
obtained by adding the temporal model of perceived control to appraisals represents a 50% 
increase from the original 26% variance explained by appraisals.  
Perceived control explained 22% of anger variance (p<.01) while attributions had a non-
significant 2% explanation for this emotion. By adding perceived control to attributions, there 
is an extra 22% of variance explanation, hitting a total of 24% of anger variance explained 
(p<.05). Anger variance explanation was similar in significance for the temporal model of 
perceived control and the appraisal model (p<.01). By adding perceived control to appraisals, 
there is an extra 20% of variance explanation.  
Appraisals explained 33% (p<.001) of guilt variance, explaining it better than perceived 
control (R²=.13, p>.05) and attributions (R²=.12, p>.05). Attributions explained fear (R²=.20, 
p<.01) better than perceived control (R²=.08, p>.05) and appraisals (R²=.12, p<.05). Figure 4 
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shows emotion variance explained when regressed on the attribution model and temporal model 
of perceived control. The overlap of variance explained provided by the graphic allows to check 
for the unique contribution of perceived control. 
 
Figure 4 – Emotions variance explained by attributions + perceived control (study 1A) 
 
 
Figure 4 makes it clear that the temporal model of perceived control may be an important 
tool to understand customers’ emotional reaction after a service failure when combined with 
the well-known causal attribution model. The larger contribution of the temporal model of 
perceived control seems to refer to regret and anger variance explanation. The same type of 
graph was made for the appraisal model plus the temporal model of perceived control (see 
figure 5). The unique contribution of the temporal model of perceived control is smaller when 
combined with the appraisal model than when associated with the attribution model. 
Nevertheless, it may still be helpful to understand the variance of different emotions (especially 
of regret and anger). 
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Figure 5 – Emotions variance explained by appraisals + perceived control (study 1A) 
 
 
The same analyses were conducted considering actual and intended behaviors as DVs. 
Since there was no specific appraisal related to customer behavioral intentions (Smith and 
colleagues only observed emotion variance explanation), all the seven appraisals were included 
in regression analyses to investigate how much of the variance in behavior they explain. Table 
8 shows percentages of behavior variance explained by each of the cognitive models. 
 
Table 8 – Behaviors explanation by each of the cognitive models (study 1A) 
  
% emotion variance explained by each 
approach (R² x 100) 
Extra % emotion variance 
explained from adding: 
Behavior 
Perceived 
control        
(k=4) 
Attributions 
(k=3) 
Appraisals 
(k=7) 
Perceived 
control to 
Attributions 
Perceived 
Control to 
Appraisals 
Switch (actual) 27** 7 11 23** 23* 
Switch (intention) 18* 2 21 18 11* 
NWOM (actual) 12 2 25* 13 5* 
NWOM (intention) 15* 6 43*** 13 3*** 
Complaint (actual) 4 3 33** 6 3* 
Complaint (intention) 6 6 30** 10 5* 
Desire for revenge 7 3 25* 7 1 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  
k corresponds to the number of independent variables used in the multiple regression analyses.  
 
We see in table 8 that the attribution model alone had no significant explanatory power 
for actual and intended behaviors after a stressful service. But the temporal model of perceived 
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control and the appraisal model had. The temporal model of perceived control could 
significantly explain the variance of actual switch behavior (R²=.27), switch intention (R²=.18), 
and negative word-of-mouth intention (R²=.15). Appraisals could significantly explain 
variances on actual (R²=.25) and intended negative word-of-mouth (R²=.43), actual (R²=.33) 
and intended complaint (R²=.30), and desire for revenge (R²=.25).  
Figure 6 shows behaviors variance explained when regressing behavior on the 
attribution model plus the temporal model of perceived control. Figure 7 shows the same for 
the appraisal model plus the temporal model of perceived control. We visualize in figures 6 and 
7 that the temporal model of perceived control may have an important contribution to explain 
customer behavior after a stressful service episode, especially when it comes to switch behavior. 
 
Figure 6 – Behaviors variance explained by attributions + perceived control (study 1A) 
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Figure 7 – Behaviors variance explained by appraisals + perceived control (study 1A) 
 
 
Instead of using the explained variance (R²) in emotions and behaviors to compare 
perceived control, attributions, and appraisals, table 9 uses the values of the standardized betas 
(β) from the multiple regressions to show the share of explanation of each approach. For 
instance, in the case of regret regressed on the four variables of the temporal model of perceived 
control (i.e., past control, present control, future control, and future likelihood) plus the three 
attribution variables (i.e., locus, stability, and controllability), the share of explanation of the 
attribution model was computed by dividing the sum of the standardized betas of locus, 
stability, and controllability by the sum of all standardized betas of the regression. The division 
result was turned into a percentage (i.e., multiplied by 100). All the standardized betas were 
previously turned into positive numbers (i.e., negative betas were multiplied by -1). 
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Table 9 – Share of explanation according to the standardized betas (study 1A) 
 
Attributions + Perceived 
control 
Appraisals + Perceived 
control 
 Attributions 
Perceived 
control Appraisals  
Perceived 
control 
Regret 25% 75% 46% 54% 
Anger 17% 83% 33% 67% 
Guilt 46% 54% 60% 40% 
Fear 67% 33% 56% 44% 
Switch (actual) 22% 78% 34% 66% 
Switch (int.) 19% 81% 59% 41% 
NWOM (actual) 14% 86% 71% 29% 
NWOM (int.) 21% 79% 76% 24% 
Complaint (actual) 29% 71% 66% 34% 
Complaint (int.) 35% 65% 75% 25% 
Desire for revenge 29% 71% 84% 16% 
 
Table 9 shows that when regret is regressed on the temporal model of perceived control 
and attribution model at the same time, the model of perceived control accounts for 75% of 
regret variance explained (i.e., 75% of R²), while the attribution model accounts for only 25%. 
These data obtained via the standardized betas show that the temporal model of perceived 
control has superior share of explanation for almost all the emotions and behaviors measured 
in this study when compared to the attribution model. Fear was the only exception. Attribution 
share of explanation for fear was 67% of the variance explained. 
When it comes to emotions and behaviors regressed on the temporal model of perceived 
control and appraisal model altogether, perceived control has a higher share of explanation for 
regret (54%), anger (67%), and actual switch behavior (66%). But it also had an important 
contribution when explaining guilt, fear, and switch intention (share of explanation over or 
equal to 40%). The next section discusses the results from study 1A. 
 
 
3.8.3 Study 1A: Discussion 
 
The results from study 1A suggest that the temporal model of perceived control may be 
helpful to investigate customers’ emotional and behavioral reactions. It performed better than 
the attribution and appraisal models to explain variances in regret, anger, repurchase, and switch 
behaviors. It also improved the variance explanation of many variables when added to 
57 
 
attributions and appraisals. These results indicate that the temporal model of perceived control 
is worthy of further investigation. Although, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been used 
in studies about customer reactions, it might be able to contribute to investigations about 
customers’ emotional and behavioral reactions to stressful service episodes. 
The appraisal model had good explanatory power over emotional and behavioral 
reactions. It could significantly explain all the emotions and most of the behaviors measured in 
this study, explaining a larger number of variables than the temporal model and the attribution 
model. In addition, when combined to the temporal model, the appraisal model had a higher 
share of variance explanation for eight out of the eleven reactions from this study. 
The explanatory power of the attribution model was surprisingly low for the emotions 
measured in this study. This contradicts previous knowledge about anger being a function of an 
external controllable cause (Weiner, 2000). Even in the study of Smith et al. (1993), in which 
attributions had lower explanatory power than appraisals, attributions had significantly 
explained anger (R²=.30, p<.001), guilt (R²=.28, p<.001), and fear (R²=.23, p<.01) – regret was 
not assessed. In the present study, the only significant explanatory power of attributions was 
for fear (R²=.20, p<.01). 
One of the possible reasons for such surprisingly low explanatory power of attributions 
is the fact that we used only 3 causal attributions while Smith et al. (1993) used 13 causal 
attributions (locus, stability, controllability, intentionality, globality, mood, physique, 
personality, ability, effort, difficulty of the task, and luck). This difference in the number of 
attributions could explain the differences between the results of this study and the results from 
Smith et al. (1993). But many studies from the service and customer behavior literature uses 
only the three attributions used in study 1A or even one or two of them (e.g., Dunn & Dahl, 
2012; Hess et al., 2003; Van Vaerenbergh, Orsingher, Vermeir, & Larivière, 2014; Wirtz & 
Mattila, 2004). These three attributions are considered the main causal dimensions or properties 
(Folkes, 1984; Weiner, 2000).  
Another explanation would be that the scale used to measure attributions did not have a 
good performance in study 1A. Indeed, there were small Cronbach alphas for stability and 
controllability attributions, which may indicate either a problem with the scale or a problem 
with the data collected. Regarding a potential problem with the scale, we believe its 
performance for this particular study was inferior to its performance in other studies. The scale 
has been widely used by other authors (e.g., Hess et al., 2003, 2007; Smith et al., 1993; Wirtz 
& Mattila, 2004) and its reliability and validity has been supported by several studies according 
to Chwalisz, Altmaier, & Russell (1992). Even though the literature indicates it is a good scale, 
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we will use another scale in our second study to see whether our results are genuine or due to a 
bad performing scale. Regarding the quality of the data collected, an attention question was 
included in the questionnaire to check the quality. The only participant who was unable to 
correctly answer the attention question was deleted from the final sample. Maybe a bigger 
sample could also help to increase the quality of the data (i.e., increase statistical power) and 
facilitate the comparison of the three models. The next section depicts study 1B, conducted with 
a bigger sample and different measures for attributions. 
 
 
3.8.4 Study 1B: Procedure 
 
Study 1B was also a survey. The purpose of this study was to repeat the investigation 
conducted in study 1A with a different sample and different measures for causal attributions. 
Rather than using the panel from the Ghent University, participants were recruited from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Total sample size was 117 (57% women, Mage=37.01, SDage=13.64) 
after deleting respondents with at least one of the following characteristics: 
 Incorrect answer for the attention question (14 respondents). The same question 
from study 1A was used;  
 Described situations unrelated to service failure (19 respondents); 
 Described situations that were rated below 5 on a 7-point stress scale (10 
respondents). 
 
Due to the fact that causal controllability attribution had an extremely low Cronbach 
Alpha in study 1A and also because attributions had such a small influence over emotions, we 
decided to try other attribution measures in study 1B. Thus, we used a revised version of the 
previous attribution measures (McAuley, Duncan, & Russell, 1992) in which the way 
controllability is assessed drastically changes while the other items remain the same.  Now 
controllability is divided into personal (i.e., internal) and external controllability. Besides 
McAuley et al.’s scale, single items were also used to measure causal attributions. There was 
one item to measure locus on the customer, one item to measure locus on the 
company/employee, one item for locus on other customers, one item for stability, and one item 
for controllability. If the problem with the small effects of attributions on emotions in study 1A 
was due to a bad performance of Russell’s (1982) scale – although this scale has been used in 
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many papers – these changes in attributions’ measures of study 1B could solve it. Several 
measures from study 1A were used again in study 1B. Table 10 does not repeat the items that 
are the same from study 1A, it only provides the Cronbach Alphas for the scales and introduces 
the items that are different from the first study. The order of the scales in the table is the same 
order they appeared in the questionnaire. 
Table 10 – Measures from study 1B 
Name of the variable, Cronbach 
alpha or correlation, source 
Item(s) 
Regret, α=.84, Yi and 
Baumgartner (2004) 
Same items from study 1A 
Anger, α=.93, Yi and Baumgartner 
(2004) 
Same items from study 1A 
Disappointment, α=.81, Yi and 
Baumgartner (2004) 
1) Disappointed 
2) Let down 
3) Hopes dashed 
Guilt Same item from study 1A 
Fear Same item from study 1A 
Actual complaining behavior Same item from study 1A 
Actual switch behavior Same item from study 1A 
Actual negative word-of-mouth 
(NWOM) behavior, α=.92, 
Joireman et al. (2013) 
Same items from study 1A 
Causal locus attribution, α=.78, 
McAuley et al. (1992) and Russell 
(1982) 
Same items from study 1A 
Causal stability attribution, α=.485, 
McAuley et al. (1992) and Russell 
(1982) 
Same items from study 1A 
Personal controllability attribution, 
α=.86, McAuley et al. (1992) 
The cause is something… 
1) Manageable by you / Not manageable by you 
2) You can regulate / You cannot regulate 
3) Over which you have power / Over which you have no power 
External controllability attribution, 
α=.80, McAuley et al. (1992) 
1) Under the power of other people / Not under the power of other people 
2) Over which others have control / Over which others have no control  
3) Other people can regulate / Other people cannot regulate 
                                                 
 
5 The Cronbach Alpha increases from .48 to .58 by deleting the second item. In study 1A, it was the deletion of 
the third that led to a higher Alpha. Despite of the low Alpha, we chose to keep the three items for analyses since 
results from study 1A and 1B do not converge when it comes to which is the problematic item (i.e., the item that 
pulls the Cronbach Alpha down).  
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Locus attribution (on the 
customer) – single item 
1) To what extent was the situation described caused by you 
Locus attribution (on the 
company) – single item 
1) To what extent was the situation described caused by the service 
company/employee 
Locus attribution (on other 
customers) – single item 
1) To what extent was the situation described caused by other customers 
Stability attribution – single item 1) To what extent is the cause of the situation described stable 
Controllability attribution – single 
item 
1) To what extent was the situation described controllable by you or other 
people 
Motivational (Goal) relevance 
appraisal 
Same item from study 1A 
Motivational (Goal) congruence 
appraisal, r=.77 
Same items from study 1A 
Self-accountability appraisal, 
Smith et al. (1993) 
Same item from study 1A 
Other-accountability appraisal, 
Smith et al. (1993) 
Same item from study 1A 
Problem-focused coping potential 
appraisal 
Same item from study 1A 
Emotion-focused coping potential 
appraisal 
Same item from study 1A 
Future expectancies appraisal Same item from study 1A 
Past control, α=.82, Frazier et al. 
(2011) 
Same items from study 1A 
Present control, α=.73, Frazier et 
al. (2011) 
Same items from study 1A 
Future control, α=.85, Frazier et al. 
(2011) 
Same items from study 1A 
Future likelihood, α=.94, Frazier et 
al. (2012) 
Same items from study 1A 
 
 
3.8.5 Study 1B: Results 
 
The deleted situations that were unrelated to service failures referred to life situations 
such as car accident, end of a romance, and problems in the workplace. Some examples of 
service failures described by participants include uncaring or rude treatment, problems with the 
payment process, incorrect service bills, poor or undelivered service, and long waiting time.  
Similar to study 1A, indicators of collinearity were examined. The highest correlation 
for the temporal model of perceived control was the one between past and future control (r=.40). 
Table 11 shows the correlation matrix for the temporal model of perceived control. The highest 
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correlation among the four attributions6 was the one between locus and personal controllability 
(r=.63). The highest correlation among the seven appraisals was the one between self- and other 
accountability (r=-.52). 
 
Table 11 – Correlation matrix: temporal model of perceived control (study 1B) 
 Past Control Present Control Future Control Future Likelihood 
  Past Control 1.00 -.04 .40*** -.02 
Present Control -.04 1.00 .13 -.11 
Future Control .40*** .13 1.00 -.07 
Future Likelihood -.02 -.11 -.07 1.00 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 
Tolerance values for the components of the temporal model of perceived control were 
above .80, while VIF values were below 2. Tolerance values for the four attributions were above 
.50, while VIF values were below 2. Similarly, tolerance values for the seven appraisals were 
above .50 and VIF values were below 2. According to the reference values suggested by Hair 
et al. (2005), there is no evidence of collinearity for the IVs of the temporal model of perceived 
control, attributions, and appraisals. 
The correlations between the temporal model of perceived control and (a) attributions 
and (b) appraisals are presented in tables 12 and 13 respectively. The highest correlation among 
components of perceived control and attributions was between past control and personal 
controllability attribution (r=-.43). The highest correlation among components of perceived 
control and appraisals was between past control and self-accountability (r=.63).  
 
  
                                                 
 
6 The first analyses of this chapter regarding attributions refer to the attributions measured using McAuley et al.’s 
(1992) scale. Analyses containing the single items that were also used to measure attributions are presented later 
in this chapter to compare the scale performance versus the single items performance on explaining emotion and 
behavior variances. 
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Table 12 – Correlation matrix: temporal model of perceived control and attributions (study 1B) 
 Past Control Present Control Future Control Future Likelihood 
  Locus -.38*** .05 -.11 .16 
  Stability -.03 .26** .09 .02 
Personal Controllability -.43*** -.12 -.27** .06 
External Controllability .22* -.12 .02 -.09 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 
Table 13 – Correlation matrix: temporal model of perceived control and appraisals (study 1B) 
 Past Control Present Control Future Control Future Likelihood 
  Relevance .31*** .07 .20* -.18* 
  Congruence .28** -.07 .18 -.09 
  Self-accountability .63*** -.10 .32*** -.02 
  Other-accountability -.36*** .09 -.09 .17 
Problem-focused coping 
potential 
.18* .13 .26** -.09 
Emotion-focused coping 
potential 
.21* .18 .15 -.11 
Future expectancies -.02 .27** .21* -.24** 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 
Just like study 1A, multiple regression analyses were conducted with the following 
variables as IVs: 
 Components from the temporal model of perceived control; 
 Attributions; 
 Appraisals; 
 Attributions + components from the temporal model of perceived control; 
 Appraisals + components from the temporal model of perceived control. 
 
The variance explained percentage (R² x 100) of each emotion and behavior regressed 
on the aforementioned IVs is depicted in tables 14 and 15. This study measured an extra emotion 
which was not measured in study 1A: disappointment. Since Smith et al. (1993) did not 
investigate disappointment in their study, there was no specification about which appraisals 
should lead to this emotion. In study 1A, we had this same issue with all the behaviors we 
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measured. The procedure we adopted there was to include all the seven appraisals in the 
regression analyses of such behaviors. We repeated this same procedure here in study 1B for 
the behaviors we measured and disappointment with one change: we did not include the 
appraisal of self-accountability when regressing disappointment. This decision was due to the 
fact that such emotion is described on the literature as being unrelated to self-accountability – 
disappointment is perceived as caused by circumstances rather than the self (Van Dijk & 
Zeelenberg, 2002; Zeelenberg et al., 1998;  Zeelenberg & Pieters, 1999). 
 
Table 14 – Emotions explanation by each of the cognitive models (study 1B) 
  
% emotion variance explained by each 
approach (R² x 100) 
Extra % emotion variance 
explained from adding: 
Emotion 
Perceived 
control        
(k=4) 
Attributions 
(k=4) 
Appraisals  
(k=3 to 6) 
Perceived 
control to 
Attributions 
Perceived 
Control to 
Appraisals 
Regret 11* 1 1 13* 11 
Anger 7 3 11** 5 4* 
Guilt 16** 4 18*** 15** 5*** 
Fear 12** 3 7 11* 10** 
Disappointment 2 2 5 3 2 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  
k corresponds to the number of independent variables used in the multiple regression analyses.  
 
According to table 14, guilt (R²=.16, p< .01) and fear (R²=.12, p<.01) were the emotions 
that the temporal model of perceived control could explain better in study 1B. This differs from 
study 1A, in which regret and anger were the emotions best explained by the temporal model 
of perceived control. In general, the explained variance in emotions was lower in study 1B when 
compared with study 1A. The highest R²s in study 1A (when regressing emotions on the 
temporal model of perceived control) were .33 (for regret) and .22 (for anger), while in study 
1B, the highest values were .16 (for guilt) and .12 (for fear). R² values were also lower when 
emotions were regressed on attributions and appraisals. The highest R² when considering 
attributions as IVs in study 1B was .04 (for guilt) versus .20 in study 1A (for fear). And the 
highest R² when considering appraisals as IVs in study 1B was .18 (for guilt) versus .33 in study 
1A (also for guilt). Despite these general lower variance explanations, we see perceived control 
performing better than attributions to explain regret, guilt, and fear, and better than appraisals 
to explain regret and fear. Figure 8 shows how much attributions can account for emotions 
variance explanation together with the temporal model of perceived control.  
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Figure 8 – Emotions variance explained by attributions + perceived control (study 1B) 
 
 
Although the explained variance (R²) in emotions was lower in the present study when 
compared to study 1A, figure 8 shows that the temporal model of perceived control may be 
helpful when combined with the attribution model in the context of stressful service episodes. 
The figure shows that such temporal model had a higher contribution to explain emotions than 
the attribution model. Figure 9 shows the same type of graphic for emotions regressed on the 
appraisal model together with the temporal model of perceived control. 
 
Figure 9 – Emotions variance explained by appraisals + perceived control (study 1B) 
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Figure 9 shows that regret and fear variance explained are the ones with higher increase 
when adding the temporal model of perceived control to the appraisal model. Regret variance 
explained was non-significant when regret was regressed on the appraisal model alone (R²=1, 
p>.05) and kept on being non-significant when adding the temporal model to the regression 
(R²=12, p>.05). Fear, in turn, was non-significant for the appraisal model alone (R²=7, p>.05) 
and became significant when adding the temporal model of perceived control (R²=17, p<.01). 
As in study 1A, behaviors were also regressed on the three cognitive models. Table 15 shows 
the percentage of explained variance in behavior by each model. 
 
Table 15 – Behaviors explanation by each of the cognitive models (study 1B) 
  
% emotion variance explained by each 
approach (R² x 100) 
Extra % emotion variance 
explained from adding: 
Behavior 
Perceived 
control        
(k=4) 
Attributions 
(k=4) 
Appraisals  
(k =7) 
Perceived 
control to 
Attributions 
Perceived 
Control to 
Appraisals 
Switch (actual) 9 8 10 6 13 
NWOM (actual) 8* 9* 18** 6* 3** 
Complaint (actual) 11* 11** 14* 6* 7** 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  
k corresponds to the number of independent variables used in the multiple regression analyses.  
 
The temporal model of perceived control did not outperform the attribution and 
appraisal models to explain customers’ behavioral reactions. However, figures 10 and 11 show 
that perceived control may increase attributions’ and appraisals’ explanatory power for 
customers’ behavioral reactions. 
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Figure 10 – Behaviors variance explained by attributions + perceived control (study 1B) 
 
 
Figure 11 – Behaviors variance explained by appraisals + perceived control (study 1B) 
 
 
Table 16 shows how much (in percentage) of the emotions and behaviors explained 
variance is due to each of the cognitive models. Just as in study 1A, the standardized betas were 
used to calculate this share of explanation (i.e., the sum of the standardized betas from the 
temporal model of perceived control was compared with the sum of the standardized betas from 
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the attribution model – first and second numerical columns – and from the appraisal model – 
third and fourth numerical columns). 
 
Table 16 – Share of explanation according to the standardized betas (study 1B) 
 
Attributions + Perceived 
control 
Appraisals + Perceived 
control 
 Attributions 
Perceived 
control Appraisals  
Perceived 
control 
Regret 26% 74% 18% 82% 
Anger 34% 66% 58% 42% 
Guilt 36% 64% 48% 52% 
Fear 33% 67% 46% 54% 
Disappointment 43% 57% 72% 28% 
Switch (actual) 50% 50% 57% 43% 
NWOM (actual) 50% 50% 74% 26% 
Complaint (actual) 39% 61% 65% 35% 
 
Based on data from table 16, the temporal model of perceived control explains a larger 
portion of regret, anger, guilt, fear, disappointment, and complaint behavior than the attribution 
model does. It also explains a larger portion of regret, guilt, and fear than the appraisal model 
does. 
As the variance explanations were still surprisingly low when regressing emotions to 
the four attributions – even though we changed the attribution scale – another set of regression 
analyses was conducted using the single items instead of the attribution scale. The purpose was 
to detect if the low explanatory power of attributions was due to a bad performance of McAuley 
et al.’s (1992) scale for this study. A comparison of the results from this new set of regressions 
with the previous results is presented in table 17. The second column (i.e., first numerical 
column) shows emotions and behaviors variance explained by the attributions measured 
through McAuley et al.'s (1992) scale. The third column shows variances explained by three 
single items (i.e., locus on the customer, stability, and controllability). The fourth column, 
variances explained by five single items (i.e., locus on the customer, locus on the 
company/employee, locus on other customers, stability, and controllability). The fifth column 
shows variances explained by the temporal model of perceived control to facilitate 
comparisons. 
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Table 17 – Emotions and behaviors variances explained by attributions scale versus single items (study 
1B) 
  % emotion variance explained (R² x 100) 
  
McAuley et 
al.'s (1992) 
attribution 
scale (k=4) 
Attributions 
single items 
(k=3) 
Attributions 
single items 
(k=5) 
Perceived 
control        
(k=4) 
Regret 1 2 3 11* 
Anger 3 8* 11* 7 
Guilt 4 19*** 25*** 16** 
Fear 3 6 14** 12** 
Disappointment 2 9* 10* 2 
Switch (actual) 8 1 7 9 
NWOM (actual) 9* 6 18*** 8* 
Complaint (actual) 11** 8* 12* 11* 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
k corresponds to the number of independent variables used in the multiple regression analyses.  
 
Table 17 shows that the single items used to measure attributions performed better than 
the attribution scale. Using five single items (measuring three variations of locus – on the 
customer, on the company, and on other customers – plus controllability and stability) leads to 
even higher variance explained by attributions than using only three single items or the 
attribution scale. Perceived control keeps a higher explanation for regret but has similar or lower 
explanation for other emotions and behaviors when compared to the five single items used to 
measure attribution. 
 
 
3.8.6 Study 1B: Discussion 
 
Even though the variance explained in emotions and behaviors was lower in the present 
study when compared to study 1A, there are still indications that the temporal model of 
perceived control sometimes can perform better than the attribution and appraisal models and 
that the temporal model may be combined with these other models to gain a clearer 
understanding of customers’ emotional and behavioral reactions after a stressful service 
episode. Because of this lower explanatory power of the three cognitive models under 
investigation and because variances explained by attributions in study 1B were still surprisingly 
low (except when using single items), a third survey (study 1C) was conducted. This study had 
an even larger sample and different attribution measures. Study 1C is detailed next.  
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3.8.7 Study 1C: Procedure 
 
Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. The same procedure 
from studies 1A and 1B was conducted (i.e., asking participants to remember and describe a 
stressful service episode). Total sample size was 205 (65% women, Mage=37.89, SDage=12.12) 
after deleting respondents with at least one of the following characteristics: 
 Incorrect answer for the attention question (19 respondents). The same question 
from studies 1A and 1B was used;  
 Described situations unrelated to service failure (3 respondents); 
 Described situations that were rated below 5 on a 7-point stress scale (43 
respondents). 
 
The only changes compared to the previous studies refer to some of the measures used 
and a larger sample. Table 18 shows which measures remain the same and which ones have 
changed. Since the attribution scales from Russell (1982) and McAuley et al. (1992) were not 
very successful in explaining variance in emotions in the previous surveys, we used a modified 
version of these scales. The modifications were based on how other authors (Chu, Song, & 
Choi, 2013; Hess et al., 2003, 2007) have adapted the original scales in their studies. Appraisals 
underwent small changes, such as replacing “good for your goals” for “good for you” and 
adding “at the time the situation occurred” before some items. Also, we split anger into two 
different types: self-focused anger (i.e., when one is anger with oneself), and other-focused 
anger (i.e., a customer angry with the service company or employee).  The order of the scales 
in table 18 is the same order they were presented in the questionnaire. 
 
Table 18 – Measures from study 1C 
Name of the variable, Cronbach 
alpha or correlation, source 
Item(s) 
Regret, α=.76, Yi and 
Baumgartner (2004) 
Same items from studies 1A and 1B 
Self-focused anger 1) Angry with myself 
Other-focused anger 1) Angry with the service company/employee 
Disappointment, α=.77, Yi and 
Baumgartner (2004) 
Same items from study 1B 
Guilt Same item from studies 1A and 1B 
Fear Same item from studies 1A and 1B 
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Dissatisfaction 1) Dissatisfied 
Actual complaining behavior Same item from study 1A and 1B 
Actual switch behavior Same item from study 1A and 1B 
Actual negative word-of-mouth 
(NWOM) behavior, α=.90, 
Joireman et al. (2013) 
Same items from studies 1A and 1B 
Third party action, α=.73, (Singh, 
1988, 1989) 
1) I took a legal action against the service provider 
2) I complained or reported what happened to a consumer agency 
3) I wrote to a complaint website (e.g., consumeraffairs.com, 
complaints.com, etc.) about my bad experience 
Causal locus attribution, α=.76, 
Chu et al. (2013), McAuley et al. 
(1992) and Russell (1982) 
1) The cause reflected an aspect of yourself (e.g., your choices) / The 
cause did not reflect an aspect of yourself 
2) The cause had to do with you / The cause had to do with others 
3) The cause was about you / The cause was about others 
Causal stability attribution, α=.527, 
Hess et al. (2003), McAuley et al. 
(1992) and Russell (1982) 
1) The cause was something  occurring frequently / The cause was 
something occurring infrequently 
2) The cause was something stable over time / The cause was something 
variable over time 
3) The cause was something permanent / The cause was something 
temporary 
4) The cause was something unchangeable / The cause was something 
changeable 
Customer (internal) controllability 
attribution, α=.89 
1) The cause was not at all controllable by you / The cause was definitely 
controllable by you 
2) The cause was not at all preventable by you / The cause was definitely 
preventable by you 
3) The cause was not at all avoidable by you / The cause was definitely 
avoidable by you 
Company (external) controllability 
attribution, α=.90, Hess et al. 
(2007) 
1) The cause was not at all controllable by the service provider / The 
cause was definitely controllable by the service provider 
2) The cause was not at all preventable by the service provider / The 
cause was definitely preventable by the service provider 
3) The cause was not at all avoidable by the service provider / The cause 
was definitely avoidable by the service provider 
Locus attribution (on the 
customer) – single item 
Same item from study 1B 
Locus attribution (on the 
company) – single item 
Same item from study 1B 
                                                 
 
7 The Cronbach Alpha increases from .52 to .57 by deleting the first item, which was not part of Russell’s (1982) 
scale but rather an extra item used by Hess et al. (2003) when adapting Russell’s items. Since the Alpha did not 
improve with the extra item and given that we used the three original items in the previous surveys, we kept using 
the same three items (i.e., items 2, 3, and 4).  
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Locus attribution (on other 
customers) – single item 
Same item from study 1B 
Stability attribution – single item Same item from study 1B 
Controllability attribution – single 
item 
1) To what extent was the situation described preventable by you or other 
people 
Motivational (Goal) relevance 
appraisal 
Same item from studies 1A and 1B 
Motivational (Goal) congruence 
appraisal, r=.47 
Same items from studies 1A and 1B 
Self-accountability appraisal, 
Smith et al. (1993) 
Same items from studies 1A and 1B 
Other-accountability appraisal, 
Smith et al. (1993) 
Same items from studies 1A and 1B 
Problem-focused coping potential 
appraisal 
Same items from studies 1A and 1B 
Emotion-focused coping potential 
appraisal 
Same items from studies 1A and 1B 
Future expectancies appraisal Same items from studies 1A and 1B 
Past control, α=.77, Frazier et al. 
(2011) 
Same items from studies 1A and 1B 
Present control, α=.78, Frazier et 
al. (2011) 
Same items from studies 1A and 1B 
Future control, α=.87, Frazier et al. 
(2011) 
Same items from studies 1A and 1B 
Future likelihood, α=.93, Frazier et 
al. (2012) 
Same items from studies 1A and 1B 
 
 
3.8.8 Study 1C: Results 
 
The situations that were unrelated to service failures referred to problems in the 
workplace. The service failure situations referred to rude treatment, unfulfilled promises, 
incorrect service bill, poor service, and poor complaint handling, among others. 
The highest correlation among the components of the temporal model of perceived 
control was between past and future control (r=.38). The highest correlations among 
attributions (measured through the scale) was between customer controllability and locus 
attribution (r=-.46) and the highest correlation among appraisals was between emotion-focused 
and problem-focused coping potential (r=.51). Table 19 shows the correlations among 
components of the temporal model of perceived control. Tables 20 and 21 present the 
correlations between the temporal model of perceived control and (a) attributions and (b) 
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appraisals respectively. The highest correlation among components of perceived control and 
attributions was between past control and customer controllability attribution (r=.68). The 
highest correlation among components of perceived control and appraisals was between past 
control and self-accountability (r=.64). 
 
Table 19 – Correlation matrix: temporal model of perceived control (study 1C) 
 Past Control Present Control Future Control Future Likelihood 
  Past Control  1.00 .13 .38*** -.06 
Present Control .13 1.00 .14* -.06 
Future Control .38*** .14* 1.00 -.28*** 
Future Likelihood -.06 -.06 -.28*** 1.00 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 
Table 20 – Correlation matrix: temporal model of perceived control and attributions scale (study 1C) 
 Past Control  Present Control Future Control Future Likelihood 
  
Locus -.41*** .01 -.22** .12 
Stability -.12 .08 -.11 .07 
Customer Controllability .68*** .05 .29*** -.08 
Company Controllability -.15* .06 .02 .11 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 
Table 21 – Correlation matrix: temporal model of perceived control and appraisals (study 1C) 
 Past Control  Present Control Future Control Future Likelihood 
  
Relevance  .00 .01 .14* -.09 
Congruence  .13 -.06 .01 -.03 
Self-accountability .64*** .00 .29*** -.10 
Other-accountability -.35*** .13 .01 .00 
Problem-focused coping 
potential  
.05 .12 .13 -.06 
Emotion-focused coping 
potential 
.14* .11 .18* -.11 
Future expectancies .25*** .19** .15* -.09 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Tolerance values for the components of the temporal model of perceived control were 
above .70, while VIF values were below 2. Similarly, tolerance values for the four attributions 
were above .70, while VIF values were below 2. Tolerance values for the seven appraisals were 
above .60 and VIF values were below 2. According to the reference values suggested by Hair 
et al. (2005), there is no evidence of collinearity for the IVs of the temporal model of perceived 
control, attributions, and appraisals. 
Table 22 shows the percentage of emotions variance explained by each of the cognitive 
models. Because the single items used to measure attributions performed better than the scale 
used in study 1B, this time the table brings two columns for attributions: one for the results 
when using the modified scale items and another for the five single items (i.e., locus on the 
customer, locus on the company, locus on other customers, stability, and controllability). 
Despite the existence of the single items, most of the comparisons between the temporal model 
of perceived control and the attribution model use the attribution scale rather than the single 
items. The purpose is to keep on working with attribution scales just like it was done in studies 
1A and 1B, comparing a multi-item scale (i.e., each component of the temporal model of 
perceived control is measured by multi-items) with attribution dimensions that were also 
measured with multi-items. Besides, most of the studies about controllability and stability 
attributions on service failure contexts use multi-item scales, which usually have a higher 
impact on customer outcomes (i.e., negative word-of-mouth and satisfaction) than single-items 
(Van Vaerenbergh et al., 2014). Thus, it seems fair and conservative to use the attribution scale 
when comparing attributions with perceived control. 
It is possible to see in table 22 that the temporal model of perceived control can 
significantly explain variances in regret, self-focused anger, guilt, fear, and disappointment. 
Some of these emotions can also be significantly explained by the attribution and appraisal 
models. On the one hand, we seem to have the temporal model of perceived control explaining 
some emotions (e.g., regret and self-focused anger) better than the attribution and appraisal 
models. But on the other hand, attributions and/or appraisals can significantly explain variances 
of some variables (e.g., other-focused anger and dissatisfaction) that perceived control cannot. 
In fact, appraisals were the only independent variables that could significantly explain all the 
emotions measured in this study. We can also see that the temporal model of perceived control 
combined with the attribution and appraisal models increases the explanatory power for some 
emotions, especially regret and self-focused anger. Figures 12 and 13 show such increase in 
variance explanation when adding perceived control to attributions and appraisals respectively. 
  
74 
 
Table 22 – Emotions explanation by each of the cognitive models (study 1C) 
  
% emotion variance explained by each approach  
(R² x 100) 
Extra % emotion 
variance explained from 
adding: 
Emotion 
Perceived 
control        
(k=4) 
Attributions 
scale              
(k=4) 
Attributions 
single items 
(k=5) 
Appraisals 
(k=3 to 7) 
Perceived 
control to 
Attributions 
scale 
Perceived 
Control to 
Appraisals 
Regret 13*** 8** 2 10*** 8*** 7*** 
Anger (self) 19*** 12*** 10** 15*** 9*** 7*** 
Anger (other) 3 9** 7* 8** < 1* 1* 
Guilt 16*** 19*** 15*** 27*** 2*** 2*** 
Fear 6* 4 8** 8** 5* 7*** 
Disappointment 7** 3 2 9** 5* 5** 
Dissatisfaction
8
 3 4 7* 10** 2 1* 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  
k corresponds to the number of independent variables used in the multiple regression analyses.  
 
 
Figure 12 – Emotions variance explained by attributions + perceived control (study 1C) 
 
  
                                                 
 
8 The extent to which dissatisfaction should be classified as an emotion may be debatable. Although 
(dis)satisfaction may be referred to as a cognition or decision following a comparison between performance and 
expectation (Oliver, 1980), it is measured with emotional items such as happy, (dis)pleased, contented, and 
frustrated (Oliver, 1980; Spreng, Mackenzie, & Olshavsky, 1996; Tsiros et al., 2004). We acknowledge both 
cognitive and emotional components of (dis)satisfaction and present dissatisfaction results together with other 
emotions results.   
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Figure 13 – Emotions variance explained by appraisals + perceived control (study 1C) 
 
 
We see in figures 12 and 13 that the larger contributions of the temporal model of 
perceived control to the attribution and appraisal models refer to explained variance in regret, 
self-focused anger, fear, and disappointment. Table 23 shows explained variance in behaviors. 
 
Table 23 – Behaviors explanation by each of the cognitive models (study 1C) 
  
% emotion variance explained by each approach  
(R² x 100) 
Extra % emotion 
variance explained from 
adding: 
Behavior 
Perceived 
control        
(k=4) 
Attributions 
scale              
(k=4) 
Attributions 
single items 
(k=5) 
Appraisals 
(k=7) 
Perceived 
control to 
Attributions 
scale 
Perceived 
Control to 
Appraisals 
Switch (actual) 14*** 3 6 3 14*** 17*** 
NWOM (actual) 4 6* 3 7* 4* 3* 
Complaint (actual) 4 4 3 10** 2 2** 
Third party action (actual) 2 2 5* 2 1 3 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  
k corresponds to the number of independent variables used in the multiple regression analyses.  
 
We see in table 23 that switch behavior variance is explained better by the temporal 
model of perceived control (R²=.14, p<.001) than the attribution (R²=.03, p>.05) and appraisal 
models (R²=.03, p>.05). Nevertheless, negative word-of-mouth and complaint behaviors can be 
significantly explained by attributions and/or appraisals but not by perceived control. Figure 14 
shows behaviors variance explained by the attribution model together with the temporal model 
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of perceived control. Figure 15 does the same for the appraisal model plus the temporal model 
of perceived control. We see in both figures that the larger contribution of perceived control 
refers to explained variance in switch behavior. 
 
Figure 14 – Behaviors variance explained by attributions + perceived control (study 1C) 
 
 
Figure 15 – Behaviors variance explained by appraisals + perceived control (study 1C) 
 
 
So far, the tables and figures of this section used as main input emotions and behaviors 
variance explained (R²) by the three cognitive models. Next, table 24 uses as main input the 
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standardized betas of regressions that contained attributions plus perceived control or appraisals 
plus perceived control as IVs. These standardized betas are used to compute the share of 
explanation of each model for the emotions and behaviors measured in this study. 
 
Table 24 – Share of explanation according to the standardized betas (study 1C) 
 
Attributions + Perceived 
control 
Appraisals + Perceived 
control 
 Attributions 
Perceived 
control Appraisals  
Perceived 
control 
Regret 41% 59% 38% 62% 
Anger (self) 40% 60% 38% 62% 
Anger (other) 79% 21% 68% 32% 
Guilt 62% 38% 72% 28% 
Fear 44% 56% 55% 45% 
Disappointment 33% 67% 53% 47% 
Dissatisfaction 46% 54% 75% 25% 
Switch (actual) 33% 67% 45% 55% 
NWOM (actual) 48% 52% 63% 37% 
Complaint (actual) 41% 59% 66% 34% 
Third party action (actual) 52% 48% 61% 39% 
 
According to table 24, when regressing several emotions and behaviors on the 
attribution model plus the temporal model of perceived control, the latter has a higher share of 
explanation for regret, self-focused anger, fear, disappointment, dissatisfaction, switch, 
negative word-of-mouth, and complaint behaviors than the former. When regressing the same 
emotions and behaviors on the appraisal model plus the temporal model of perceived control, 
the latter has a higher share of explanation for regret, self-focused anger, and switch behavior.  
Before moving on to the discussion section, which will discuss the results from this and 
the previous studies, extra analyses were conducted with a database comprising all the 
respondents from the three surveys reported in this chapter. The next section reports the results 
obtained with such database. 
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3.8.9 Results based on a common database of studies 1A, 1B, and 1C 
 
The three surveys reported in this chapter had many things in common. First, all of them 
adopted the same procedure of asking participants to remember a stressful service failure, 
describe it, and answer some questions afterwards. Second, all the surveys used the same items 
to measure the components of the temporal model of perceived control. Third, all the surveys 
measured customer regret, guilt, anger9, fear, complaint, switch, and NWOM. Because of this 
similarities, a database comprising all the respondents from each survey was created to conduct 
further analyses. This database has 384 respondents (62 from study 1A, 117 from study 1B, and 
205 from study 1C). The purpose of adding all the respondents in a common database was to 
have a bigger sample, which could lead to more solid and reliable results.  
Since the items adopted to measure attributions and appraisals changed across the 
studies, it would be impossible (or incorrect) to compare the explanatory power of these models 
with the temporal model of perceived control. So, rather than comparing the three cognitive 
models as we have done so far, this section goes deeper into the effects of the temporal model 
in each of the emotions and behaviors mentioned in the previous paragraph. It shows which of 
the components of the model are significantly impacting such emotions and behaviors. It does 
so by providing the regression tables for each emotion and behavior, in which we can see the 
individual impact of past, present, future control, and future likelihood.  
The benefit of such analysis is to gain some knowledge about the effects of each of these 
components on emotional and behavioral reactions to stressful service failures. The theoretical 
background had some suggestions about the impact of each component on regret and anger 
(e.g., positive effect of past control on regret, negative effect of present control on regret and 
anger, etc.) but such effects had not been analyzed during this chapter. The regression analyses 
presented in this section are not proof of causal effect, neither the survey method from studies 
1A, 1B, and 1C. The regression analyses show if there is a significant relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables and the direction of such relationship (positive versus 
                                                 
 
9 Studies 1A and 1B measured anger while study 1C measured self-focused anger and other-focused anger. 
Analyses from this chapter used the latter (i.e., other-focused anger), together with anger measures from studies 
1A and 1B, because this is the type of anger consistent with the concept of anger widely used and mentioned 
during the literature review.  
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negative). We do not intend to show the results as evidence of causal effects, but rather explore 
if there are significant relationships between the components of the temporal model of 
perceived control and customer emotional and behavioral reactions and the direction of such 
relationships. Table 25 provides the regression coefficients regarding regret regressed on the 
four components of the temporal model of perceived control. 
 
Table 25 – Regret regressed on the temporal model of perceived control 
 
  
t p 
Collinearity Statistics 
β SE Tolerance VIF 
 
Past Control .14 .069 2.59 .010 .84 1.20 
Present Control -.13 .088 -2.67 .008 .98 1.02 
Future Control .16 .059 2.78 .006 .79 1.27 
Future Likelihood -.02 .053 -.46 .644 .94 1.07 
 
The temporal model significantly explained 7% of regret variance (R²=.07, p<.001). 
Table 25 shows that three components of the temporal model of perceived control had 
significant impact on regret: past control (β=.14, p<.05), present control (β=-.13, p<.01), and 
future control (β=.16, p<.01). Based on the valence of their regression coefficients (positive 
versus negative), we may infer that past and future control are positively related to regret, while 
present control is negatively related to regret. So, the perception that one could have prevented 
a stressful service failure is associated with a high level of regret, while the perception that one 
can control how one thinks and feels about the service failure is associated with a low level of 
regret. Such relationships were predicted in the theoretical background. However, it was not 
predicted that the perception that one will be able to prevent a stressful service failure in the 
future would be associated with a high level of regret. Table 26 shows regression coefficients 
for guilt. 
 
Table 26 – Guilt regressed on the temporal model of perceived control 
 
  
t p 
Collinearity Statistics 
β SE Tolerance VIF 
 
Past Control .33 .04 6.36 .000 .84 1.20 
Present Control -.11 .05 -2.36 .019 .98 1.02 
Future Control .06 .04 1.13 .261 .79 1.27 
Future Likelihood -.05 .03 -1.07 .284 .94 1.07 
 
The temporal model significantly explained 14% of guilt variance (R²=.14, p<.001). 
Two components of the model had significant impact on guilt: past control (β=.33, p<.001) and 
present control (β=-.11, p<.05). High levels of past control are associated with high levels of 
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guilt, while high levels of present control are associated with low levels of guilt. Both types of 
control are related to guilt in the same way they are related to regret. This is not surprising due 
to the common characteristics between these two emotions (e.g., both refer to self-blame), 
mentioned during the literature review. Table 27 shows the regression coefficients for anger. 
 
Table 27 – Anger regressed on the temporal model of perceived control 
 
  
t p 
Collinearity Statistics 
β SE Tolerance VIF 
 
Past Control -.23 .05 -4.15 .000 .84 1.20 
Present Control -.13 .07 -2.61 .009 .98 1.02 
Future Control .19 .04 3.32 .001 .79 1.27 
Future Likelihood .06 .04 1.10 .271 .94 1.07 
 
The temporal model significantly explained 7% of anger variance (R²=.07, p<.001). Past 
control (β=-.23, p<.001), present control (β=-.13, p<.01), and future control (β=.19, p<.01) were 
significantly related to anger. So, high past and present control levels are associated with low 
levels of anger, while high levels of future control are associated with high anger level. The 
relationships between past control and anger as well as present control and anger converge with 
the relationship expected during the theoretical background section, but the positive 
relationship between future control and anger was unexpected. Table 28 shows regression 
coefficients for fear. 
 
Table 28 – Fear regressed on the temporal model of perceived control 
 
  
t p 
Collinearity Statistics 
β SE Tolerance VIF 
 
Past Control .15 .59 2.78 .006 .84 1.20 
Present Control -.19 .07 -3.84 .000 .98 1.02 
Future Control .08 .09 1.38 .167 .79 1.27 
Future Likelihood -.04 .06 -.79 .433 .94 1.07 
 
The temporal model significantly explained 7% of fear variance (R²=.07, p<.001). Past 
(β=.15, p<.01) and present control (β=-.19, p<.001) were significantly related to fear, such that 
high perceived past control was associated with high fear level, while high perceived present 
control was associated with low fear level. Table 29 shows regression coefficients for switch 
behavior. 
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Table 29 – Switch regressed on the temporal model of perceived control 
 
  
t p 
Collinearity Statistics 
β SE Tolerance VIF 
 
Past Control .01 .10 .10 .924 .84 1.20 
Present Control -.06 .13 -1.10 .274 .98 1.02 
Future Control .16 .09 2.90 .004 .79 1.27 
Future Likelihood -.07 .08 -1.32 .189 .94 1.07 
 
The temporal model significantly explained 4% of switch variance (R²=.04, p<.01). 
Only future control was significantly related to switch behavior (β=.16, p<.01), indicating that 
customers who believe they will be able to prevent the recurrence of a service failure also 
demonstrate high switch behavior. Table 30 shows regression coefficients for complaint 
behavior. 
 
Table 30 – Complaint regressed on the temporal model of perceived control 
 
  
t p 
Collinearity Statistics 
β SE Tolerance VIF 
 
Past Control -.28 .09 -5.23 .000 .84 1.20 
Present Control -.06 .11 -1.19 .236 .98 1.02 
Future Control .23 .08 4.06 .000 .79 1.27 
Future Likelihood .01 .07 .11 .916 .94 1.07 
 
The temporal model significantly explained 8% of complaint variance (R²=.08, p<.001). 
Past (β=-.28, p<.001) and future control (β=.23, p<.001) are significantly associated with 
complaint behavior. The result suggests that customers who perceived they could have 
prevented a stressful service failure tend to present low level of complaint behavior, while 
customers who perceived they will be able to prevent a stressful service failure tend to present 
high level of complaint. Table 31 shows regression coefficients for NWOM. 
 
Table 31 – NWOM regressed on the temporal model of perceived control 
 
  
t p 
Collinearity Statistics 
β SE Tolerance VIF 
 
Past Control -.17 .08 -3.17 .002 .84 1.20 
Present Control -.12 .10 -2.32 .021 .98 1.02 
Future Control .17 .07 2.92 .004 .79 1.27 
Future Likelihood .12 .06 2.35 .019 .94 1.07 
 
The temporal model significantly explained 6% of NWOM variance (R²=.06, p<.001). 
All the four components of the temporal model were significantly related to NWOM. Past 
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control (β=-.17, p<.01) and present control (β=-.12, p<.05) were negatively associated with 
NWOM, while future control (β=.17, p<.01) and future likelihood (β=.12, p<.05) were 
positively associated with NWOM. Table 32 summarizes whether the components of the 
temporal model of perceived control are significantly related to customer reactions, indicating 
the direction of the significant relationships. 
 
Table 32 – Summary of the relationships between the components of temporal model of perceived control 
and customers’ reactions 
  Regret Guilt Anger Fear Switch Complaint NWOM 
Past Control + + - + n.s. - - 
Present Control - - - - n.s. n.s. - 
Future Control + n.s. + n.s. + + + 
Future Likelihood n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. + 
“+” corresponds to a significant positive relationship, “-” corresponds to a significant negative relationship, “n.s.” 
corresponds to a non-significant relationship. 
 
The next section resumes and discusses results from the three studies and examines what 
we may infer from the relationships obtained with this common database. 
 
  
3.8.10 Discussion 
 
This section discusses not only results from study 1C but also the results of all surveys 
conducted so far and compares it to the results from Smith et al. (1993). In order to enable such 
comparison, results are summarized in a few tables. Table 33 compares results from studies 1A, 
1B, 1C as well as results from Smith et al. (1993), using just the emotions that are the same in 
all four studies: anger, guilt, and fear. Smith and colleagues did not measure other emotions 
(e.g., regret and disappointment) and behaviors (e.g., complaint and switch) that were measured 
in this chapter. This table shows emotions variance explained by attributions only.  
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Table 33 – Emotions explained by attributions in four studies 
  % emotion variance explained by Attributions (R² x 100) 
 
Study 1A 
(k=3) 
Study 1B 
(k=4) 
Study 1C 
(k=4) 
Smith et al. 
(1993) 
(k=13) 
Anger
10
 2 3 9** 30*** 
Guilt 12 4 19*** 28*** 
Fear 20** 3 4 23** 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  
k corresponds to the number of independent variables used in the multiple regression analyses.  
 
We see in table 33 that despite some low variances explained by attributions in studies 
from this dissertation (i.e., studies 1A, 1B, and 1C), some of the results were not that much 
different from variances explained by attributions in Smith and colleagues’ study. For instance, 
fear variance explained was almost the same in study 1A and Smith and colleagues’ study 
(R²=.20 and R²=.23 respectively), both with the same significance level (p<.01). Guilt variance 
explained had the same significance level in study 1C and Smith and colleagues’ study 
(p<.001). Anger was significant in study 1C (p<.01), though its significance level was not as 
strong as it was on Smith and colleagues’ study (p<.001). So, these three emotions that could 
be significantly explained by attributions in Smith et al.’s (1993) study could also be 
significantly explained by attributions in at least one of this dissertation studies.  
The use of different attribution measures (i.e., modified scales and single items) 
throughout the studies of this chapter is an endeavor to find correct and comparable results for 
attributions. The intent of the research conducted here is not to praise the temporal model of 
perceived control by making attributions look bad or seem like a poor approach to explain 
customer reactions after stressful services. On the contrary, we tried to find the best possible 
results for attributions and check whether the temporal model of perceived control could still 
be of any help to understand customer emotional and behavioral reactions.  And we may see 
throughout these three studies that the temporal model of perceived control could always help 
the attribution model to explain some emotions and behaviors variance. Table 34 shows anger, 
guilt, and fear variances explained by appraisals in the same four studies of the previous table. 
 
                                                 
 
10 Anger was divided into self- and other-focused in study 1C. The values reported in tables 33 and 34 for study 
1C refer to other-focused anger because anger is usually conceptualized as an other-focused emotion (e.g., 
Bonifield & Cole, 2007) and the other studies from these tables did not measure self-focused anger.  
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Table 34 – Emotions explained by appraisals in four studies 
  % emotion variance explained by Appraisals (R² x 100) 
 
Study 1A 
(k=3) 
Study 1B 
(k=3) 
Study 1C 
(k=3) 
Smith et al. 
(1993) 
(k=3) 
Anger 18** 11** 8** 42*** 
Guilt 33*** 18*** 27*** 27*** 
Fear 12* 7 8** 14*** 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 
According to table 34, some of the variances explained by appraisals in Smith and 
colleagues’ study are close to the variances explained by appraisals in the studies of this chapter. 
For instance, guilt explained variance in studies 1A (R²=.33), 1B (R²=.18), and 1C (R²=.27) had 
the same significance level from Smith and colleagues’ study (R²=.27, p<.001). Anger 
explained variance was significant in Smith et al.’s (1993) study (R²=.42, p<.001) as well as in 
studies 1A (R²=.18, p<.01), 1B (R²=.11, p<.01), and 1C (R²=.33, p<.01). Fear explained 
variance was also significant in Smith et al.’s (1993) study (R²=.14, p<.001) and in studies 1A 
(R²=.12, p<.05) and 1C (R²=.08, p<.01). The fact that some of the results for appraisals and 
attributions were close to the results of Smith and colleagues – even though the measures used 
in studies 1A, 1B, and 1C are not exactly the same from Smith et al. (1993) – reinforces the 
credibility of the studies from this chapter. Table 35 summarizes emotions and behaviors 
variances explained by the temporal model of perceived control in all three studies.  
 
Table 35 – Emotions and behaviors explained by the temporal model of perceived control in three studies 
  
% emotion and behavior variance explained by  
Perceived Control (R² x 100) 
 
Study 1A 
(k=4) 
Study 1B 
(k=4) 
Study 1C 
(k=4) 
Regret 33*** 11* 13*** 
Anger 22** 7 3 
Guilt 13 16** 16*** 
Fear 8 12** 6* 
Disappointment N/A 2 7** 
Switch (actual) 27** 9 14*** 
NWOM (actual) 12 8* 4 
Complaint (actual) 4 11* 4 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
Emotions and behaviors that were measured only in one study (e.g., self-focused anger, third party action, 
desire for revenge, etc.) are not in this table. 
 
According to table 35, the temporal model of perceived control could significantly 
explain regret variances in all three studies. It could also significantly explain guilt variance in 
studies 1B and 1C. When it comes to anger as an other-focused emotion, perceived control 
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could significantly explain anger variance only in study 1A. But in study 1C, perceived control 
could significantly explain self-focused anger (R²=.19, p<.001) – this result is not in the table 
because self-focused anger was measured only in study 1C. Such results regarding regret, anger 
(self- and other-focused), and guilt suggest that the temporal model of perceived control may 
be especially helpful when it comes to self-focused rather than other-focused emotions. But that 
does not mean that it cannot be helpful when it comes to other type of emotions, such as fear 
and disappointment. The temporal model of perceived control could also significantly explain 
fear and disappointment variances. 
If we had to select the emotion that the temporal model of perceived control could better 
explain so far, it would be regret. Regret is the only emotion that was significantly explained 
by this model in all three studies. Besides, when adding the perceived control model to the 
attribution model, the former had a higher share of explanation than the latter in studies 1A 
(75% of regret explained variance was explained by perceived control), 1B (74%), and 1C 
(59%). And by adding the temporal model to the appraisal model, the former had a higher share 
of explanation than the latter in studies 1A (54%), 1B (82%), and 1C (62%).  
And if we had to select the behavior that the temporal model of perceived control could 
better explain so far, it would be switch behavior. Despite the non-significant result in study 
1B, the model of perceived control could significantly explain actual switch behavior variance 
in studies 1A and 1C, and also switch intention in study 1A (R²=.18, p<.05). When using 
perceived control and attributions in the same regressions, switch behavior was better explained 
by the former than the latter in studies 1A (78% of switch explained variance was explained by 
perceived control) and 1C (67%). When using perceived control and appraisals in the same 
regressions, switch was better explained by the former in studies 1A (66%) and 1C (55%). But 
even in the study in which switch was better explained by appraisals, perceived control share 
of explanation is higher than 40%, which is a considerable high share of explanation. 
One of the limitations of studies 1A, 1B, and 1C was to assess appraisals with items 
created for the studies instead of the original items used by Smith et al. (1993) and  Smith and 
Lazarus (1993). This happened because most of the items were not disclosed by the authors. 
Even with this limitation, appraisals performed better than attributions on predicting emotional 
reactions after service stressful episodes – the result we expected based on Smith et al.’s (1993) 
study. Appraisals also performed better than the temporal model of perceived control in many 
situations. Perhaps with the original items, appraisals could have even better results. So, maybe 
it is not completely fair to compare the temporal model of perceived control’s performance with 
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appraisals’ performance. But it is still possible to argue that the temporal model of perceived 
control performed better than attributions on predicting customers’ emotional reactions.  
One methodological concern is that the use of self-reported measures in studies like 
these may lead to common method bias, a situation in which the variance found is due to the 
method used to collect the data rather than the relationships among the constructs (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). However, the use of self-measures was necessary 
because it is the most appropriate way of measuring what someone thinks (cognitive reactions), 
how someone feels (emotional reactions), and what a person did (behavioral reactions) after a 
service failure. To avoid the occurrence of common method bias, some actions suggested by 
Podsakoff et al. (2003) were taken: (1) different response scales were adopted, such as scales 
anchored by the agreement level (e.g., “totally disagree” and “totally agree”) and bipolar items 
(i.e., “permanent” versus “temporary”); (2) constructs were measured in different questionnaire 
pages to create some distance among them; (3) constructs  that were expected to influence other 
constructs were measured at the end of the questionnaire (i.e., perceived control, attributions, 
and appraisals were measured after emotional and behavioral reactions); (4) participants were 
informed that their identity would remain anonymous. 
Regarding the regression analyses conducted with a common database for the three 
studies (i.e., the sum of all respondents reported in section 3.8.9), there are a few things to be 
discussed: First, the low tolerance values and high VIF values suggest that there is no 
collinearity among the four components of the temporal model of perceived control. In other 
words, they really measure different types of control. Second, the four components were 
significantly related to at least one emotional or behavioral reaction. This shows how important 
the temporal dimension is. If one looks only at past control when trying to figure out how 
customers will react to a service failure, one will miss the significant effects of present control, 
future control, and future likelihood. Third, according to Frazier et al.’s (2012) findings, it was 
expected that future control would impact future likelihood which, in turn, would impact 
emotional reactions. But results show that future control had significant effects on emotional 
reactions, while future likelihood had not, suggesting that the impact of future control on 
emotions does not depend on perceived future likelihood.  
Future control was positively related to regret and anger. So, customers who think they 
will be able to prevent the recurrence of a service failure feel regretful and angry. But why? 
Maybe when customers foresee a solution for a failure they may regret the fact they did not 
think about it before or feel angry with the service provider for not having anticipated such 
solution. Such results are not surprising when we look at findings from Frazier et al. (2011) 
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showing a positive relationship between future control and distress. Besides, future control was 
positively related to switch, complaint, and NWOM. At first, such results may seem intriguing. 
For instance, why would someone complaint and switch if this person has already figured out 
how to prevent the recurrence of the service failure? But complaint and switch behaviors could 
be the tactic to prevent the failure. Also, switch is a natural consequence of regret, while 
complaint and NWOM are consequences of anger (Bougie et al., 2003; Cho & Song, 2012; 
Weiner, 2000; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 1999). Thus, the positive association of future control with 
regret and anger helps to explain the positive association of future control with switch, 
complaint, and NWOM. 
Past and present control were associated with regret in the same way as suggested in 
prior literature: past control was positively related to regret, while present control was 
negatively related to regret. The same relationships were established when regressing guilt 
rather than regret on the temporal model of perceived control. Past control was related to high 
guilt level, while present control was related to low guilt level. This is totally coherent since 
regret and guilt are very similar in content (Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 2008). Anger was also 
related to past and present control in the same way suggested by the literature review: both 
types of control were negatively related to anger. Similar to what happened with regret and 
guilt, fear was positively related to past control and negatively related to present control. Fear 
was not significantly related to future control and future likelihood. And this is somehow 
unexpected. It would make more sense to find significant relationships of fear with future 
control and future likelihood rather than past control because fear is produced by danger or 
threat (Smith et al., 1993) and expectancies of failure (Weiner, 2000). In other words, fear is 
associated with the possibility of something bad happening in the future. 
Past control was negatively related to complaint and NWOM. Such result is convergent 
with the fact that complaining and NWOM are associated with external rather than internal 
attribution (Folkes, 1984). In other words, customers who think they could have prevented a 
service failure (i.e., past control) may attribute at least some of the blame to themselves (i.e., 
internal attribution) which, in turn, should discourage them to complaint to the service provider 
or telling others negative things about such provider. Present control was negatively related to 
NWOM. This is also an expected result, because present control seems to be negatively related 
to emotions that could lead to NWOM, such as anger. Finally, from all the emotions and 
behaviors that were regressed using the common database, future likelihood was only 
significantly related to NWOM, such that high future likelihood was related to high NWOM. 
This could indicate a minor contribution of future likelihood in explaining customers’ emotional 
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and behavioral reactions to a service failure when compared to past, present, and future control. 
Nevertheless, all the discussion derived from the common database is just a preliminary effort 
in determining the potential effects of the temporal model of perceived control on customers’ 
reactions to service failures. More studies could help to gain a deeper understanding of this 
model.   
Altogether, studies 1A, 1B, and 1C indicate that the temporal model of perceived control 
may be helpful to investigate customer’s emotional and behavioral reactions after a stressful 
service episode. In order to further investigate the helpfulness of such model, we conducted an 
experimental study. In this study, we hold causal attribution constant (i.e., service provider’s 
fault) and manipulate one of the variables of the temporal model: past control. The idea is to 
investigate whether the perception that one could have prevented a stressful service from 
happening vs. the perception that one could not have prevented such stressful service (i.e., high 
vs. low past control) may affect customer emotional and behavioral reactions when the service 
provider is the one to blame. By conducting such study, we suggest one way to combine the 
different cognitive models to analyze consequences of a stressful service.  
 
 
3.9 STUDY 2 
 
Past control was manipulated (high vs. low) on an external causal locus context. So, the 
service employee was the one to blame for the stressful service episode, but the customer was 
induced to think s/he could have prevented (vs. could not have prevented) the stressful situation. 
It was a single factor between subjects experiment. Participants were recruited via Mechanical 
Turk. Total sample size was 123 (50% women, Mage=36.17, SDage=13.88) after deleting 
respondents with at least one of the following characteristics: 
 Incorrect answer for the attention question (20 respondents). The same question 
from previous studies was used;  
 Stress level was rated below 5 on a 7-point stress scale (37 respondents). 
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3.9.1 Procedure 
 
Participants received a text to read. The situation described in the text was based on a 
stressful service episode reported by a participant from one of the surveys previously described 
in this chapter. Table 36 shows the two different texts to which participants were randomly 
assigned.  
 
Table 36 – Experimental manipulation 
High Past Control Low Past Control 
“Imagine that you had a problem with your car and 
you took it to a repair shop. After a quick look at your 
car, the mechanic says that it seems someone has been 
doing unsuccessful attempts to fix your car and asks if 
that was you. You answer that you indeed did some 
things in order to fix the problem but that you soon 
enough realized the work was beyond your 
capabilities. The mechanic is clearly upset and starts 
mentioning everything that is wrong with the car. He 
treats you in a very rude and impolite way, almost 
yelling at you. He complains about all the work it will 
take to fix your car. You feel very bad about the way 
he treats you. At the same time, you do realize that you 
could have done something to prevent your car 
problems to become this serious, since you actually 
aggravated the problem when trying to fix it.” 
“Imagine that you had a problem with your car and 
you took it to a repair shop. After a quick look at your 
car, the mechanic says that it seems someone has been 
doing unsuccessful attempts to fix your car and asks if 
that was you. You answer that no, you did nothing in 
order to fix the problem because you soon enough 
realized the work was beyond your capabilities. 
The mechanic is clearly upset and starts mentioning 
everything that is wrong with the car. He treats you in 
a very rude and impolite way, almost yelling at you. 
He complains about all the work it will take to fix your 
car. You feel very bad about the way he treats you. At 
the same time, you do realize that there was nothing 
you could have done to prevent your car problems 
to become this serious, since you didn’t do anything 
wrong to the car.” 
 
The potentially11 stressful service situation to which participants were exposed was the 
rude treatment by the service provider. Rude treatments by service personnel are considered a 
type of failure (Roschk & Gelbrich, 2013) and a potential source of stress (Duhachek, 2005). 
Such a rude behavior of the mechanic – which is inexcusable in any service situation – should 
trigger external causal locus attribution, both for respondents in the low and the high perceived 
past control condition. Participants in the high past control scenario could have prevented the 
mechanic’s fury and consequent rude treatment if only they had not aggravated the car 
problems, while there was nothing participants in the low past control scenario could have done 
to prevent the mechanic’s fury and rude behavior.   
                                                 
 
11 It is potentially stressful because stress is subjective – what may be stressful to someone may be not stressful to 
someone else (Duhacheck, 2005; Moschis, 2007; Stephens & Gwinner, 1998). 
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Past control manipulation check consisted of one of the past control scale items (adapted 
to the described context): “I could have done something to prevent such bad situation at the 
repair shop”. There was also an external causal locus manipulation check, because although we 
did not have different levels for causal locus (e.g., internal x external), we wanted to check 
whether participants indeed had the perception that the fault was on the service employee, who 
should not have been rude. The external manipulation check was “To what extent was the bad 
situation at the repair shop caused by the mechanic?” Besides the manipulation checks, there 
was an item to assess the realism of the situation: “The situation with the repair shop is: 
Impossible to happen to someone in real life / Possible to happen to someone in real life.” 
Table 37 shows the items used to measure the variables of this study. All the variables 
were measured with 7-point scales, including the already mentioned manipulation checks and 
the scenarios credibility. The order of the scales in the table is the same order they appeared in 
the questionnaire. 
 
Table 37 – Measures from study 2 
Name of the variable, Cronbach 
alpha, source 
Item(s) 
Regret, α=.73, Yi and Baumgartner 
(2004) 
Same items from studies 1A, 1B, and 1C 
Self-focused anger Same item from study 1C 
Other-focused anger Same item from study 1C 
Disappointment, α=.73, Yi and 
Baumgartner (2004) 
Same items from study 1B and 1C 
Guilt Same item from studies 1A, 1B, and 1C 
Fear Same item from studies 1A, 1B, and 1C 
Complaining intention Same item from study 1A 
Switch intention Same item from study 1A 
Negative word-of-mouth (NWOM) 
intention, α=.92,  
Same items from studies 1A, 1B, and 1C 
Present control, α=.82, Frazier et 
al. (2011) 
Same items from studies 1A, 1B, and 1C 
Future control, α=.85, Frazier et al. 
(2011) 
Same items from studies 1A, 1B, and 1C 
Future likelihood, α=.94, Frazier et 
al. (2012) 
Same items from studies 1A, 1B, and 1C 
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3.9.2 Results 
 
Scenarios were perceived as highly and equally realistic by participants from both 
experimental conditions (Mlow=6.51, SDlow=.82 vs. Mhigh=6.52, SDhigh=.82, p>.10). ANOVA 
revealed that the past control manipulation was effective (F(1, 121)=53.80, p<.001). 
Participants in the low past control condition reported lower past control than participants in 
the high past control condition (Mlow=2.02, SDlow=1.57, Mhigh=4.19, SDhigh=1.70). 
The general mean for the external causal locus manipulation check was high (M=5.81), 
indicating that participants recognized that the mechanic has caused the bad situation at the 
repair shop. But there was a significant effect of past control on external locus attribution (F(1, 
121)=7.75, p<.01), such that participants in the low past control condition reported more 
external locus attribution (M=6.22; SD=1.48) than participants in the high past control condition 
(M=5.44; SD=1.63). This means that external locus attribution varied even though the text about 
the rude treatment was exactly the same for both experimental conditions. 
Past control had a significant effect on regret. Participants in the high past control 
condition reported higher regret (M=4.96, SD=1.47) than participants in the low past control 
condition (M=4.18, SD=1.50; F(1, 121)=8.42, p<.01). This is consistent with what was 
expected based on the theoretical background presented in this chapter. Table 38 shows more 
details about the effect of past control on regret. 
 
Table 38 – Effect of past control on regret (study 2) 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F p 
Corrected Model 18.56 1 18.56 8.42 .004 
Intercept 2564.11 1 2564.11 1163.64 .000 
Past control 18.56 1 18.56 8.42 .004 
Error 266.63 121 2.20     
Total 2871.33 123       
Corrected Total 285.19 122       
 
Since past control had a significant effect on locus attribution and attributions, in turn, 
are deemed to affect emotions (Folkes, 1984, Weiner, 2000), a mediation analysis was 
conducted to further investigate how exactly past control, locus attribution, and regret relate. A 
mediation analysis conducted using PROCESS (model 4; 5,000 bootstrap samples) (Hayes, 
2013) showed that the effect of past control on regret was partially mediated by external causal 
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locus (a=-.39, b=-.21, ab=.08). The confidence interval for the indirect effect through external 
causal locus did not include zero (from .01 to .20), which indicates that the mediation exists. 
When considering external locus as a mediator, the direct effect of past control on regret 
remained significant (c’=.30, p<.05), which indicates that external locus is not completely 
mediating the effect of past control on regret and there may exist other mediators (Zhao, Lynch, 
& Chen, 2010). The total effect was significant (c=.39, p<.01). Figure 16 shows data from the 
mediation analysis. 
 
Figure 16 – Indirect effect of past control on regret (study 2) 
 
 
Past control had also a significant effect on guilt. Participants in the high past control 
condition reported to feel more guilty (M=4.02, SD=1.85) than participants in the low past 
control condition (M=2.03, SD=1.54; F(1, 121)=41.34, p<.001). This is also consistent with 
what was expected. Table 39 shows more details about the effect of past control on guilt. 
 
Table 39 – Effect of past control on guilt (study 2) 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F p 
Corrected Model 120.56 1 120.56 41.34 .000 
Intercept 1123.49 1 1123.49 385.20 .000 
Past control 120.56 1 120.56 41.34 .000 
Error 352.92 121 2.92     
Total 1629.00 123       
Corrected Total 473.48 122       
 
The effect of past control on guilt was also partially mediated by external causal locus 
(a=-.39, b=-.44, ab=.17), since the confidence interval for the indirect effect did not include 
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zero (from .04 to .34) and the direct effect of past control on guilt remained significant (c’=.82, 
p<.001). The total effect was significant (c=.99, p<.001). Figure 17 shows data from this 
mediation analysis. 
 
Figure 17 – Indirect effect of past control on guilt (study 2) 
 
 
Past control had a significant effect on self-focused anger. Participants in the high past 
control condition reported to feel more angry with themselves (M=4.39, SD=1.94) than 
participants in the low past control condition (M=2.39, SD=1.61; F(1, 121)=38.40, p<.001). 
This is also consistent with what was expected. Table 40 shows more details about the effect of 
past control on self-focused anger. 
 
Table 40 – Effect of past control on self-focused anger (study 2) 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F p 
Corrected Model 122.89 1 122.89 38.40 .000 
Intercept 1411.38 1 1411.38 440.98 .000 
Past control 122.89 1 122.89 38.40 .000 
Error 387.27 121 3.20     
Total 1958.00 123       
Corrected Total 510.16 122       
 
The effect of past control on self-focused anger was partially mediated by external 
causal locus (a=-.39, b=-.46, ab=.18). The confidence interval for the indirect effect did not 
include zero (from .04 to .36) and the direct effect of past control on guilt remained significant 
(c’=.82, p<.001). The total effect was significant (c=1.00, p<.001). Figure 18 shows data from 
this mediation. 
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Figure 18 – Indirect effect of past control on self-focused anger (study 2) 
 
 
Other-focused anger was also affected by past control. Participants in the high past 
control condition reported to feel less angry with the mechanic (M=5.64, SD=1.35) than 
participants in the low past control condition (M=6.24, SD=.95; F(1, 121)=7.90, p<.01), 
consistent with what was expected. Table 41 shows more details about the effect of past control 
on other-focused anger. 
 
Table 41 – Effect of past control on other-focused anger (study 2) 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F p 
Corrected Model 10.93 1 10.93 7.90 .006 
Intercept 4331.19 1 4331.19 3130.44 .000 
Past control 10.93 1 10.93 7.90 .006 
Error 167.41 121 1.38     
Total 4499.00 123       
Corrected Total 178.34 122       
 
The effect of past control on other-focused anger was fully mediated by external causal 
locus (a=-.39, b=.34, ab=-.13). The confidence interval for the indirect effect did not include 
zero (from -.29 to -.03). When considering external locus as a mediator, the direct effect of past 
control on other-focused anger became non-significant (c’=-.16, p>.05), but the total effect was 
significant (c=-.30, p<.01). Figure 19 shows data about this mediation. 
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Figure 19 – Indirect effect of past control on other-focused anger (study 2) 
 
 
Besides the effects on the emotions of regret, guilt, self- and other-focused anger, past 
control also affected some of the participants’ behavioral intentions. For instance, switch 
intention was significantly lower in the high past control (M=6.36, SD=1.12) than in the low 
past control condition (M=6.76, SD=.60; F(1, 121)=6.08, p<.05). Table 42 shows more data 
about this effect. 
 
Table 42 – Effect of past control on switch intention (study 2) 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F p 
Corrected Model 4.99 1 4.99 6.08 .015 
Intercept 5286.07 1 5286.07 6433.95 .000 
Past control 4.99 1 4.99 6.08 .015 
Error 99.41 121 .82     
Total 5386.00 123       
Corrected Total 104.41 122       
 
The effect of past control on switch intention was fully mediated by external causal 
locus and other-focused anger. This analysis was conducted with model 6 from PROCESS 
(Hayes, 2013). The confidence intervals for the indirect effect through external causal locus 
and other-focused anger did not include zero (ranging from -.18 to -.003). The direct effect 
became non-significant when considering both external locus and other-focused anger as 
mediators (c’=-.07). The total effect was significant (c=-.20). Results suggest that the more 
customers think they could have prevented a service failure, the less they blame the service 
provider, the less angry with the service provider they feel and such reduced external blame and 
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anger leads to less intention to switch to another service provider. Figure 20 shows the indirect 
effect through external locus attribution and other-focused anger. 
 
Figure 20 – Indirect effect of past control on switch intention (study 2) 
 
 
NWOM was significantly affected by past control. NWOM intention was significantly 
lower in high past control (M=6.08, SD=1.27) than in low past control condition (M=6.49, 
SD=.85; F(1, 121)=4.42, p<.05). More data about this effect is presented in table 43. 
 
Table 43 – Effect of past control on NWOM intention (study 2) 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F p 
Corrected Model 5.25 1 5.25 4.42 .038 
Intercept 4850.35 1 4850.35 4081.32 .000 
Past control 5.25 1 5.25 4.42 .038 
Error 143.80 121 1.19     
Total 4994.44 123       
Corrected Total 149.05 122       
 
The effect of past control on NWOM intention was also fully mediated by external 
causal locus and other-focused anger. The confidence intervals for the indirect effect through 
external causal locus and other-focused anger did not include zero (ranging from -.22 to -.01). 
The direct effect became non-significant when considering both external locus and other-
focused anger as mediators (c’=.01). The total effect was significant (c=-.21). The same logic 
from switch intention applies here: high past control leads to reduced external blame and anger 
toward the service provider which, in turn, lead to less intention to engage in NWOM. Figure 
21 shows the indirect effect through external locus attribution and other-focused anger. 
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Figure 21 – Indirect effect of past control on NWOM intention (study 2) 
 
 
Besides testing the effects of past control on emotions and behaviors, we also checked 
whether past control could influence other variables of the temporal model of perceived control: 
present control, future control, and future likelihood. The idea of investigating a potential effect 
of past control on other variables from the temporal model of perceived control comes from 
Frazier et al.'s (2001) suggestion of future investigation about the relationship between past and 
future control. The authors explain that these two forms of control might be related to each 
other. Therefore, we tested these and other possible relationships regarding past control. 
ANOVA revealed a positive effect of past control on future control. Participants in the high 
past control condition reported higher perceived future control (M=5.10) than participants in 
the low past control condition (M=4.57, F(1, 121)=8.48, p<.05). There was no significant effect 
of past control on perceived present control and future likelihood (p>.10).  There were also 
other variables measured on this study which were not significantly affected by past control:  
 Fear (F(1, 121)=.21, p=.65); 
 Disappointment (F(1, 121)=.22. p=.64); 
 Complaint intention (F(1, 121)=1.51, p=.22); 
 
 
3.9.3 Discussion 
 
According to the results of this experiment, the more a customer thinks s/he could have 
prevented a stressful service situation (i.e., the higher the past control), the less this customer 
blames the service provider (i.e., the lower the external locus attribution). Despite our effort on 
keeping external locus attribution constant – keeping the same rude treatment in both scenarios 
– individuals’ perception that they could have prevented a stressful situation made them ascribe 
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less blame to the service provider. Although there was an expectation that past control would 
not affect external attribution – after all, a service provider was rude to a customer that was not 
rude to him and this situation seems so inappropriate – the effect that was found converges with 
results from Hui and Toffoli (2002) showing that the higher the perceived control, the lower 
the external causal attribution, and also with the significant negative correlation between past 
control and external locus attribution found in studies 1A, 1B, and 1C.  
The effects of past control on regret, guilt, and self-focused anger were partially 
explained (i.e., complementary mediation) by external locus attribution, while the effect of past 
control on other-focused anger was fully explained (indirect-only or complete mediation). In 
sum, the higher the past control, the lower the external locus attribution and other-focused 
anger, and the higher the regret, guilt, and self-focused anger. 
The effects of past control on repurchase, switch, and NWOM intentions were fully 
explained by external locus attribution and other-focused anger. The higher the past control, the 
lower the external locus attribution and other-focused anger, consequently reducing switch and 
NWOM intentions. 
The fact that external locus attribution partially or completely mediates the effects of 
past control on emotions and behavioral intentions does not diminish the potential relevance of 
past control and the rest of the temporal model. In fact, it shows that past control has some 
influence over causal locus attribution, therefore, it is important to understand what the 
customer thinks about his/her role in the service failure to predict what the customer will think 
about the service provider’s role. It may be possible for service providers to influence customer 
locus attribution by increasing customer perceived past control. Perceived control may be 
increased through its antecedents, such as choice and information (Skinner, 1996), which could 
be antecedents of past control as well. Therefore, providing the customer with adequate service 
options and information previous to the service execution may lead to higher customer 
perceived past control over a service failure. In turn, such high past control may lead customers 
to attribute less blame to service providers. Besides, the partial (complementary) mediations 
indicate that external locus attribution does not explain all the effect of past control on emotions. 
In other words, one cannot deeply understand and anticipate customers’ reactions to service 
failure looking only to causal locus attribution because past control offer some insight to such 
reactions too. And finally, past control is just one part of the temporal model. Maybe other 
components of the temporal model of perceived control may as well interact with causal 
attributions and appraisals to explain customers’ reactions. 
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3.10 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
As failures are a reality in service industry and its consequences may be extremely 
harmful to customers and service providers, it is important to understand customers’ emotional 
and behavioral reactions to service failures. This article represents an initial effort to incorporate 
the temporal model of perceived control in studies about service failure. The temporal 
dimension of perceived control has not been investigated in service research - neither the model 
developed by Frazier and colleagues nor other temporal models. The four studies reported in 
this paper show that the temporal model of perceived control helps to explain and predict 
customer emotional and behavioral reactions after a stressful service experience.  
Not every emotion and behavior measured in this article was affected by the temporal 
model of perceived control. From the emotions and behaviors that were affected, regret, anger, 
guilt, repurchase, switch, and NWOM, were the ones more consistently related to the model 
because they were affected in study 2 and in at least one out of the three surveys previously 
described. So, the temporal model offers some significant results on its own, but it can also be 
used together with causal attributions and appraisals, increasing their explanatory power as 
shown in studies 1A, 1B, and 1C. It can also affect causal locus attribution as show in study 2.  
If used alone, as a substitute of causal attributions, the temporal model changes the focus 
of service failure research from external to internal, investigating customers’ perceived control 
rather than customers’ attributions about the service provider. If used together with attributions 
or appraisals, the temporal model allows the investigation of customers’ perceived role in a 
service failure no matter whether the failure was caused by the service provider. The model 
complements causal attributions and appraisals by asking whether customers: 1) had past 
control over the service failure, 2) have present control over their thoughts and emotions 
regarding the failure; 3) have future control over the failure, and 4) think the failure is likely to 
reoccur.   
Although the temporal model of perceived control had some encouraging results in this 
article, it did not excel attributions and appraisals in every emotional and behavioral reactions 
here investigated. But it seems to be very helpful when used together with attributions and 
appraisals, increasing some emotions and behaviors variance explained. Thus, the temporal 
model should be used along with causal attributions and appraisals to complement both models 
and lead to higher understanding of customer reactions to a service failure. 
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3.10.1 Implications 
 
Results have theoretical and managerial implications. From a theoretical perspective, it 
shows that the perceived control temporal model can be used in service failure research to better 
understand customers’ emotional and behavioral reactions. It broadens the scope of service 
research as it enables to look at the role of customers’ during and after service failures, 
something that has been overlooked in the area. It looks to customer perceived control in a 
temporal dimension (past, present, and future). Service and marketing research already adopt 
the concept of customer perceived control and its effect on causal attributions was already 
investigated (e.g., Hui & Toffoli, 2002). But studies have not been addressing the temporal 
dimension of perceived control. This article shows that such temporal dimension of perceived 
control affects customer reactions to service failures – like it affects individuals’ reactions to 
stressful life events (as showed by Frazier and colleagues). Therefore, investigations about 
service failures can benefit from using such model. 
From a managerial perspective, it shows that customer perceived control – something 
that service companies can manage – helps to predict customer reactions to a service failure. 
Service companies may increase customer perceived control – if they wish to do so – by 
providing antecedents of control to customers. Such antecedents could be information, 
predictability, choice, and decisions (Skinner, 1996). In other words, service providers may 
increase consumer perceived control by providing relevant information about the service 
process (e.g., which are the steps of the process and its total length), telling customers what to 
expect from the service outcome (e.g., how the service outcome will look like), and giving 
customers some options (e.g., letting them choose some of the service characteristics). Service 
providers may also increase customer perceived control by encouraging customer participation 
in service production/delivery (Chan et al., 2010). Knowing the different effects of perceived 
control on customers’ reactions may help service companies to decide the most suitable 
moments to raise customer perceived control.  
In view of the fact that the studies showed that the temporal dimension of perceived 
control matters when it comes to assessing customers’ reactions to service failures, practitioners 
should keep such temporality in mind when planning to raise or lower customer perceived 
control. In other words, service providers may benefit from increasing/decreasing customers’ 
perceived control before or after the service failure. For instance, according to the valence of 
the regression coefficients listed in section 3.9.8 (regressions conducted with the common 
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database), it may be helpful to increase past and present control and decrease future control in 
order to decrease customers’ anger toward the service provider. Increasing past control requires 
increasing customers’ perceived control prior to the service failure, while increasing (or 
decreasing) present and future control requires affecting customers’ perceived control after the 
service failure. So, there are probably many antecedents of perceived control that may be 
managed by service providers before or during the service delivery (i.e., before the occurrence 
of the service failure) and during the service recovery (i.e., after the service failure). 
At a first glance, increasing customers’ past and present control while decreasing 
customers’ future control seems like a good deal for service providers because it could lead to 
less NWOM according to the valence of the regression coefficients from section 3.9.8. 
Although regression results themselves do not show whether perceived control (cognition) 
affects behavior or whether it is the other way around, the literature suggests that behaviors are 
affected by cognitions and emotions (Weiner, 2000; Smith et al., 1993). Thus, it is interesting 
to notice that the best outcome for service providers does not come from empowering the 
customer whenever possible, otherwise increased future control should lead to less rather than 
more NWOM. Even though we can think of such theoretical and managerial implications, there 
are still many other investigations that could be done to create a solid knowledge about the 
temporal dimension of perceived control and its impact on customers’ reactions to stressful 
service failures. Next section debates the limitations of the studies conducted in this chapter 
and suggests some future research. 
 
 
3.10.2 Limitations and future research 
 
As a first step to use the perceived control temporal model in service failure research, 
this research has limitations concerning the scope of its investigation. Although it tested the 
potential effects of the temporal model on several emotions and behaviors, there are other 
emotions (e.g., shame and anxiety) and behaviors (e.g., inertia) that could also be affected by 
the model. Each emotion leads to particular way(s) of coping with it, also leading to specific 
behaviors. For instance, regretful customers have different behavioral reactions when compared 
to disappointed ones (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004). This is a reason why it is relevant to 
understand whether and how the temporal model of perceived control could influence other 
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emotions. Future studies could scrutinize the effects of each component of the temporal model 
(i.e., past, present, future, and future likelihood) on different emotions. 
Also, the temporal model of perceived control could be affecting (or being affected by) 
causal attributions and appraisals. For instance, there was a significant negative correlation 
between future control and external locus attribution in studies 1A and 1C (p<.05), and a 
significant positive correlation between present control and future expectancies appraisal in 
studies 1B and 1C (p<.05). Future studies could address the way the model relates to 
attributions, appraisals, or other customer cognitions. 
Some of the components of the model seem uncorrelated to some attributions and 
appraisals. One example is the lack of significant correlation between future control and 
stability attribution in studies 1A, 1B, and 1C, suggesting that both cognitions work 
independently from each other. Even cases like this could generate interesting future researches. 
One could investigate what happens when a customer thinks the cause of a failure is permanent 
(stable and, therefore, likely to reoccur) but at the same time s/he thinks s/he can prevent the 
failure from happening again (future control). What could have a higher impact on customer 
switch intention: the fact that whatever caused the service failure has not been fixed yet or the 
fact that the customer will not be able to prevent the failure recurrence? In case stability is the 
one thing that matters the most, switch intention should be positively affected (higher switch 
intention). But in case perceived future control is more important than stability, switch intention 
could be positively affected (i.e., low future control leading to low switch intention) – according 
to the valence of regression coefficients from the common database – or unaffected, because 
customers who think they can prevent the failure from occurring again do not need to fear the 
failure reoccurrence. In other words, customers who think they can prevent a failure can keep 
on doing business with the same service provider because they know what to do to prevent the 
failure. 
Besides affecting or interacting with causal attributions, the components of the 
perceived control temporal model could influence each other. Frazier et al. (2001) discuss 
whether past and future control could be related to each other without empirically investigating 
it. The authors use examples to show that past and future could be either related or unrelated to 
each other. They argue that a person who caused a car accident while talking on his or her cell 
phone could report a high level of both past and future control because this person may think 
he or she could have prevented this accident and will be able to prevent a similar one in the 
future. On the other hand, a person whose partner died from cancer may report a high level of 
past control, believing s/he could have prevented her/his partner’s disease by making this 
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partner eat healthy food, but it is unlikely that high past control level would be associated with 
high future control level on this situation. Thus, future studies could examine whether and how 
past and future control (or past and present, future and present, etc.) relate to each other and 
how this could affect customer emotions and behaviors. 
The temporal model of perceived control was used in the present chapter exactly the 
same way it was used by Frazier and colleagues (i.e., the same four components and 22 items). 
The model was developed to explain emotional and behavioral reactions to varied stressful life 
events. In order to use it in a more specific context such as service failures, one can adapt such 
model, using different components and items relevant to such context. For instance, a second 
type of perceived present control that could be investigated in the context of service failure is 
whether customers have any control over the failure right now, acting to correct or mitigate the 
consequences of the failure rather than simply trying to control their thoughts and emotions 
about it. For instance, in a situation similar to the one described in study 2, there are things 
customers can do when the mechanic is being rude (e.g., ask to talk to another person, tell the 
mechanic to calm down, leave the repair shop, etc.) or after (e.g., complain to the manager, 
complain to the mechanic, etc.) that refer neither to controlling their emotions and thoughts nor 
preventing the recurrence of the event. Rather, such actions refer to having control over the 
situation in the present, changing the failure course of action or mitigating its consequences. 
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4 CO-PRODUCTION AND THE CAUSAL LOCUS ATTRIBUTION 
 
Imagine that you went to a gym aiming to lose some weight. You and your personal 
trainer established a workout programme together to achieve this objective. After some months, 
you are not satisfied with the outcome of your workout programme. Who is to blame? You, 
who helped your personal trainer to set up the workout programme, or your personal trainer, 
the service provider who should have advised you correctly? This causal locus attribution (i.e., 
blaming the service provider, yourself, or both for a failure) in contexts in which customers 
participate in the production of a service for themselves is a key element of service management 
because co-production – customer participation in the production of an outcome that will be 
consumed (Etgar, 2008; Lusch & Vargo, 2006) – is becoming increasingly common (Atakan, 
Bagozzi, & Yoon, 2014), and service failures are a reality in many service encounters (Joireman 
et al., 2013). Despite such importance, there are few studies about the effect of co-production 
on causal locus attribution, and these studies have conflicting results. Also, knowledge about 
failed co-produced services is lacking (Heidenreich et al., 2015). This research aims to partly 
fill this gap by analysing failed results of co-production, their impact on customers’ causal locus 
attribution, emotional reactions (i.e., regret, disappointment), and dissatisfaction. Regret and 
disappointment were chosen among several negative emotions because they are the two 
emotions most closely related to decision making (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002). Besides, 
these two emotions have been addressed as antecedents of customer dissatisfaction in the 
context of failed services (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 1999, 2004). 
Previous research has demonstrated the positive effects of co-production as a service 
management strategy, such as higher customer satisfaction, perceived control, and perceived 
quality (Chan et al., 2010; Golder, Mitra, & Moorman, 2012; Hunt, Geiger-Oneto, & Varca, 
2012). Although co-production has been associated with such positive outcomes, co-produced 
services may have failures and lead to customer dissatisfaction. According to Heidenreich et al. 
(2015), research on the consequences of failed co-produced services is scarce. Service 
management theory and practice can be improved by studying not only successful co-
production cases but also what happens when co-production results in failure.  
When approaching service failures, causal locus attribution seems imperative for 
explaining customers’ reactions. Few papers have addressed the relationship between co-
production and causal locus attribution (i.e., whether the cause of a failure is perceived as 
internal – due to the customer – or external – due to the service provider or other circumstances) 
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in a failed co-produced service (e.g., Heidenreich et al., 2015; Jong-Kuk et al., 2010; Yen et al., 
2004). Some of these studies show that high participation leads to more external attributions 
(Jong-Kuk et al., 2010; Yen et al., 2004). These findings are in line with the self-serving 
attributional bias literature (hereafter referred to as self-serving bias), which refers to a tendency 
for individuals to attribute success to internal causes (i.e., themselves) and failures to external 
causes (i.e., other people or circumstances) (Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004; 
Weiner, 1985). According to this bias, one could expect more external attributions for failed 
co-produced services. In contrast, Heidenreich et al. (2015) found that high participation leads 
to more internal attributions. Indeed, evidence suggests that co-production is positively related 
to customer perceived control (Chan et al., 2010), which in turn is positively related to internal 
causal attributions (Hui & Toffoli, 2002). Consequently, one could expect more internal 
attributions for failed co-produced services. In short, despite such important previous research, 
the literature on the subject is conflicting and inconclusive.  
However, sometimes it may be hard to attribute a failure to the service provider or the 
customer, because people may be uncertain about causal attributions (Choi & Mattila, 2008; 
Weary & Jacobson, 1997). As far as we know, none of the previous research about causal locus 
attribution in failed co-produced services have addressed causal uncertainty. And there are two 
reasons why addressing causal uncertainty in failed co-produced services is relevant: First, two 
parties (customer and service provider) had participated in the creation of the failed service, so 
both could have contributed to cause the failure. Not one party or the other, but both could have 
made decisions that together led to the undesirable outcome. Therefore, it is possible to have 
more than one cause for the failure, and the presence of more than one cause can lead to causal 
uncertainty (Barrowclough & Hooley, 2003). Second, causal uncertainty may lead to reduced 
emotional intensity (Barrowclough & Hooley, 2003). Thus, it would be interesting to 
understand whether causal uncertainty could reduce customer regret, disappointment, and 
dissatisfaction in case of failed co-produced services. 
The present research differs from the few previous investigations regarding the 
influence of co-production on causal locus attribution by examining the effects of uncertain 
causal locus attribution (i.e., when it is hard to tell who is the one to blame). More specifically, 
the purpose of this research is threefold: 1) to investigate the influence of co-production on 
customers’ causal locus attribution for failed co-produced services, adding to the scarce amount 
of empirical studies on the subject; 2) to investigate customers’ dissatisfaction and emotional 
reactions to such failures, particularly regret and disappointment, which depict internal and 
external attributions, respectively; and 3) to explore how people react when causal locus 
106 
 
attribution is uncertain. Failed co-produced services in which the causal locus is uncertain is 
investigated and compared with situations of internal and external causal attributions.  
This paper is structured as follows. First, the theoretical framework is presented, 
addressing co-production, causal locus attributions, regret, disappointment, and dissatisfaction. 
Next, two experimental studies that test the hypotheses are described. Finally, there is a general 
discussion, together with theoretical and managerial implications, limitations, and suggestions 
for future studies. 
 
 
4.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
4.1.1 Co-production  
 
The terms “co-production” and “co-creation of value” are sometimes used 
interchangeably. We adopt the distinction made by Lusch and Vargo (2006), endorsed by Etgar 
(2008), that co-production refers to customer participation in the creation of the core offering, 
while co-creation of value refers to customer creation of value during the consumption stage. 
This chapter focuses on service co-production only: customer participation in service 
specification and delivery (Yen et al., 2004). In a co-production situation, at least two parties – 
the service provider and the customer – collaborate in the generation of an outcome that can be 
satisfactory or not. 
One of the main characteristics of services is the inseparability of production and 
consumption (Parasuraman et al., 1985). Thus, customers usually are present during the service 
production stage. This may raise the question of whether every service involves some level of 
co-production. One could wrongly assume that customers are always present during the 
production and consumption of services and that customers are always services co-producers. 
In that case, one could think we should be exploring the effects of low versus high co-production 
levels rather than the effects of co-production versus no co-production. Indeed, there are papers 
investigating the effects of co-production levels (e.g., Heidenreich et al., 2015; Jong-Kuk et al., 
2010; Yen et al., 2004). 
But this inseparability characteristic has been challenged, and there are some services 
in which production and consumption are not simultaneous (Lovelock & Gummesson, 2004). 
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One example of separable services refer to services delivered to physical possessions, in which 
the presence of the customer is not necessary, such as equipment maintenance (Lovelock & 
Gummesson, 2004). Thus, customers do not need to be present during the service delivery or 
participate of it. And even when services involve customers’ presence, such as dinner at a 
restaurant, customers may either participate in the creation of the service – by ordering an item 
from the menu and specifying its characteristics (e.g., rare steak, no pepper) – or not. Bendapudi 
and Leone (2003) manipulated co-production versus no co-production in service contexts (e.g., 
a customer drafting and sending a letter – with the assistance of a lawyer – versus a lawyer 
drafting and sending a letter on behalf of a customer). So, we see no problem on comparing co-
production with no co-production in service contexts.  
 
 
4.1.2 Co-production and causal locus attributions 
 
Attribution emerges when the customer compares performance versus expectations and 
evaluates such outcomes (Weiner, 2000). Sometimes, these outcomes are negative, which is 
obviously not desired by neither the customer nor the service provider. The search for 
attribution is more frequent after failures – when customers do not obtain a desired outcome 
(Abramson et al., 1978) – than after successful situations (Weiner, 2000). One of the attributions 
a customer may formulate after a failure refers to the causal locus – attributing the cause of the 
failure to oneself, the company or the circumstances (Folkes, 1984, Weiner, 2000).  
So far, the literature on whether customers who co-produce will make more external 
(vs. internal) attributions after service failures is still inconclusive. One research stream states 
that a self-serving bias will occur, that is, the tendency for individuals to attribute success to 
internal causes (i.e., themselves) and failures to external causes (i.e., other people or 
circumstances) (Mezulis et al., 2004; Weiner, 1985). However, another research stream states 
that co-production leads to more perceived control (Chan et al., 2010), which should lead to 
more internal attributions for failures (Heidenreich et al., 2015; Hui & Toffoli, 2002). In short, 
there are different approaches in the literature suggesting that co-production may either increase 
or decrease the self-serving bias (Yen et al., 2004). 
Jong-Kuk et al. (2010) and Yen et al. (2004) show that co-production may increase 
external attributions and, therefore, the self-serving bias. According to these authors, 
customers’ level of participation during co-production may explain the impact on causal 
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attributions. Higher customer participation leads to more external attribution than lower 
customer participation (i.e., higher customer participation increases the self-serving bias). 
Jong-Kuk et al. (2010) and Yen et al. (2004) use equity theory (Walster, Berscheid, & 
Walster, 1973) to formulate their hypotheses and justify their results. The authors’ rationale is 
that high participation implies high inputs from the customer (e.g., information, effort, and other 
inputs). The discrepancy between customers’ high inputs and service providers’ low output 
(i.e., failed service) will generate customers’ desire to protect their self-esteem, which will make 
them attribute blame to the service provider rather than blaming themselves (Jong-Kuk et al., 
2010; Yen et al., 2004).  
The psychology literature may also offer some insight about the positive relationship 
between co-production and self-serving bias. According to Campbell and Sedikides (1999), 
factors that pose a threat to the self usually lead to self-serving bias to protect the self against 
such threat. For instance, these authors argue that a person who plays an actor role will 
experience more self-threat and more self-serving bias than a person who plays an observer 
role. One may argue that, when co-producing, customers play more the role of actor than 
observer, which suggests that co-producers will face a higher self-threat compared to non-co-
producers, which in turn should lead to higher self-serving bias.  
However, there are conflicting findings regarding co-production increasing internal 
attributions and, therefore, reducing the self-serving bias. For example, Heidenreich et al. 
(2015) found evidence that a high level of co-production leads to more internal attributions than 
a lower level of co-production, which is the opposite result found by Jong-Kuk et al. (2010) and 
Yen et al. (2004). The rationale behind this result is that high level of co-production (i.e., high 
participation) means high customer involvement, which in turn is positively related to 
responsibility. So, customers with high level of co-production feel more responsible and make 
more internal attributions than customers with low level of co-production (Heidenreich et al., 
2015). 
And as far as satisfaction is concerned, Bendapudi and Leone (2003) have shown that 
there is no difference in the resulting dissatisfaction with the company between customers who 
co-produced and those who did not. According to Bendapudi and Leone (2003), differences 
appear only when customers have the option to co-produce. Giving customers this option leads 
to lower dissatisfaction with the company. This result suggests that co-production, associated 
with the option given to the customer to participate in the process, may reduce the self-serving 
bias (i.e., increase internal attribution) in dissatisfying services. 
109 
 
Other evidence suggesting that co-production may increase internal attribution is the 
higher perceived control level among customers who co-produce (Chan et al., 2010; Pacheco 
et al., 2013). Customers with higher perceived control levels tend to make more internal 
attributions than external attributions (Hui & Toffoli, 2002). In addition to being an antecedent 
of perceived control, co-production may be seen as an actual type of control, i.e., behavioural 
control, which refers to an action that may influence or modify an event (Averill, 1973). Control 
and responsibility are closely related (Weiner, 1995). The more people perceive having control 
over their acts, the more responsible they feel (Caouette et al., 2012). Lack of control, in turn, 
increases attributional activity (Pittman & Pittman, 1980), suggesting that the lower the 
perceived control, the higher the search for someone to blame for a failure. 
In an effort to understand which perspective holds for failed co-produced services, this 
paper relies on such control and responsibility literature and empirical evidence to expect more 
internal attributions for failed co-produced services. Previous results linking co-production to 
higher external attribution may be due to factors other than co-production itself, such as effort 
and commitment. For instance, Yen et al. (2004) describe a scenario with a level of co-
production in which customers did their best while co-producing, which would consequently 
lead to higher external attribution for a failure (i.e., if I did everything right, somebody else 
must have done something wrong). However, co-production is not necessarily related to highly 
committed customers putting all their effort into it. When levels of effort and commitment 
during co-production are not stressed, customers who co-produce may see themselves as partly 
responsible for the service outcome (Hess et al., 2007), consequently perceiving less service 
provider control over such outcome. Hence, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
H1: Customers who co-produce (vs. do not co-produce) tend to make more internal than 
external attributions for a service failure. 
 
Rather than blaming the service provider or themselves, sometimes customers may be 
uncertain about causal attributions (Choi & Mattila, 2008; Weary & Jacobson, 1997). In 
general, uncertainty is caused by a lack of knowledge (Volz, Schubotz, & Von Cramon, 2004). 
Causal uncertainty may be consequence of chronic individual differences but it may also be 
produced by the situation (Weary & Jacobson, 1997). Co-production may enhance the 
possibility of such causal locus uncertainty because it brings customers into the service 
production process, making customer and service provider jointly work on it. So, both customer 
and service provider could be responsible for what they have jointly produced. And situations 
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are not always so straightforward to identify only one responsible. Sometimes, both parties may 
have some responsibility over the results. There may be more than one cause for a failure too, 
and the presence of more than one cause can lead to causal uncertainty (Barrowclough & 
Hooley, 2003). 
Adding causal locus uncertainty to the investigation of internal and external attributions 
may help to better understand customers’ emotional reactions in face of failed co-produced 
services. This way, it is possible to comprehend customer experienced regret, disappointment, 
and dissatisfaction when the fault is on the company, customer, and when it is hard to determine 
(uncertain). Causal uncertainty may lead to reduced emotional intensity (Barrowclough & 
Hooley, 2003), mitigating customers’ negative reactions towards the service provider (Choi & 
Mattila, 2008). Therefore, it is logical to expect reduced levels of negative emotions from 
customers with causal locus uncertainty (vs. internal or external causal locus attribution). 
However, this result cannot be taken for granted, since we did not find papers addressing locus 
uncertainty in failed co-produced services. If co-production leads to more internal attribution 
as stated by H1, then locus uncertainty could lead to emotional reactions similar to those of 
internal locus attribution. We do not formulate hypothesis about the effects of uncertain causal 
locus, but we do investigate how locus uncertainty affects regret, disappointment, and 
dissatisfaction in failed co-produced services. The next section addresses the expected effects 
of internal and external causal attributions on regret, disappointment, and dissatisfaction. 
 
 
4.1.3 Regret, disappointment, and dissatisfaction 
 
The comparison between obtained and expected results is known as counterfactual 
thinking, and it affects customers’ emotional reactions (Zeelenberg et al., 1998). Regret 
emerges from a comparison between the result and the outcome that could have been obtained 
if the customer had done something different. Disappointment emerges from a comparison 
between the obtained result and the outcome that could have been obtained if an external 
circumstance (e.g., the service provider’s actions) had been different (Zeelenberg et al., 1998). 
Based on counterfactual thinking theory (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004), regret may emerge when 
the causal locus of a failure is on the customer. Conversely, disappointment may emerge when 
the causal locus is on the company. In line with that, it is expected that customers will 
experience more regret when they attribute the cause of a failed co-produced service to 
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themselves and more disappointment when they attribute the cause of a failed co-produced 
service to the service provider.  
Although frustration and sadness – proxies for dissatisfaction – may be seen as more 
outcome-dependent (i.e., associated with failure) than attribution-dependent (Weiner, 1985), 
there is evidence pointing to a direct effect of causal attribution on (dis)satisfaction. According 
to Choi and Mattila (2008), customers report lower satisfaction level after a service failure when 
they perceive that the service provider could have prevented the failure but did not do so (i.e., 
external controllable cause), compared to when the customer is partly responsible for the failure 
(i.e., internal and controllable cause). This suggests a positive effect of external attribution on 
dissatisfaction. Besides, Zeelenberg and Pieters (2004) found that both regret and 
disappointment are important determinants of dissatisfaction. Together, both emotions 
explained 88% of dissatisfaction variance in their study – disappointment accounted for 60% 
of such explained variance. This high association between dissatisfaction and disappointment 
is an extra sign of a potential positive effect of external attribution on dissatisfaction. Therefore, 
the following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
H2: In case of failed services, the higher the customer internal attribution, (a) the higher 
the regret, (b) the lower the disappointment, and (c) the lower the dissatisfaction. 
 
In short, it is expected that, in case of failed services, co-production will affect causal 
locus attribution, such that customers who co-produce will make more internal than external 
attributions, as opposed to customers who do not co-produce (H1). It is also expected that 
customers who co-produce will experience more regret and less disappointment and 
dissatisfaction than customers who do not co-produce because regret is associated with internal 
attributions, whereas disappointment and dissatisfaction are associated with external 
attributions (Choi & Mattila, 2008; Zeelenberg et al., 1998). And when co-production is kept 
constant but attributions vary, customers who co-produce and make internal attributions will 
tend to experience more regret and less disappointment and dissatisfaction than customers who 
co-produce and make external attributions (H2).  
Figure 22 shows the theoretical framework that integrates co-production, causal locus 
attributions, regret, and disappointment.   
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Figure 22 – Theoretical framework 
 
 
Next sections describe the methodological procedure aimed at testing the two 
hypotheses. Two experiments were conducted. Study 1 is aimed at overcoming conflicting 
results of previous research about the influence of co-production on customer causal locus 
attributions for failed services. Study 2 extends the results of study 1 by investigating the effects 
of causal locus attribution on regret, disappointment, and dissatisfaction while exploring how 
people react when causal locus attribution is uncertain. Together, the studies test the two 
hypotheses under different types of services (restaurant, gym, and online purchase of a t-shirt) 
to strengthen the external validity of the results. The different service contexts allow the 
observation of co-production and causal locus attribution effects on services that vary in length 
(a restaurant service is delivered the same day it is ordered while a gym service is delivered a 
little bit each day), although such variable was not controlled for. 
 
 
4.2 STUDY 1 
 
The purpose of study 1 was to test the hypotheses by manipulating co-production (co-
production and no co-production) and measuring causal locus attributions, regret, and 
disappointment. The final sample was 118 people (53% women, Mage=37.25, SD=13.72) after 
deleting 13 respondents with incorrect answer to the attention check. The attention check was 
a question in which participants were told to choose the option “others” as the answer. 
Participants were recruited via Mechanical Turk. 
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4.2.1 Procedure  
 
Each participant was randomly assigned to two co-production or two no co-production 
scenarios to test two different service contexts (restaurant and gym). First they read a text about 
a meal that was worse than expected (restaurant context) and answered questions about it. Then, 
they read a text about workout programme results that were worse than expected (gym 
scenario). The four scenarios are presented in table 44. 
 
Table 44 – Co-production conditions for restaurant and gym contexts 
 Co-production manipulation No co-production manipulation 
Restaurant 
context 
Imagine that you decided to go to a restaurant in 
order to have dinner. In the restaurant, you are able 
to create a special meal the way you want (i.e., a 
customized meal) instead of choosing a pre-existing 
option from the menu. You decided to try a meal you 
have never tasted before. So, you tell the waiter 
which pasta you want, the pasta’s sauce, and the side 
dish you chose. You even ask him to include some 
ingredients to the sauce that were not in the original 
recipe. After your meal is served, you get the feeling 
that it was worse than you expected. 
Imagine that you decided to go to a restaurant in 
order to have dinner. In the restaurant, you are able 
to order your meal by choosing a pre-existing option 
from the menu, but you cannot create a special meal 
the way you want (a customized meal). So, you tell 
the waiter which option you chose. It is pasta with 
sauce and a side dish. You cannot include 
ingredients to the sauce that were not in the original 
recipe. After your meal is served, you get the feeling 
that it was worse than you expected. 
Gym 
context 
Imagine that you joined a gym to lose some weight. 
You actively participated in the design of your 
workout programme with your personal trainer. You 
chose the exercises you would do and the ones you 
wouldn’t. After three months, the results were worse 
than you expected. 
Imagine that you joined a gym to lose some weight. 
You did not participate in the design of your workout 
programme. Your personal trainer chose for you the 
exercises you would do and the ones you wouldn’t. 
After three months, the results were worse than you 
expected. 
 
 
4.2.2 Measures 
 
Co-production manipulation check consisted of one item measuring the extent to which 
participants agree they have actively participated in the creation of the meal (restaurant context) 
and in the design of the workout programme (gym context) on a 7-point scale. Causal locus 
attribution was measured with a bipolar item asking who was the responsible for the fact that 
the meal/workout results were worse than expected (1 = the restaurant/personal trainer, 7 = 
myself). 
Both regret and disappointment were measured by 7-point items adapted from Marcatto 
and Ferrante (2008): “I wish I had chosen differently” for regret and “I wish the other 
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people/factors involved that were beyond my control had led me to a different outcome” for 
disappointment. Dissatisfaction was measure with one item on a 7-point scale. Table 45 shows 
all these measures in the same order they were asked in the questionnaire. 
 
Table 45 – Measures from study 1 
Name of the variable, source Item(s) 
Co-production manipulation check I have actively participated in the creation of the meal I ordered in this 
restaurant 
Causal locus attribution In the situation just described, who was the responsible for the fact that 
your meal was worse than you expected (The restaurant / Myself) 
Regret, Marcatto and Ferrante 
(2008) 
I wish I had made a different choice 
Disappointment, Marcatto and 
Ferrante (2008) 
I wish other people/factors that were beyond my control had led to a 
different outcome 
Dissatisfaction In general, how dissatisfied were you with this restaurant 
 
On the debriefing, participants were asked to guess the purpose of the investigation. 
There was no evidence of demand artifacts since participants did not identify the purpose of the 
investigation. Scenarios were reported as credible for both restaurant (M=5.57, 1 = impossible 
to occur in real life, 7 = possible to occur in real life) and gym (M=5.64). ANOVA showed that 
scenarios with and without co-production did not vary regarding their credibility (prest=.96; 
pgym=.44). 
 
 
4.2.3 Results 
 
ANOVA revealed that manipulations were effective in both service contexts. 
Participants in the co-production scenario reported higher levels of participation in the creation 
of their meal (F(1, 116)=254.78, p<.001, M=6.28, SD=1.22) and workout programme (F(1, 
116)=314.85, p<.001, M=6.35, SD=.83) than participants in the no co-production scenarios in 
both restaurant (M=2.15, SD=1.56) and gym contexts (M=2.02, SD=1.66). 
Consistent with H1, customers who co-produced reported more internal attribution for 
failures than customers who did not co-produce. For the restaurant context, participants in the 
no co-production scenario attributed the blame more to the restaurant (F(1, 116)=57.29, p<.001, 
M=3.02, SD=1.89) whereas participants in the co-production scenario attributed the blame more 
to themselves (M=5.46, SD=1.58). For the gym context, participants in the no co-production 
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scenario also attributed the blame more to the service provider (F(1, 116)=33.85, p<.001, 
M=3.39, SD=2.12) than participants in the co-production scenario (M=5.37, SD=1.50). 
H2a stated that the higher the internal attribution, the higher the customer regret. There 
was no support for this hypothesis because neither co-production (p>.10 for both service 
contexts) nor locus attribution affected regret (p>.10 for both service contexts).  
Consistent with H2b, customers who reported higher internal attribution (i.e., customers 
who co-produced) reported lower disappointment. The effect of co-production on 
disappointment was significant for the restaurant context (p<.001) and marginally significant 
for the gym context (p<.10). For the restaurant context, participants in the co-production 
scenario reported lower disappointment (F(1, 116)=10.74, p<.001, M=4.53, SD=1.77) than 
participants in the no co-production scenario (M=5.44, SD=1.23). For the gym context, 
disappointment level was slightly lower for participants in the co-production scenario (F(1, 
116)=3.00, p=.09, M=4.68, SD=1.78) than for participants in the no co-production scenario 
(M=5.25, SD=1.74).  
Regression analyses showed significant effect of locus attribution on disappointment for 
both the restaurant (R²=.11, β=-.34, t=-3.87, p<.001) and gym contexts (R²=.11, β=-.33, t= -3.71, 
p<.001). The negative valence of the t values indicates that the more internal the attribution, the 
lower the disappointment. This result provides further support to H2b.  
To test whether locus mediated the relationship between co-production and 
disappointment, it was conducted analysis with model 4 of PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) using 
5,000 bootstrap samples. There was no sign of mediation for the restaurant context because the 
confidence interval for the indirect effect included zero (from -.48 to .01). But there was sign 
of mediation for the gym context (the confidence interval for the indirect effect did not include 
zero: from -.47 to -.09). For the gym context, participants who co-produced reported more 
internal attribution (a=.99), which in turn led to less disappointment (b=-.28). The direct effect 
of co-production on disappointment was no significant (c’=-.01, p=.96). These results point to 
a complete or indirect-only mediation (Zhao et al., 2010). Figure 23 shows results from the 
mediation analysis for the gym context. 
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Figure 23 – Direct and indirect effect of co-production on disappoinment for the gym context 
 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 
Co-production was also associated with lower dissatisfaction levels. For the restaurant 
context, participants in the co-production scenario reported lower dissatisfaction (F(1, 
116)=28.84, p<.001, M=4.23, SD=1.70) than participants in the no co-production scenario 
(M=5.72, SD=1.31). Similarly, for the gym context, participants in the co-production scenario 
reported lower dissatisfaction (F(1, 116)=24.97, p<.001, M=4.40, SD=1.75) than participants 
in the no co-production scenario (M=5.79, SD=1.23).  
For the restaurant context, regression analyses showed significant effects of locus 
attribution (R²=.34, β=.-.58, t=-7.73, p<.001) and disappointment (R²=.16, β=.40, t=4.74, 
p<.001) on dissatisfaction. No significant effect of regret on dissatisfaction though (p=.56). For 
the gym context, there was significant effects of locus attribution (R²=.15, β=-.39, t=-4.52, 
p<.001) and disappointment (R²=.07, β=.26, t=2.87, p<.01) on dissatisfaction and marginally 
significant effect of regret on dissatisfaction (R²=.03, β=.17, t=1.81, p=.07). 
 Using model 6 of PROCESS (Hayes, 2013), we tested whether locus attribution and 
disappointment12 mediated the effect of co-production on dissatisfaction. This model tests 
mediators operating in serial (i.e., co-production -> locus -> disappointment -> dissatisfaction) 
and also provides results for one mediator at a time (i.e., co-production -> locus -> 
dissatisfaction / co-production -> disappointment -> dissatisfaction). For both the restaurant and 
gym contexts, only the confidence interval for locus as the single mediator did not include zero 
(from -.64 to -.21 and from -.33 to -.003, respectively).  
                                                 
 
12 Regret was not tested as a mediator because there was no effect of co-production on regret. 
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Because there was no sign of disappointment as a mediator, we repeated the mediation 
analysis using only locus attribution as a mediator and using model 4 of PROCESS. For the 
restaurant context, participants who co-produced reported more internal attribution (a=1.22), 
which in turn led to less dissatisfaction (b=-.39). The confidence interval for the indirect effect 
(ab=-.47) based on 5,000 bootstrap samples did not include zero (-.70 to -.27). The direct effect 
of co-production on dissatisfaction was only marginally significant (c’=-.28, p=.07). For the 
gym context, the effect of co-production on locus attribution (a=.99) and the effect of locus 
attribution on dissatisfaction (b=-.19) kept the same direction from the restaurant context. The 
confidence interval for the indirect effect (ab=-.19) did not include zero (-.36 to -.04). The direct 
effect of co-production on dissatisfaction was significant (c’=-.50, p=.001). These results point 
to a complementary mediation (Zhao et al., 2010), which means that causal locus is a mediator 
but other variable(s) may also be mediating the effect of co-production on dissatisfaction. 
Figures 24 and 25 show the mediation data for the restaurant and gym contexts, respectively. 
 
Figure 24 – Direct and indirect effect of co-production on dissatisfaction for the restaurant context  
 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 
Figure 25 – Direct and indirect effect of co-production on dissatisfaction for the gym context  
 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Figures 26 (restaurant context) and 27 (gym context) show levels of regret, 
disappointment, and dissatisfaction for co-production and no co-production conditions. 
 
Figure 26 – Customer regret, disappointment, and dissatisfaction for the restaurant context  
 
 
Figure 27 – Customer regret, disappointment, and dissatisfaction for the gym context 
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4.2.4 Discussion 
 
Results from two different service contexts (gym and restaurant) suggest that co-
production is positively associated with internal attributions for a service failure. These results 
are in line with results from Heidenreich et al. (2015), but contradict findings from Jong-Kuk 
et al. (2010) and Yen et al. (2004). Results from both service contexts (gym and restaurant) are 
consistent with indications that co-production is positively related to perceived control (Chan 
et al., 2010; Pacheco et al., 2013), which in turn is positively related to internal attributions (Hui 
& Toffoli, 2002), and that perceived control and responsibility are closely related (Weiner, 
1995).  
Results of this first study show that failed co-produced services may have more 
beneficial consequences for the service provider than failed services that were not co-produced. 
When customers participate in the service production and the outcome is worse than expected, 
customers tend to attribute at least part of the blame to themselves, feel less dissatisfied and 
disappointed with the service provider than customers who did not participate. Causal locus 
attribution – as a complementary mediator – helps to explain the effect of co-production on 
customer dissatisfaction. Co-production and the increased internal attribution derived from co-
production did not make participants feel more regretful. These results suggest that co-
production may decrease customer negative emotional reactions toward the service provider 
without necessarily increasing customer self-focused negative emotional reactions. 
So far, the results show that co-production has a bright side even when services fail. 
Thus, co-production may be instigated by service providers that seek to reduce customer 
disappointment and dissatisfaction. In order to further investigate the consequences of failed 
co-produced services – the dark side of co-production – study 2 examines customer regret, 
disappointment, and dissatisfaction in a failed co-produced service with different causal locus 
attributions. For this purpose, co-production is kept constant while only causal locus is 
manipulated. This enables an investigation of consequences of failed co-produced services from 
a different perspective.  
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4.3 STUDY 2 
 
This study consisted in a single-factor13 between-subjects experiment. It was conducted 
in the context of an online service that allows customers to co-produce a T-shirt. Causal locus 
was manipulated in a way that the fault was on the company (company’s locus), on the customer 
(customer’s locus), or uncertain (uncertain locus). The final sample consisted of 129 people 
(47% women, Mage=30.86, SD=10.06) after deleting 15 respondents with incorrect answer to 
the attention check (same question from study 1). Participants were recruited via Mechanical 
Turk and randomly assigned to one of the three conditions of the study. 
 
 
4.3.1 Procedure 
 
Participants were told to read a text and imagine themselves in a scenario that involved 
the co-production of a T-shirt on a company’s website, the design of the artwork to be printed 
in the T-shirt, and also the choice of the T-shirt’s size and colors. The scenario stated that the 
co-produced T-shirt delivered at their homes was worse than expected. Then, participants 
allocated to the company’s locus scenario read the following text: “So, you think it was the 
company’s fault, since they made some changes in the artwork you designed”. Participants 
allocated to the customer’s locus scenario read the text: “So, you think it was your fault, since 
you designed an artwork that did not look well on a T-shirt”. Finally, participants of the 
uncertain locus scenario read the text: “You do not know whose fault it was, because you do 
not remember whether you designed the artwork that way or the company made some changes 
on it”. 
                                                 
 
13 In a pilot study, we tried to conduct an experiment with a 2 (co-production: yes and no) x 3 (causal locus 
attribution: customer, company, and uncertain) factorial design. But co-production manipulation affected causal 
locus attribution (in the same direction predicted by H1 and found in the results of study 1). Because one 
manipulation should not affect the other and we had no reason to believe we could solve this issue – according to 
previous research, co-production really affects causal locus attribution – we decided to run a single factor study to 
be able to compare the effects of different causal locus attributions (including uncertain locus) on customers’ 
emotional reactions, keeping co-production constant. 
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Scenarios were pre-tested via Mechanical Turk to check for manipulations efficacy and 
demand artifacts. Manipulations were effective and there was no evidence of demand artifacts 
since that participants could not correctly guess the purpose of the investigation. Scenarios were 
reported as credible by participants from the final sample (M=6.28, SD=.98, 1 = impossible to 
occur in real life, 7 = possible to occur in real life) with no differences among the experimental 
conditions (F(2, 126)=.45, p=.64). 
 
 
4.3.2 Measures  
 
Table 46 shows the measures adopted in study 2 in the same order they were asked in 
the questionnaire. 
 
Table 46 – Measures from study 2 
Name of the variable, source Item(s) 
Co-production manipulation check I have helped to design the T-shirt I have bought 
Internal locus attribution 
manipulation check 
The unpleasant result was not at all caused by me / The unpleasant result 
was very much caused by me 
External locus attribution 
manipulation check  
The unpleasant result was not at all caused by the company / The 
unpleasant result was very much caused by the company 
Uncertain locus attribution 
manipulation check 
I know for sure the cause of the result / I do not know for sure the cause 
of the result 
Regret Same item from study 1 
Disappointment Same item from study 1 
Dissatisfaction Same item from study 1 
 
 
4.3.3 Results 
 
Causal locus manipulation was effective. Participants in the company’s locus scenario 
reported higher company’s locus attribution (F(2, 126)=45.89, p<.001, M=5.65, SD=1.25) than 
participants in customer’s locus (M=2.86, SD=1.57, p<.001) and uncertain locus scenarios 
(M=4.15, SD=1.29, p<.001). Participants in the customer’s locus scenario reported higher 
customer’s locus attribution (F(2, 126)=55.36, p<.001, M=5.63, SD=1.51) than participants in 
the company’s locus (M=2.57, SD=1.26, p<.001) and uncertain locus scenarios (M=4.05, 
SD=1.34, p<.001). Finally, participants in the uncertain locus scenario reported higher locus 
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uncertainty (F(2, 126)=24.85, p<.001, M=5.53, SD=1.89) than participants in the company’s 
locus (M=3.28, SD=1.83, p<.001) and customer’s locus scenarios (M=2.91, SD=1.74, p<.001). 
ANOVA revealed a main effect of causal locus attribution on regret (F(2, 126)=7.38, 
p<.001). Participants in the customer’s locus scenario reported higher regret (M=5.63, 
SD=1.48) than participants in the company’s locus (M=4.65, SD=1.52, p<.01). This result 
supports H2a, indicating that higher internal attribution may lead to higher customer regret. 
Participants in the uncertain locus scenario also reported higher regret (M=5.70, SD=1.27) than 
participants in the company’s locus (p<.01), but there was no significant difference on regret 
levels from uncertain and customer’s locus (p=.82).  
ANOVA also revealed that causal locus attribution affects disappointment (F(2, 
126)=9.36, p<.001). Disappointment was higher among participants in the company’s locus 
scenario (M=5.96, SD=1.03) than those in the customer’s locus (M=4.58, SD=1.97, p<.001). 
This result supports H2b, indicating that higher external attribution may lead to higher customer 
disappointment. Participants in the uncertain locus scenario also reported higher 
disappointment (M=5.55, SD=1.48) than participants in the customer’s locus (p<.01), but there 
was no significant difference in disappointment levels between uncertain and company’s locus 
(p=.22).  
Causal locus attribution also affected customer dissatisfaction (F(2, 126)=20.50, 
p<.001). Dissatisfaction was higher for participants in the company’s locus scenario (M=5.87, 
SD=1.11) than for participants in the customer’s locus (M=3.84, SD=1.84, p<.001) and 
uncertain locus scenarios (M=4.85, SD=1.48, p<.01). This result supports H2c, indicating that 
higher external attribution may lead to higher customer dissatisfaction. Participants in the 
customer’s locus scenario reported the lowest dissatisfaction level, significantly different even 
from uncertain locus (p<.01). Figure 28 shows customer regret, disappointment, and 
dissatisfaction in each scenario. 
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Figure 28 – Customer regret, disappointment, and dissatisfaction for each attribution.  
 
 
 
4.3.4 Discussion 
 
This study tested hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c. Results supported all of them: the 
higher the internal attribution, the higher the regret, and the lower the disappointment and 
dissatisfaction. This study had a new element in comparison to study 1: the uncertain locus. 
There were no hypotheses regarding the effect of uncertainty on regret, disappointment, and 
dissatisfaction but it seems acceptable to think that results regarding the uncertain locus could 
be in-between results from customer’s and company’s locus, because these last two could be 
extremes of a causal locus attribution continuum.  
Regardless the expectations about uncertain locus effects on the dependent variables, 
there is one result contradicting the self-serving bias perspective: Participants in the uncertain 
locus scenario reported to be as regretful as participants in the customer’s locus scenario. This 
result shows that causal uncertainty does not necessarily imply in reduced emotional intensity. 
Since regret is a self-focused emotion experienced when we wish we had done something 
different (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), participants who were uncertain about who they should 
blame felt as bad to themselves for something they did (or didn’t do) as participants who knew 
they were the ones to blame. Thus, the tendency to make external attributions to protect the self 
was not fully working for participants in the uncertain locus scenario.  
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The other results regarding uncertain locus – disappointment level similar to company’s 
locus and higher than customer’s locus, dissatisfaction level lower than company’s locus and 
higher than customer’s locus – do not contradict the self-serving bias perspective. It only shows 
that being uncertain about who to blame in a failed co-produced service may lead to high levels 
of regret and disappointment and a moderate level of dissatisfaction if compared to knowing 
that either the company or the customer itself should be blamed. 
 
 
4.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
This research contributes to the service management literature under three perspectives: 
1) showing the influence of co-production on causal locus attribution; 2) showing customers’ 
reactions (i.e., regret, disappointment, and dissatisfaction) to failed co-produced services; and 
3) showing how people react when causal locus attribution is uncertain. The first and second 
contributions are depicted in table 47, which brings a summary of the hypotheses results. The 
third contribution resulted from further investigation on the subject of causal locus attribution 
for failed co-produced services without a specific hypothesis about it. 
 
Table 47 – Results of hypotheses 
Hypotheses Study 1 Study 2 
H1: Customers who co-produce (vs. do not co-produce) tend to make more 
internal than external attributions for a service failure. 
Supported Not applicable 
H2: In case of failed co-produced services, the higher the customer internal 
attribution, (a) the higher the regret and (b) the lesser the disappointment 
(c) and the dissatisfaction.  
(a) Not 
Supported 
(b) Supported 
(c) Supported 
(a) Supported 
(b) Supported 
(c) Supported 
 
While study 1 shows that co-production may lead to more internal attributions (H1) and 
less dissatisfaction and disappointment towards the service provider, study 2 shows that the 
decrease in dissatisfaction and disappointment holds for failed co-produced services caused by 
customers. Actually, the decrease in dissatisfaction holds even when the customer is uncertain 
about who is the one to blame. Internal service failure attribution is positively associated with 
higher customer regret (H2a) – just in study 2 – and less disappointment toward the service 
provider (H2b) and dissatisfaction (H2c) – in both studies. 
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Both studies have results that contradict the self-serving bias. Study 1 shows that co-
producers blame themselves more than no co-producers and study 2 shows co-producers facing 
an uncertain causal locus situation feel as regretful as co-producers facing a failed service 
caused by the customer (both indicating high self-blame). So, co-production may be direct or 
indirectly reducing the self-serving bas. The finding that co-production leads to more internal 
attributions contradicts the self-serving bias literature (Mezulis et al., 2004). But such finding 
is consistent with the idea that co-production is associated with perceived control and, 
consequently, internal attributions (Chan et al., 2010; Hui & Toffoli, 2002; Pacheco et al., 
2013). 
Taken together, results from both studies indicate that companies can benefit from co-
production not only in satisfactory service encounters, but also in situations when failures occur. 
This is because customers will take at least part of the responsibility for a failure and feel less 
disappointed and dissatisfied when a failure happens in a co-production context. And luckily, 
it seems that the decrease in disappointment and dissatisfaction levels does not happen at the 
expense of an increase in regret level, in view of the fact that regret level was not affected by 
co-production in study 1. Considering that service failures are sometimes inevitable, these 
results bring important theoretical and managerial implications. 
 
 
4.4.1 Theoretical implications 
 
The key difference between this investigation and part of previous research is that it 
supports the idea that service companies can benefit of co-production even when service 
failures occur. Previous literature had already recognized the benefits of co-production but 
usually it does not address the positive results of co-production in failed co-produced services 
(for an exception see the paper of Bendapudi and Leone, 2003, which evaluates dissatisfaction 
rather than causal locus attribution). In this sense, co-production may be interesting for service 
companies, even when problems happen. The positive results are related to less external causal 
attributions and reduced levels of disappointment and dissatisfaction. During the literature 
review, only three papers (Heidenreich et al., 2015; Jong-Kuk et al., 2010; Yen et al., 2004) 
directly addressing the relationship between co-production and causal locus attribution in a 
failure situation were found, but our results evidence different conclusions, considering these 
three previous papers. 
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 Yen et al. (2004) and Jong-Kuk et al. (2010) found that high participation level lead to 
more external attribution. So, why does the present research find co-production to be associated 
with higher internal attribution? This finding seems due to the fact that the present research 
does not stress participation level or customer effort. Yen et al.’s (2004) research scenario for 
high participation level (where customers have put real effort on doing everything right, doing 
their best during co-production) may not represent many daily situations of service encounters 
worldwide. It is natural to expect external attribution in their high participation level because 
the scenario exempts customers from any responsibility over the failure, showing they did 
everything right. And in the case of Jong-Kuk et al.’ (2010) survey, the fact of asking 
participants about their participation level (inputs) in a failed co-produced service may have 
triggered self-serving bias (i.e., external attribution for failure) for at least two reasons: (1) if a 
customer provided several inputs to a failed co-produced service, it seems less likely that this 
customer forgot (omitted) an important input when compared to a customer who provided few 
inputs. Thus, if the customer did not do anything wrong, the service provider must be 
responsible for the failure; (2) if a customer provided several inputs, this customer could be 
more susceptible to commit a mistake (e.g., provide an inadequate input) than customers who 
provided few inputs. In other words, high participation level may be positively related to self-
threat (e.g., if the customer provided a lot of inputs and the outcome was worse than expected, 
thus the quality of customers’ inputs was low). Self-threat is positively related to self-serving 
bias (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). Participation level is not only positively related to external 
attribution but it is also negatively related to satisfaction with the co-production process 
(Haumann, Güntürkün, Schons, & Wieseke, 2015). By not detailing how much effort the 
customer put on the failed co-produced service, the studies of this chapter allow participants to 
imagine how much they did for that service and indicate a level of responsibility that would 
match such effort. By letting participants freely imagine how much effort they put on the co-
production process, this research tried to be as close as possible to customers’ realities. 
One could argue that the present results are similar to those of Heidenreich et al. (2015) 
regarding the effects of causal locus attribution, but they are not. Heidenreich et al. (2015) have 
found negative consequences of failed co-produced services: high co-production levels were 
associated with lower customer satisfaction. This could be framed as a dark side of co-
production, as they propose. This research shows a bright side of such failures: the reduction of 
customer disappointment towards the company and reduced dissatisfaction. Bendapudi and 
Leone (2003) also suggested that co-production could mitigate the self-serving bias (although 
causal locus attribution was not assessed in their studies), but they advocate that this would only 
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happen when customers were given the option to co-produce. The present results show that the 
reduction of the self-serving bias may happen even without this option. This conclusion is 
relevant to service management literature because it may be applied to understand the 
consequences of failed co-produced services. This research seems to be the first to show that 
customers who co-produce tend to attribute the responsibility for a failure more to themselves 
(feeling more regretful sometimes) while customers who do not co-produce tend to attribute the 
failure to the company (feeling more disappointed and dissatisfied). This study is one of the 
first that tries to explain how different emotions emerge in a failed co-production context. 
Recent service literature argues for the importance of understanding how different emotions 
emerge in co-production contexts (Fliess, Dyck, & Schmelter, 2014). 
 
 
4.4.2 Managerial Implications 
 
This research suggests that service providers should employ co-production whenever 
possible. The results suggest that service providers may manage customer causal locus 
attributions concerning service failures even before their occurrence. By allowing the customer 
to co-produce services, companies are not only increasing the probability to have higher 
customer satisfaction and perceived quality (Golder et al., 2012; Hunt et al., 2012), but also 
increasing the probability that customers will take some responsibility over a failed co-produced 
service and feel less disappointed and dissatisfied. Strengthening co-production practices is 
important because customer causal locus attribution is not something that service providers can 
easily control, but they may affect it through a variable they may control: co-production. 
 From a managerial perspective, it is interesting to focus on co-production even when 
co-production increases regret through greater internal attribution – which was the case in study 
2 – because disappointment and dissatisfaction are better predictors of word-of-mouth than 
regret (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 1999, 2004). Besides, disappointment is a better predictor of 
switching behavior (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004). Consequently, co-production could lead to 
less negative word-of-mouth and switching behaviors through lower disappointment and 
dissatisfaction levels. Also, the two studies from this article suggest that co-production (vs. no 
co-production) may lead to the lowest customer dissatisfaction level because co-production 
leads to higher internal attribution (finding from study 1) while internal attribution leads to the 
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lowest dissatisfaction level when compared to external (company’s) and uncertain attribution 
(finding from study 2).    
These findings might have an implication on the choice for a service recovery strategy 
as well. For instance, when the service failure is caused by the customer (internal attribution), 
both monetary and nonmonetary recovery strategies lead to the same customer satisfaction level 
(Fu, Wu, Huang, Song, & Gong, 2015). Thus, in case of failed co-produced services, both 
monetary and nonmonetary recovery strategies could be equally successful because co-
production leads to more internal attributions for failures. The service provider could then 
choose the recovery strategy that better suits its preferences or business model.  
  
 
4.4.3 Limitations and directions for future research 
 
Although study 1 brings evidence that co-production leads to higher internal attribution 
than no co-production in two different service contexts, the study itself does not solve the 
literature inconsistency about the effects of co-production on causal locus attribution. It does 
not explain why previous research have found the opposite result (i.e., a positive relationship 
between co-production and external attribution). Even though we suppose that variables such 
as customer perceived control and effort could help to explain the reason why research on the 
subject points to opposite directions, we did not measure these variables. In spite of this 
limitation, this chapter contributes to the discussion of whether failed co-produced services 
could be less harmful to services providers than failed services that were not co-produced and 
provides material that could be further analyzed in a future meta-analysis. And this meta-
analysis, in turn, could solve the literature inconsistency. 
Another limitation is the fact that it was not possible to investigate differences in co-
production versus no co-production in study 2. Because co-production affects causal locus 
attribution (Heidenreich et al., 2015; Jong-Kuk et al., 2010; Yen et al., 2004), it was not possible 
to have a factorial design without the interference of one manipulation (i.e., co-production) on 
the other (i.e., locus attribution). Thus, to compare customers’ reactions to failed services for 
uncertain locus, customer’s locus, and company’s locus, we had to keep co-production constant. 
But at least this study showed that causal uncertainty is not always associated with lower 
emotional intensity level, since the regret level for uncertain locus was equivalent to the regret 
level for customer’s locus and both were higher than the regret level for company’s locus. Co-
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production could be the factor explaining this result: co-production led to more internal 
attribution (in study 1) and the literature points that internal attribution and regret are positively 
related (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004). Thus, customers who co-produce could still have a high 
sense of responsibility even in face of causal uncertainty. 
Regret and disappointment were investigated because they are the two emotions most 
closely related to decision making (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002). However, the very concept 
of these emotions is already associated to internal (in case of regret) and external (in case of 
disappointment) locus attributions. This makes the hypothesis about the effects of causal locus 
on regret and disappointment somehow obvious. We did not confirm the effect of internal 
attribution on regret in study 1 though. This could indicate either a bad fit of the regret measure 
to this specific data or that internal attribution for a service failure does not necessarily leads to 
regret. Either way, there are other emotions that may be relevant for a failed co-produced service 
context and which hypotheses could be less obvious. For instance, anxiety is one of the most 
frequent negative emotions people experience (Saffrey et al., 2008), while anger is a good 
predictor of behavioral reactions following service dissatisfaction (Kalamas et al., 2008). These 
and other negative emotions could be affected by co-production and locus attribution as well. 
Even positive emotions could be affected by co-production in service failure contexts. Future 
studies could investigate emotions that have not been investigated here. This would be 
interesting to check for further bright (or dark) sides of co-production. 
The studies had both short-term and long-term service contexts – services that varied 
from minutes to months to be delivered – without investigating whether the length of a service 
influences customers’ emotional reactions to failed co-produced services. Previous research has 
also adopted either short-term – purchasing a train ticket, reserving a room, shopping at a 
grocery store (Bendapudi and Leone, 2003; Heidenreich et al., 2015) – or long-term services – 
taking a university course (Yen et al., 2004) – without addressing the potential effects of service 
length on customer emotions and behaviours. Additionally, customer financial loss could be 
very different for each service failure adopted. For instance, customers could spend different 
amounts of money on a gym membership, a restaurant meal, and a T-shirt. Future studies could 
further examine the role of service length and financial loss in failed co-produced services.   
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5 THOUGHT SPEED AND CAUSAL LOCUS ATTRIBUTIONS 
 
How fast someone thinks differs among individuals but also depends on the situation. 
For example, if someone else talks very quickly to you or there are a lot of fast moving images 
in the environment, then you will normally think faster. Thought speed affects emotional and 
behavioral reactions. For example, people who report fast thought speed (vs. regular or slow 
thought speed) experience more positive affect and take more risks (Chandler & Pronin, 2012; 
Pronin, 2013; Yang, Friedman-Wheeler, & Pronin, 2014). 
Fast thought speed (FTS) leads to higher positive affect (Pronin et al., 2008; Pronin & 
Wegner, 2006) and it is also deemed to be responsible for increased energy, self-confidence, 
self-esteem, willingness to take risks, creativity, and capacity for solving novel problems 
(Pronin, 2013). One of the topics already discussed in this dissertation – the self-serving bias – 
has also been associated to some of these thought speed consequences. For instance, the self-
serving bias (tendency to make internal attributions for success and external attributions for 
failure) is positively associated to positive affect and life satisfaction (Sanjuán & Magallares, 
2014) and self-esteem (Weiner, 1985), while the absence or reduction of such bias is associated 
with depression (Mezulis et al., 2004; Peterson & Villanova, 1988). Hence, the self-serving bias 
protects people's self.  
Given that FTS may increase positive affect and self-esteem, would it be necessary to 
protect the self with the self-serving bias after a failure? May the FTS reduce the self-serving 
bias? Reduction of the self-serving bias is beneficial for service companies, because it means 
customers will share some responsibility over the failures and acknowledge the company’s 
responsibility over success.  
The assumption that people with higher positive affect and self-esteem may not need 
that much of a tool like the self-serving bias which purpose is to protect the self is in line with 
the perspective of mood as a resource. According to this perspective, positive mood leads 
people to process positive as well as negative information about themselves. But in a negative 
mood state, people tend to avoid negative information about themselves because they lack the 
resources needed for coping with the affective costs of such negative information (Raghunathan 
& Trope, 2002). On the other hand, people with positive affect and high self-esteem tend to 
respond more defensively to a threat to their self-image than people with negative affect and 
low self-esteem, reporting higher self-serving bias (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). In this case, 
FTS should lead to more external attribution for failures, increasing the self-serving bias. 
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However, there are at least two reasons to believe that thought speed may not affect 
causal locus attribution after a service failure: First, positive mood may serve as a goal in itself 
rather than a resource. When positive mood is a goal, people tend to focus on positive 
information about themselves, avoiding negative information (Trope, Ferguson, & 
Raghunathan, 2001). In this sense, if people tend to focus on positive information, they may 
keep on making internal attributions for success and external attributions for failure no matter 
their current mood or thought speed. Second, the effects of thought speed may be short-lived 
(Pronin, 2013), which means that such effects could last for a short period and be over 
(unobservable) after a service failure. 
 
 
5.1 THOUGHT SPEED: A REVIEW 
 
Pronin and colleagues argue that FTS leads to different emotional and behavioral 
outcomes when compared with both regular and slow thought speed (STS). For instance, Pronin 
and Wegner (2006) and Pronin et al. (2008) show empirical evidence that FTS leads to more 
positive affect. In order to formulate their hypothesis about FTS and positive affect, Pronin and 
colleagues used evidence of prior researches that were indirectly related to thought speed (i.e., 
studies that have not explicitly examined the effects of thought speed, but that could offer some 
hints for the hypothesis formulation). For example, the authors mention sources suggesting that: 
 Faster processing  elicits  more  positive  mood (e.g., Monahan, Murphy, & 
Zajonc, 2000; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001);   
 Music with a faster tempo is more likely to induce positive  mood  and  arousal  
than  music  with  a  slower  tempo (e.g., Gagnon & Peretz, 2003); 
 Mania  is  often  accompanied  by  fast thoughts and euphoria while depression 
is often accompanied by slow thoughts and dysphoria (e.g., Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, American Psychiatric Association, 
1994);  
 Stimulants such as amphetamines and caffeine lead to faster cognitive 
processing speed and elevate positive mood (e.g., Asghar, Tanay, Baker, 
Greenshaw, & Silverstone, 2003; Smit & Rogers, 2000);  
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 People describe near-death experiences as situations involving  fast thoughts and  
an  odd  sense  of  euphoria and pleasurable emotions (e.g., Noyes & Kletti, 
1977);  
 Brainstorming sessions elicit rapid idea generation and feelings of enjoyment  
(e.g., Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006);  
 Physical exercise may accelerate thoughts and improve people’s mood (e.g., 
Brisswalter, Collardeau, & René, 2002; Hansen, Stevens, & Coast, 2001). 
 
The effect of FTS on positive affect is independent of thought content (elating vs. 
depressing content) and ease of cognitive processing or fluency. In other words, FTS induces 
positive affect even when the thought content is more depressive and difficult to process 
(Pronin, 2013). Yang et al. (2014) found empirical evidence that the positive affect of 
individuals with mild to moderate depressive symptoms, as well as individuals with no 
depressive symptoms at all, may be increased by inducing fast thoughts. This was not possible 
in case of individuals with more severe depressive symptoms though. Despite of the influence 
of FTS on positive affect, it seems that FTS has no influence on negative affect (Pronin et al., 
2008; Pronin & Wegner, 2006). 
Chandler and Pronin (2012) provided empirical evidence that FTS leads to more risk 
taking. The authors measured risk taking behavior using the Balloon Analogue Risk Task 
(BART). This task consists of inflating balloons by clicking a pump. The more participants 
inflate the balloons, the more money they earn for it. But if a balloon bursts because it was too 
much inflated, participants do not earn any money for that balloon. Participants in the fast 
thought condition showed greater risk taking as they pumped the balloons more times than 
participants in the slow thought condition. The authors replicated this result with a self-reported 
measure of risk taking. According to the authors, the following facts form the rationale behind 
the hypothesis that FTS increases risk taking: 
 People with the psychological disorder of mania exhibit fast thoughts and engage 
in risky behavior (e.g., Clark, Iversen, & Goodwin, 2001); 
 Stimulant substances (e.g., cocaine and amphetamine) induce fast thoughts and 
people who take too much of these substances show more risky behavior (e.g., 
Leland & Paulus, 2005); 
 People under time pressure show an elevated tendency to engage in the risky 
behavior of making high-stakes gambles (e.g., Dedonno & Demaree, 2008). 
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According to Pronin (2013), the occurrence of fast thoughts may be a signal to a person’s 
mind and body that it is necessary to be ready for urgent action. The author suggests that the 
state of preparation for urgent action would be responsible for increased energy, self-
confidence, self-esteem, willingness to take risks, creativity, and capacity for solving novel 
problems. The author argues that since FTS leads to such preparation for urgent action, its 
effects could be more short-lived than sustained, but this supposition was not tested.  
 
 
5.2 POTENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THOUGHT SPEED AND CAUSAL 
LOCUS ATTRIBUTIONS  
 
There are some factors indicating that FTS could reduce external attribution for a service 
failure (i.e., reduce the self-serving bias). The rationale behind this potential effect begins with 
the fact that FTS increases positive affect and self-esteem (Pronin, 2013). The self-serving bias 
works in order to protect individuals’ self-concept: internal attribution for failure lowers 
individuals’ self-esteem, internal attribution for success raises individuals’ self-esteem, and 
external attribution either for failure or success does not affect the self-concept (Weiner, 1985). 
If one’s self-esteem and positive affect is raised by FTS, a negative event likely does not pose 
a big threat to one´s self-concept. Therefore, the protective feature of the self-serving bias does 
not seem extremely necessary for the maintenance of a positive self-concept when self-esteem 
and positive affect are high. After all, in which case should you be more careful with your food: 
when you have 5 apples or when you have only 1? If you lose 1 apple out of 5, you still have 4 
apples left, but if you lose your only apple, you lose it all. The same analogy could be used to 
think about protecting the self-concept.  
This rationale is reinforced by the literature about mood as a resource (Raghunathan & 
Trope, 2002; Trope et al., 2001). According to this literature, positive mood serves as a resource 
that facilitates the processing of both positive and negative self-relevant information. This 
happens because positive mood serves as a resource that mitigates affective costs associated 
with the processing of negative information about the self. It makes the processing of negative 
information bearable. In cases of negative mood, individuals tend to focus on processing of 
positive self-relevant information (avoiding negative information) because they are depleted of 
positive mood as a resource. Applying the same logic to a service dissatisfaction situation, 
customers with more positive mood may process self-relevant negative information such as 
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what did they do wrong (self-blame), while customers with more negative mood may avoid 
such negative information processing. This would result in more self-serving bias for those in 
a negative mood and less self-serving bias for those in a positive mood. Although thought speed 
is not supposed to influence negative mood, we may expect the first case of the previous 
sentence to be those with STS (since STS leads to less positive mood when compared to FTS) 
and the second case of the previous sentence to be those with FTS.  
It is true that having less positive mood is not the same as having negative mood. So, 
comparing STS and FTS is not the same as comparing negative mood and positive mood, but 
rather lower positive mood and higher positive mood. However, it is reasonable to expect those 
in FTS to have more positive mood (i.e., more resource) than those in STS, establishing 
expectations similar to the situation of having vs. not having positive mood as a resource. 
Corroborating this perspective of mood as a resource, Schuettler and Kiviniemi (2006) 
found evidence that positive mood experienced at the time of an illness diagnosis raised 
perceptions of self-efficacy (i.e., ability to successfully overcome the illness) while negative 
mood lowered perceptions of self-efficacy. Due to the positive mood, individuals may feel 
sufficiently efficacious to follow the treatment regimen and recover from the illness. The 
authors believe this is evidence of how positive mood may serve as a resource.  
Besides, according to Raghunathan and Trope (2002), a negative mood indicates that 
something is wrong, stimulating individuals to survey the environment carefully to better 
understand and control it. Conversely, a positive mood indicates that everything is fine, making 
individuals to pay superficial attention to the environment. The authors argue that individuals 
in a negative (vs. positive) mood should engage in greater and more systematic elaboration. 
Mohanty and Suar (2014) found evidence corroborating more systematic information 
processing among individuals with negative (vs. positive) mood. Thinking about individuals 
with FTS (more positive mood), we may expect them to pay less attention to the environment 
than those individuals with STS (less positive mood) when trying to understand a service 
failure. Systematic processing should be greater among individuals with STS. With greater 
attention to the environment and systematic processing, we could expect individuals with STS 
to make more external attributions than individuals with FTS. 
Considering what has been discussed so far about potential effects of thought speed on 
causal locus attribution, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
H1: FTS (vs. STS) will lead to less external causal attributions for a service failure.  
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On the other hand, there is also evidence contradicting the rationale behind H1: 
According to Campbell and Sedikides (1999), people with positive affect tend to respond more 
defensively to the same threat as people with negative affect, hence, reporting higher self-
serving bias. The same is true for people with high self-esteem versus low self-esteem (i.e., the 
former report higher self-serving bias). Thus, due to their high positive affect and self-esteem, 
people with FTS (vs. STS) should make more external causal attributions for service failures.  
Findings from Campbell and Sedikides (1999) came from a meta-analytic review, which means 
that more than one study indicated such relationship between positive mood and self-serving 
bias, as well as self-esteem and self-serving bias. The authors advocate the rationale that the 
higher the self-threat (i.e., the more a favorable view of the self is challenged or contradicted), 
the higher the self-serving bias. 
This rationale and findings are corroborated by Coleman (2011). The author found that 
negative emotions (guilt and revulsion) led to more internal attributions for failure than the 
control condition. The author explains that his findings support the self-threat rationale because 
such negative emotions led to a drop in self-esteem, meaning that participants had less self-
esteem to protect. So, the higher the self-esteem, the higher the threat to a valued self and the 
external attribution for failure. And it seems logical to expect that, in case of a failure, a person 
with high self-esteem would believe s/he had done things right, consequently, the blame might 
be on someone else. This whole idea contradicts the previously mentioned premise of mood as 
a resource: the idea that people with positive mood (i.e., FTS) process self-relevant negative 
information while people with negative mood avoid it.  
Besides, the fact that a reduced level or the absence of the self-serving bias is associated 
with depression (Peterson & Villanova, 1988; Peterson et al., 1982) and that the self-serving 
bias effect is smaller for people with psychological disorders (Mezulis et al., 2004) is a signal 
that the bias predominantly exists in a happy and healthy mind. Therefore, chances are that 
people who are experiencing positive affect, such as people who were induced to have fast 
thoughts, are already attributing success to themselves and failures to external causes (i.e., they 
already present the self-serving bias).  
One of the experiments conducted by Pronin et al. (2008) might be a sign that FTS could 
be positively related to the self-serving bias. In their experiment, participants listened to a tape 
of people brainstorming about a problem in order to do their own recording after that. Those in 
the FTS condition were told that their tape would go to a new group of subjects and they could 
use whatever ideas they want (including ideas already mentioned by the previous group). Those 
in the STS condition were told their tape would go back to the same group of subjects and they 
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should only say ideas that were not mentioned by the previous group. Results show that 
participants in the FTS condition reported faster thought speed, higher grandiosity, creativity, 
and elation than did their peers. When Pronin (2013) comments the results of this experiment, 
she highlights how ironic it is to find higher positive affect and self-esteem among people who 
used other people’s ideas (participants in the FTS condition) as compared to people who 
generated their own ideas (participants in the STS condition). Are the former participants 
attributing success to themselves in a higher degree than the latter? In other words, is the self-
serving bias stronger for those in the FTS condition? Therefore, a second and rival hypothesis 
is formulated: 
 
H2: FTS (vs. STS) will lead to more external causal attributions for a service failure. 
 
However, there are also some factors indicating that thought speed may have no effect 
on causal locus attribution. Changing from a mood as a resource perspective to a mood as goal 
in itself perspective, when positive mood is a goal, people ignore negative information about 
themselves and seek positive information to achieve or maintain a positive mood (Raghunathan 
& Trope, 2002). Therefore, if positive mood is a goal, external attributions for service failures 
would be expected irrespective whether customers experience STS or FTS. This could lead to 
a no effect of thought speed on causal locus attribution. The chance of a short-lived effect of 
thought speed (Pronin, 2013) is another factor pointing to a potential no effect on causal locus 
attribution.  
The current literature review shows reasons to believe that FTS, through enhanced 
positive affect and self-esteem, could be associated with external attributions for a service 
failure in two ways: (1) it could lead to a negative effect on external attributions for a service 
failure (H1), (2) it could lead to a positive effect on external attributions (H2). But it could also 
have no effect on external attributions at all. 
Four studies were conducted to test the hypotheses and other potential consequences of 
thought speed in face of a service failure. The next section describes the first study. 
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5.3 STUDY 1 
 
Study 1 consisted of a single factor between subjects experiment. One hundred 
seventeen panel members of the Ghent University (68% women; Mage=22.21, SD=3.88) 
participated in this first study. This was the final sample after deleting 3 respondents who 
provided the wrong answer to the attention check (i.e., a multiple choice question about the 
content of the service failure). These respondents were deleted to eliminate those who were not 
paying attention to the questionnaire or did not understand the service failure. 
 
 
5.3.1 Procedure  
 
Thought Speed was manipulated at two levels: fast and slow. The same type of 
manipulation used by Chandler and Pronin (2012) and Pronin and Wegner (2006) was adopted. 
Participants were exposed to sentences about a student’s regular day (e.g., “I woke up this 
morning at 8” and “I went to the bathroom”) at either a fast (40 milliseconds per letter, 320 
milliseconds intervals between sentences) or a slow speed (170 milliseconds per letter, 4,000 
milliseconds intervals between sentences). According to Chandler and Pronin (2012), this fast 
condition is equivalent to half the time of normal reading speed while the slow condition 
corresponds to twice the time of normal reading speed. This manipulation took 2 minutes – 
manipulations from Chandler and Pronin (2012) and Pronin and Wegner (2006) usually takes 
2 or 3 minutes. The only difference with Pronin and colleagues’ manipulations is that they asked 
participants to read the sentences aloud. This was not the case in the present study because each 
lab session had more than one participant at the same time, which made the task of reading out 
loud inappropriate due to the potential disturbing effect it could have on the other participants.  
After answering a manipulation check (“What did you feel was the speed of your 
thoughts, as you were reading the statements on the computer screen?” 1= very slow, 9 = very 
fast), which was the same manipulation check used by Pronin and Wagner (2006), participants 
read the following text about a service failure: 
 
“Imagine that you get to a hotel today. You have a very busy schedule, so all you want to do is to go to 
your room as soon as possible. At the reception desk, you mention you made an online reservation at this 
hotel some months ago (or at least you tried to). You say your name, but the receptionist cannot find any 
booking for you. There is no room available at the hotel, so you will have to find another place to sleep. 
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This is very inconvenient for you because you are in a hurry and have many things to do. Only after 15 
minutes and several calls you are able to find another hotel to stay. Now you have to get there. 
You go to the next hotel wondering whether there was any error message at the first hotel website when 
you tried to make your online reservation.” 
 
After reading the text, participants answered a question to check whether they read and 
correctly understood the described situation: “The story you read on the previous page was 
about: (a) a problem with the hotel reservation, (b) a problem with the hotel bill, (c) you could 
not talk to the hotel receptionist.” Those who gave an incorrect answer to this question were 
deleted from the final sample because they failed to understand the content of the service failure. 
Participants also answered questions that measured a variety of cognitive, emotional, and 
behavioral reactions. Table 48 shows the measures used in this study in the same order they 
were asked in the questionnaire. 
 
Table 48 – Measures from study 1 
Name of the variable, Cronbach 
alpha, source 
Item(s) 
Causal locus attribution, Peterson 
et al. (1982) 
1) Is the cause of the problem at the hotel due to something about you or 
to something about other people or circumstances (1 = totally due to 
other people or circumstances, 7 = totally due to me) 
Failure severity, α=.87, Grégoire et 
al. (2010) 
The failure caused me:  
1) minor problems - major problems (7-point) 
2) small inconveniences - big inconveniences 
3) minor aggravation - major aggravation 
Positive affect, α=.85, Watson et 
al. (1988) 
1) Interested (1 = not at all and 7 = very much) 
2) Excited 
3) Strong 
4) Enthusiastic 
5) Proud 
6) Alert 
7) Inspired 
8) Determined 
9) Attentive 
10) Active 
Negative affect, α=.93, Watson et 
al. (1988) 
1) Distressed (1 = not at all and 7 = very much) 
2) Upset 
3) Guilty 
4) Scared 
5) Hostile 
6) Irritable 
7) Ashamed 
8) Nervous 
9) Jittery 
10) Afraid 
139 
 
State performance self-esteem, 
α=.75, Heatherton & Polivy (1991) 
1) I feel confident about my abilities 
2) I feel frustrated or rattled about my performance (R) 
3) I feel that I am having trouble understanding things that I read (R) 
4) I feel as smart as others   
5) I feel confident that I understand things 
6) I feel that I have less scholastic ability right now than others (R) 
7) I feel like I'm not doing well (R) 
Obs. Scales were translated into Dutch (participant’s native language) by a specialist (i.e., marketing professor or 
PhD student) who was a native Dutch speaker fluent in English. The only exception was the State performance 
self-esteem scale, which already had a Dutch translation elaborated by Vermunt et al. (2001). 
 
At the end of the questionnaire, participants had to answer a multiple-choice question 
about the manipulation: how did the person from the story go to the college (by foot, by bus, 
by bike). The purpose of asking them to do so was to avoid a potential awkward feeling they 
could have about paying attention to the sentences and doing nothing with them after that. 
 
 
5.3.2 Results 
 
ANOVA revealed that the manipulation was effective: the participants from the FTS 
condition reported they were thinking significantly faster than participants from the STS 
condition (F(1, 115)=48.51, p<.001, Mfast=6.84, SDfast=1.55, Mslow=4.21, SDslow=2.46).  
Thought speed had a marginally significant effect on causal locus attribution (F(1, 
115)=3.05, p=.08), such that participants from the FTS condition made slightly higher external 
attributions (M=3.74, SD=1.41) than participants from the STS condition (M=4.1814, SD=1.31). 
The direction of this effect converges with H2. Because failure severity might impact 
attributions – for instance, a more severe failure could pose a bigger self-threat and generate 
more self-serving bias – failure severity was tested as a covariate using ANOVA and as a 
moderator using regression, but it was non-significant in both cases (p=.21).  
Thought speed had no effect on state performance self-esteem (F(1, 115)=1.48, p=.23), 
positive affect (F(1, 115)=.02, p=.89), negative affect (F(1, 115)=.56, p=.46), or failure severity 
(F(1, 115)=0.01, p=.92). Since there was no significant effect of thought speed on positive and 
                                                 
 
14 Low values indicate external attribution while high values indicate internal attribution.  
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negative affect scales, a MANOVA was conducted considering each item of these scales as a 
dependent variable. None of the twenty items were affected by thought speed (p>.10). 
Regression analyses showed that self-esteem and negative affect had significant effects 
(p<.05) on locus attribution. Self-esteem was negatively related to locus attribution (t=-2.97, 
β=-.27, p<.01), indicating that the higher the self-esteem, the more external the attribution. 
Negative affect was positively related to locus attribution (t=2.28, β=.21, p<.05), indicating that 
the higher the negative affect, the less external the attribution. The other variables (positive 
affect and failure severity) were not significantly related to locus attribution (p>.10). 
The software used to collect the data automatically registers the moment participants 
start and finish answering the questionnaire. This information was used to calculate 
participants’ total time to answer the questionnaire, to check if any of the experimental groups 
could be answering faster than the other. ANOVA revealed that there was no difference in total 
time participants from both experimental conditions took to complete the questionnaire (F(1, 
115)=.39, p=.53). 
 
 
5.3.3 Discussion 
 
From the variables measured in this study, causal locus attribution was the only one that 
was affected by thought speed. But the effect was only marginally significant, pointing to the 
same direction hypothesized by H2. It was expected that a potential effect of thought speed on 
locus attribution could be explained by differences in positive affect and self-esteem. But 
thought speed had no influence on affect (positive or negative) or self-esteem. Interestingly, the 
fact that lower self-esteem and higher negative affect were leading to lower external attribution 
(i.e., lower protection of the self) corroborates the self-threat rationale (Campbell & Sedikides, 
1999; Coleman, 2011) used to formulate H2. 
The fact that the total time that participants took to answer the questionnaire did not 
vary between the experimental conditions may imply that participants from the FTS condition 
are not thinking faster than participants from the STS condition during the entire questionnaire. 
Although there are other things influencing individuals’ speed to complete a question (e.g., 
individual differences in reading skills and intelligence), the random assignment of the 
experimental conditions should equalize such differences between groups. When ignoring such 
individual differences, it could be expected that people who are thinking faster could finish a 
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task earlier than people who are thinking slower, but this did not happen. Let’s say that 
participants who were induced to think faster during the manipulation kept their accelerated 
thoughts for some seconds or minutes after the manipulation, reading and answering the first 
questions faster than participants who were induced to think slower. Then, if both groups take 
the same time to answer the complete questionnaire, either participants’ thoughts decelerated 
after the FTS manipulation or participants’ thoughts accelerated after the STS manipulation (or 
both). This change in participants’ thought speed during the questionnaire could help to explain 
the small difference between groups regarding causal locus attribution and the lack of other 
differences between the groups.  
To advance on the investigation about the potential effects of thought speed, another 
study was conducted. Study 2 had some differences regarding thought speed manipulation, 
service failure description, and other measures. The change regarding the service failure is 
primordial to check how thought speed could influence causal locus attribution in other 
contexts. But changing thought speed manipulation and other measures is also important to gain 
external validity and a deeper understanding about the phenomenon. Also, measures that allow 
the investigation about whether participants’ thought speed varies during the questionnaire were 
adopted. 
 
 
5.4 STUDY 2 
 
Study 2 also consisted of a single factor between subjects experiment. Eighty-four panel 
members of the Ghent University (61% women; Mage=21.96, SD=5.49) participated in this 
second study. This was the final sample after deleting 2 respondents who provided the wrong 
answer to a multiple choice question about the content of the service failure.  
 
 
5.4.1 Procedure  
 
Thought Speed was manipulated at two levels: fast and slow. The manipulation was 
similar to study 1, with the same presentation speed, but the content of the sentences was 
different. Participants were exposed to trivia sentences (e.g., “All polar bears are left handed” 
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and “Mercury is the smallest planet in the Solar System”), the same way Yang et al. (2014) did. 
This manipulation took 2 minutes and 30 seconds.  
The same manipulation check from study 1 was adopted. Then, participants read a text 
about a service failure. The text, adapted from Choi and Mattila (2008), was the following: 
 
“Imagine that you have been suffering from serious coughing in the past few days. Due to the upcoming 
exams and papers you have to finish, you have not been able to make time to visit a hospital yet. You've 
just heard about a hospital nearby that offers not only good treatment services for coughing but also 
prompt services in accordance with appointment times. You decide to use this hospital. 
On the day of your appointment, you are in a hurry because you have to go back to your studies as soon 
as possible. Upon your arrival at the hospital at the appointed time, the hospital offers you service 
promptly. All you have left to do before leaving the hospital is make a payment for the service you 
received. As you walk toward the check-out desk, you notice that no service person is present at the desk 
to serve you. So you decide to take a seat at a bench near the desk and wait for a service person. 
You have waited for about 20 min but no service person has shown up yet. You are getting a little anxious 
since you have to hurry back to your studies. You look around to see how other patients who are also 
waiting to make payments are handling the situation. You notice that some of them pass the check-out 
desk right through and disappear around the corner. You wonder where they are going and decide to 
follow them. It turns out that there is another check-out desk around the corner and those patients are 
making their payments right there. You realize you could have left the hospital much earlier if you had 
only known earlier that this desk was available for you to use. 
You make your payment at this desk. You leave the hospital wondering whether there was any sign or 
direction to inform patients of this other check-out desk.” 
 
After reading the text, participants answered a question to check whether they read and 
understood the service failure: “The story you read on the previous page was about: (a) you 
waiting a long time for an appointment at the hospital, (b) you waiting a long time for paying a 
bill at the hospital, (c) you leaving the hospital without the service you wanted.”  
Because there was no effect of thought speed on positive affect in study 1 (contradicting 
Pronin and colleagues’ findings), two changes were introduced in study 2: First, a short version 
of the Pleasure, Arousal, and Dominance (PAD) scale (Mehrabian & Russell, 1974) substituted 
the positive affect from PANAS, used in study 1. PAD is a more comprehensive measure of 
emotional states than PANAS, which according to Mehrabian (1997) lacks validity as a general 
measure of positive and negative affect. Second, because the lack of effect of thought speed on 
positive affect and other measures might be due to a short-lived effect of the manipulation, 
participants’ thought speed was assessed not only right after the manipulation but also at the 
end of the questionnaire. This way, it is possible to check if differences evoked by the 
manipulation were sustained. The potential short-lived effect is also the reason why we used a 
short-version of PAD. 
143 
 
Because some participants from study 1 used a space for comments and suggestions to 
report that they were confused about whether they should think about the service failure to 
answer questions about positive and negative affect, study 2 had more specific guidelines about 
it. Participants were asked to think about the service failure to answer the negative affect 
measure. PAD was measured twice: (1) asking participants to forget about the failure and 
describe how they were feeling at that moment, and (2) asking participants to describe how they 
felt during the manipulation.  
Two other scales were modified for this study. One of them was the negative affect scale 
(Watson et al., 1988). Some items from this scale were deleted because they were not likely to 
be evoked by the service failure described (e.g., scared and afraid) while other items were 
included because they seemed likely to be evoked (e.g., impatient and stupid). A self-integrity 
scale (Sherman et al., 2009) was included. Two of its items were not used – “I feel that I’m 
basically a moral person,” and “I try to do the right thing” – because they were measures about 
moral or ethical behavior, which does not seem relevant for the scope of this research. The self-
integrity scale measures the extent to which individuals view themselves as moral, adequate, 
and efficacious (Sherman et al., 2009) and, just as self-esteem, it is a measure of self-worth. 
Since there was no effect of thought speed on self-esteem in study 1, study 2 replaced the self-
esteem scale by the self-integrity scale.  
Also, additional measures of locus attribution and controllability were adopted in this 
study to check whether the results would vary depending on the chosen measure. Table 49 
shows all the measures used in this study in the same order they were asked in the questionnaire. 
 
Table 49 – Measures from study 2 
Name of the variable, Cronbach 
alpha, source 
Item(s) 
Causal locus attribution, Peterson 
et al. (1982) 
1) Same item used in study 1 
Internal locus attribution, Chu et 
al., (2013)  
1) To what extent do you think the long waiting time for paying the bill 
has to do with you (1 = not at all and 7 = very much) 
Internal controllability attribution, 
Choi and Mattila (2008) 
1) To what extent do you think you could have prevented that waiting 
time (1 = not at all and 7 = very much) 
Negative affect (related to the 
failure), α=.67, modified version 
of the negative affect from Watson 
et al. (1988) 
1) Distressed (1 = not at all and 7 = very much) 
2) Upset 
3) Angry 
4) Irritable 
5) Ashamed 
6) Nervous 
7) Impatient 
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8) Stupid 
Failure severity, α=.86, Grégoire et 
al. (2010) 
The failure caused me:  
1) minor problems - major problems (7-point) 
2) small inconveniences - big inconveniences 
3) minor aggravation - major aggravation 
Pleasure (at the moment), α=.86, 
Mehrabian and Russell (1974) 
1) unhappy – happy (7-point) 
2) unsatisfied – satisfied 
3) annoyed – pleased  
Arousal (at the moment), α=.52, 
Mehrabian and Russell (1974) 
1) relaxed – stimulated (7-point) 
2) calm – excited 
3) sleepy – wide-awake 
Dominance (at the moment), 
α=.58, Mehrabian and Russell 
(1974) 
1) influenced – influential (7-point) 
2) cared for – in control 
3) submissive – dominant 
Self-integrity, α=.81, modified 
version of Sherman et al. (2009) 
1) I have the ability and skills to deal with whatever comes my way (1 = 
Totally disagree and 7 = Totally agree) 
2) On the whole, I am a capable person 
3) I am a good person 
4) When I think about the future, I’m confident that I can meet the 
challenges that I will face 
5) Even though there is always room for self-improvement, I feel a sense 
of completeness about who I fundamentally am 
6) I am comfortable with who I am 
Pleasure (during the 
manipulation), α=.69, Mehrabian 
and Russell (1974) 
Same items previously mentioned in this table 
Arousal (during the manipulation), 
α=.79, Mehrabian and Russell 
(1974) 
Same items previously mentioned in this table 
Dominance (during the 
manipulation), α=.52, Mehrabian 
and Russell (1974) 
Same items previously mentioned in this table 
Thought speed (at the end of the 
questionnaire) 
How is you thought speed now (9-point) 
1) very slow / very fast  
Obs. Scales were translated into Dutch (participant’s native language) by a specialist (i.e., marketing professor or 
PhD student) who was a native Dutch speaker fluent in English. 
 
It was also required that participants wrote two sentences from the manipulation at the 
end of the questionnaire, pretending that the trivia sentences were some form of attention task. 
Similar to study 1, the purpose of asking them to do so was to avoid a potential awkward feeling 
from doing nothing with the sentences from the manipulation. The amount of time that 
participants spent in each questionnaire page was measured to check whether participants from 
the FTS condition were answering faster than participants from the STS condition.    
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5.4.2 Results 
 
The manipulation was effective since the participants from the FTS condition reported 
they were thinking significantly faster than the participants from the STS condition (F(1, 
82)=12.20, p<.001, Mfast=6.40, SDfast=1.78, Mslow=4.80, SDslow=2.37). 
ANOVA showed that there was no effect of thought speed on measures of locus 
attribution (F(1, 82)=.10, p=.75), internal locus attribution (F(1, 82)=.09, p=.76), and internal 
controllability (F(1, 82)=.01, p=.93). Thus, there was neither support for H1 nor H2. Failure 
severity was a significant covariate for locus attribution and internal locus though (p<.05). 
Thought speed also had no effect on negative affect (F(1, 82)=1.67, p=.20), self-integrity (F(1, 
82)=.004, p=.95), and failure severity (F(1, 82)=.06, p=.81). 
Thought speed affected arousal (F(1, 82)=23.56, p<.001) and dominance during the 
manipulation (F(1, 82)=6.65, p<.05), such that participants from the FTS condition reported to 
be more aroused (M=4.74, SD=.92) and more dominated (M=4.30, SD=.74) than participants 
from the STS condition (Marousal=3.53, SDarousal=1.35, Mdominance=4.71, SDdominance=.73). Severity 
was a significant covariate for arousal during the manipulation (p=.05). There was no 
significant difference between participants from the two experimental conditions regarding 
pleasure during the manipulation (p=.53). When asked to forget about the service failure and 
indicate how they were feeling at the moment (during the questionnaire), participants from both 
conditions reported similar levels of pleasure (p=.42), arousal (p=.14), and dominance (p=.86). 
Regarding the item measuring thought speed at the end of the questionnaire (1 = very 
slow and 9 = very fast), there was no difference in thought speed between participants from the 
FTS and STS condition (F(1, 82)=.21, p=.65, Mfast=5.63, SDfast=1.42, Mslow=5.46, SDslow=1.83). 
Paired samples t-test was used to check whether participants’ thought speed at the end of the 
questionnaire was slower or faster than right after the video (manipulation). Participants from 
the FTS condition reported their thought speed was 6.40 right after the manipulation and 5.63 
at the end of the questionnaire, which indicates that the latter was significantly slower than the 
former (t=2.32, p=.03). Participants from the STS condition reported their thought speed was 
4.80 right after the manipulation and 5.46 at the end of the questionnaire, with no significant 
difference between the latter and the former (t=-1.51, p=.14). 
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The time participants from each group took to answer each questionnaire page did not 
vary (p>.10)15, except for the time they took to write two sentences from the manipulation video 
(F(1, 82)=10.37, p<.01). Participants from the FTS condition spent 49 seconds on this page, 
while participants from the STS condition spent 38 seconds. There was a marginally significant 
difference between groups regarding the total time to answer the questionnaire. In average, 
participants from the FTS condition took extra 40 seconds to answer the complete questionnaire 
than participants from the STS condition (F(1, 82)=3.14, p=.08). 
Contrary to study 1, regression analyses showed no effect of self-integrity and negative 
affect on causal locus attribution (p>.10). Severity had a significant effect on it (t=-2.2, p<.05, 
such that the more severe the failure, the more external the attribution. Although it explains 
only 6% of locus variance (R²=.06). However, when testing failure severity as a moderator 
using multiple regression (i.e., when testing whether there is an interaction effect of thought 
speed and failure severity on locus attribution), no significant effect was found (p>.10) – even 
failure severity was no significant. 
 
 
5.4.3 Discussion 
 
Results from this second study suggest that thought speed has no effect on causal locus 
attribution for a service failure. This may be due to a short-lived effect of the thought speed 
manipulation. Although participants from the FTS condition reported to be thinking faster than 
participants from the STS condition during the manipulation, there is some evidence pointing 
out that this difference of thought speed between groups did not last long.  
First, at the end of the questionnaire, participants from the FTS condition reported they 
were thinking slower than right after the manipulation. Both FTS and STS groups reported to 
have statistically equivalent thought speed at the end of the questionnaire. 
Second, the time both groups spent on the next pages of the questionnaire was 
statistically the same – except for the time to write sentences from the manipulation. There are 
probably other factors influencing the time participants take to answer a questionnaire besides 
                                                 
 
15 This data was checked page per page and the time was equivalent on every page but the one mentioned in the 
text. 
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thought speed (e.g., individual differences regarding fluency). Yet, taken together with other 
results, this might suggest that the differences in thought speed evoked by the manipulation 
were not sustained. We have to admit though that participants from the STS condition were 
exposed to less sentences than participants from the FTS condition, and each sentence from the 
STS condition remained on the screen for a longer period. Therefore, it was probably easier for 
participants from the STS condition remember, choose, and write two sentences, which explains 
why these participants were faster to go through this questionnaire page.  
Third, although participants from the FTS condition reported to feel more aroused and 
more dominated than participants from the STS condition during the manipulation, both groups 
did not differ in terms of arousal and dominance later on. All of these seems to be evidence that 
even though the manipulation was effective, the differences in thought speed between groups 
were short-lived, and participants soon returned to a regular thought speed level (i.e., close to 
the scale middle-point). 
The likely short-lived differences in thought speed may be the reason why there was no 
effect of thought speed on pleasure. Based on findings from Pronin and colleagues, it was 
expected to find higher positive affect among the participants induced to think faster. But 
another possible reason for the lack of effect of thought speed on pleasure could be the 
differences in reported dominance. The FTS group reported to feel more dominated (i.e., less 
in control) than the STS group during the manipulation. This increased feeling of being 
dominated could have reduced the pleasure that the participants from the FTS condition would 
normally feel. 
Study 3 was conducted with a different thought speed manipulation and service failure 
to further investigate potential effects on causal locus attribution and other customer emotional 
reactions. 
 
 
5.5 STUDY 3 
 
Study 3 consisted of a single factor between-subjects experiment. Once again, thought 
speed was manipulated (fast vs. slow). Fifty-three panel members of the Ghent University (70% 
women; Mage=21.22, SD=2.25) participated in this study. This was the final sample after 
deleting 5 respondents with wrong answers for the attention checks (i.e., a multiple choice 
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question about the content of the failure service and a question asking participants to choose 
option number 5). 
 
  
5.5.1 Procedure  
 
A different thought speed manipulation was used. A video containing images and 
information about products of a French car manufacturer was created. The purpose of this video 
was to manipulate thought speed the same way service providers could do through their 
advertising material. Rather than just reading trivia sentences, participants were watching what 
could be a promotional video from a car dealership. Sentences from the video were presented 
in the same speed adopted in studies 1 and 2 (i.e., 40 milliseconds per letter for FTS and 170 
milliseconds per letter for STS condition). While a moving image was displayed for 1.75 
seconds in the FTS condition, the same image was displayed for 7 seconds in the STS condition. 
This makes the speed of the image on FTS condition 4 times faster than on STS condition, 
similar to the proportion of milliseconds per letter, which is 4.25 times faster for the FTS 
condition. The video lasted for 2 minutes for both experimental condition. The videos of each 
condition had 1 minute of sentences and 1 minute of text, to keep content equivalent between 
them.  The same manipulation check from studies 1 and 2 was used. 
Then, participants were presented with the following service failure: 
 
“You visit a local car dealer to buy a new car. You see a new model that you like a lot. The show room 
car has a red exterior and the interior also comes with a red coachwork with black seats. You like this 
combination a lot and mention this explicitly to the salesperson. He asks you to step in his office to 
calculate how much the car would cost with all the extra options you like and all your preferences (such 
as the red interior). You are pleased, but since it is the first dealer you visit, you decide to visit a few other 
dealers before the purchase. As you didn’t find any better option, you return to the first dealer the next 
day. The salesperson who helped you before has a day off, but his colleague helps you out. He mentions 
that all details of your request are still in the computer, he prints the offer and asks you to sign. When the 
car is delivered, it turns out that the interior is grey instead of red. You are very disappointed since you 
explicitly asked for the red interior – at the first salesperson. The second salesperson did not ask you and 
just ordered the standard interior and you did not notice it on the document you signed.”    
 
Different from studies 1 and 2, the service failure in this study was not about 15 or 20 
minutes of waiting time and the scenario did not suggest that participants were in a hurry. We 
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changed the nature of the service failure to something unrelated to time pressure in order to 
avoid that participants from the STS condition could be primed to think faster by the content of 
the service failure. 
Table 50 shows the measures used after the service failure. Most of the measures from 
this study were the same from study 2. More items were added to measure negative affect (e.g., 
angry with myself, angry with the salesperson, helpless, negligent, etc.). The measures appear 
in the table in the same order they appear in the questionnaire. 
  
Table 50 – Measures from study 3 
Name of the variable, Cronbach 
alpha, source 
Item(s) 
Causal locus attribution, Peterson 
et al. (1982) 
Same item from studies 1 and 2 
Internal locus attribution, Chu et 
al. (2013)  
Same item from study 2 
Internal controllability attribution, 
Choi and Mattila (2008) 
Same item from study 2 
Negative affect (related to the 
failure), α=68, modified version of 
the negative affect from Watson et 
al. (1988) 
1) Distressed (1 = not at all and 7 = very much) 
2) Upset 
3) Angry with myself 
4) Angry with the salesperson 
5) Helpless 
6) Disappointed 
7) Deceived 
8) Irritable 
9) Ashamed 
10) Negligent 
11) Irresponsible 
12) Impatient 
13) Stupid 
Failure severity, α=.76, Grégoire et 
al. (2010) 
Same items from study 2 
Pleasure (at the moment), α=.86, 
Mehrabian and Russell (1974) 
Same items from study 2  
Arousal (at the moment), α=.61, 
Mehrabian and Russell (1974) 
Same items from study 2 
Dominance (at the moment), 
α=.78, Mehrabian and Russell 
(1974) 
Same items from study 2 
Self-integrity, α=.93, modified 
version of Sherman et al. (2009) 
Same items from study 2 
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Pleasure (during the 
manipulation), α=.90, Mehrabian 
and Russell (1974) 
Same items from study 2  
Arousal (during the manipulation), 
α=.77, Mehrabian and Russell 
(1974) 
Same items from study 2 
Dominance (during the 
manipulation), α=.68, Mehrabian 
and Russell (1974) 
Same items from study 2 
Thought speed (at the end of the 
questionnaire) 
Same item from study 2 
Obs. Scales were translated into Dutch (participant’s native language) by a specialist (i.e., marketing professor or 
PhD student) who was a native Dutch speaker fluent in English. 
 
Similar to study 2, participants had to remember and write things they read during the 
manipulation. This time, they had to write the name of two cars from the video. The amount of 
time that participants spent on each questionnaire page was again measured.  
 
 
5.5.2 Results 
 
Thought speed manipulation was effective (F(1, 51)=16.14, p<.001). Participants from 
the FTS condition reported to be thinking faster than participants from the STS condition 
(Mfast=6.16, SDfast=1.88, Mslow=3.77, SDslow=2.45). 
Similar to study 2, thought speed had no effect on locus attribution (F(1, 51)=1.39, 
p=.24), internal attribution (F(1, 51)=0.08, p=.78), or internal controllability (F(1, 51)=1.46, 
p=.23). Thought speed also had no effect on self-integrity (p=.53), negative affect (p=.27), and 
severity (p=.89). 
Thought speed had a significant effect on arousal during the manipulation (F(1, 
51)=16.81, p<.001), such that participants from the FTS condition reported to be more aroused 
than participants from the STS condition (Mfast=4.32, SDfast=1.17, Mslow=2.94, SDslow=1.26). 
But there was no effect on pleasure (F(1, 51)=.26, p=.61) and dominance during the 
manipulation (F(1, 51)=.71, p=.41). When asked to forget about the service failure and indicate 
how they were feeling at the moment (during the questionnaire), participants from both 
conditions reported similar levels of arousal (p=.81) and dominance (p=.17), but slightly 
different levels of pleasure (F(1, 51)=3.51, p=.07). This indicated a marginally significant effect 
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of thought speed on pleasure during the questionnaire, such that participants from the FTS 
condition reported a little lower level of pleasure than participants from the STS condition 
(Mfast=4.30, SDfast=1.02, Mslow=4.88, SDslow=1.22). 
Participants’ thought speed levels at the end of the questionnaire did not differ between 
the experimental groups (F(1, 51)=.10, p=.76). Participants from the FTS condition reported, 
on average, 6.16 for the first measure (i.e., right after the manipulation) and 5.52 for the second 
measure (i.e., at the end of the questionnaire). Paired samples t test suggests that their thought 
speed had no significant change during the questionnaire (t=1.47, p=.15). However, the fact 
that participants from the STS condition reported 3.77 for the first and 5.36 for the second 
measure suggests that their thought speed became significantly faster during the questionnaire 
(t=-2.16, p<.05).  
Similar to study 2, participants from both experimental conditions took on average the 
same time on each page of the questionnaire (p<.10). The only exception was again on the page 
where they had to remember and write something from the thought speed manipulation (F(1, 
51)=5.43, p<.05). Participants from the STS condition took less time to do this task than 
participants from the FTS condition (Mfast=20 seconds, SDfast=8 seconds, Mslow=16 seconds, 
SDslow=5 seconds), just as in study 2. The total time participants took to answer the complete 
questionnaire was also different between the experimental conditions (F(1, 51)=6.86, p<.05). 
On average, participants from the FTS condition answered the questionnaire 44 seconds faster 
than participants from the STS condition. This is the opposite from what happened in study 2. 
Regression analyses showed a significant effect of negative affect on locus attribution, 
such that the higher the negative affect, the less external the attribution (t=2.31, β=.31, p<.05). 
But it could explain only 10% of locus variance (R²=.10). Self-integrity also had significant 
effect on locus attribution, such that higher self-integrity led to less external attribution (t=4.03, 
β=.49, p<.001), converging with the rationale behind H1. It explained 24% of locus variance 
(R²=.24). The result regarding negative affect is similar to study 1, while the result regarding 
self-integrity is the opposite from study 1. There was also a marginally significant effect of 
arousal (at the moment rather than during the manipulation) on causal locus (t=-1.84, β=-.25, 
p=.07), such that the higher the arousal, the more external the attribution, converging with the 
rationale used to formulate H2. This effect was only observed in study 3. Unlike study 2, failure 
severity had no effect on locus attribution (p>.10). Also, failure severity was neither a covariate 
(p=.91) nor a moderator (p=.89) of the relationship between thought speed and causal locus 
attribution.  
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5.5.3 Discussion 
 
The results from this study confirm most of the findings from study 2. Let’s take a look 
at the similarities between both studies. First, there was no effect of thought speed on causal 
attribution, internal attribution, or internal controllability. Second, there was no effect of 
thought speed on most of the variables measured. Third, participants from FTS condition 
reported to feel more aroused (i.e., stimulated and excited) during the manipulation, but not 
after that, during the questionnaire. This suggests that the effect of the manipulation was short-
lived. Fourth, participants’ reported thought speed at the end of the questionnaire did not vary 
between the two experimental groups. And fifth, the average time the groups spent on each 
page of the questionnaire was the same, suggesting that their thought speed could also be the 
same. 
But there were also some differences between studies 2 and 3. Only in study 3, 
participants from the FTS condition reported a little less pleasure during the questionnaire than 
participants from the STS – the difference was only marginally significant though (p=.07). The 
opposite was expected based on Pronin and colleagues, whose findings point to more positive 
affect among participants from the FTS condition. Their measure of positive affect 
contemplates items such as excited and alert, which matches the content of the arousal scale 
used in studies 2 and 3, as well as happy and powerful, which matches the contents of the 
pleasure and dominance scales, respectively. While the marginally significant difference 
between the experimental groups regarding pleasure in study 3 is far from being a strong 
evidence that FTS could lead to less pleasure than STS, the lack of significant differences in 
positive affect (study 1), pleasure (study 2), arousal, and dominance (studies 2 and 3) seems to 
make a stronger case for an unsustained effect of the thought speed manipulation. In other 
words, there is more reason to believe in a no effect of thought speed on affect measures than a 
negative effect. 
Another difference between studies 2 and 3 refers to the total time to complete the 
questionnaire. In study 2, participants from the FTS condition took more time to complete the 
questionnaire (extra 40 seconds) than participants from the STS condition – this difference was 
only marginally significant (p=.08). But the opposite happened in study 3, participants from the 
FTS condition took less time to complete the questionnaire (minus 44 seconds) than participants 
from the STS condition (p<.05). Since participants from the FTS condition were forced to read 
faster, they could have kept on using some of this fast pace to read texts and questions from the 
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questionnaire, finishing it in less time than participants from the STS condition, which would 
explain the result from study 3. Also, due to increased self-esteem, self-confidence, and risk-
taking behavior (Chandler & Pronin, 2012; Pronin, 2013), participants from the FTS condition 
could be able to choose more easily and faster their answers to objective questions like the ones 
from the questionnaire. On the other hand, a fast reading speed could impair participants’ 
understanding of what they were reading, making them reading some sentences for the second 
time or using extra time to think about the sentences to properly understand them, which would 
explain the result from study 2. It is not possible to make conclusive inferences about such 
differences in time to complete the questionnaire. Especially because the total time to answer 
the questionnaire in study 1 was the same for the two experimental condition – no significant 
differences (p=.53). 
A new study was conducted with the main purpose of extending the differences in 
thought speed during the questionnaire. In other words, the new study tries to make participants 
from the STS (FTS) condition keep the slow (fast) thought pace throughout the questionnaire 
to check whether thought speed would then impact causal locus attribution. The next section 
describes this study. 
 
 
5.6 STUDY 4 
 
Study 4 consisted of a single factor between-subjects experiment. Thought speed was 
manipulated at three levels: fast, normal (NTS), and slow. NTS condition was introduced to 
check, in case of potential effects of thought speed on other variables, whether it is the STS or 
FTS condition (or both) that differ from the average thought speed and its effects. For instance, 
in case STS and NTS lead to the same locus attribution level, while FTS leads to a different 
level (e.g., less or more external attribution than STS and NTS), we will have evidence 
suggesting that it is the acceleration rather than the deceleration of thoughts that triggers 
differences in attribution. One hundred and five panel members of the Ghent University (52% 
women; Mage=20.58, SD=1.43) participated in this study. This was the final sample after 
deleting 32 respondents with wrong answers for a multiple choice question about the content 
of the failure (13 respondents from the STS condition, 5 from the NTS, and 14 from the FTS). 
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5.6.1 Procedure  
 
A different thought speed manipulation was used. Aiming to make the differences in 
thought speed last longer, we told participants to keep a fast/normal/slow thought and reading 
pace during the questionnaire. Table 51 shows the texts used to explain what participants were 
expected to do: 
 
Table 51 – Explanatory texts for the experimental groups 
FTS NTS STS 
In this task we are interested in the 
extent to which the speed of 
thinking during the performance of 
a task affects how respondents feel 
afterwards.  
Please speed up your thoughts 
during filling out the questionnaire. 
Read the sentences quickly and 
think them over in a fast way. This 
does not mean that you should skip 
parts of sentences or respond 
impulsively without thinking over 
your answers. All you have to do is 
try to speed up your normal pace of 
reading and thinking. To get you in 
the right mood, we will expose you 
to a video in which the text will 
come in a fast pace. Try to keep this 
pace during the remainder of this 
questionnaire. In the end, we will 
ask you how you experienced 
working at this pace. 
Pay also close attention to the 
content of the video because you 
will also get questions about this. 
 
In this task we are interested in the 
extent to which the speed of 
thinking during the performance of 
a task affects how respondents feel 
afterwards.  
Please keep your thoughts in 
a normal pace during filling out the 
questionnaire (so neither too slow 
nor too fast). Read the sentences 
and think them over at a 'normal 
pace'. This does not mean that you 
should change the way you 
normally read the questions or 
think differently about your 
answers. All you have to do is try 
to keep an average pace of reading 
and thinking. To get you in the 
right mood, we will expose you to 
a video in which the text will come 
at such an average pace. Try to 
keep this pace during the remainder 
of this questionnaire. In the end, we 
will ask you how you experienced 
working at this pace.  
Pay also close attention to the 
content of the video because you 
will also get questions about this. 
 
In this task we are interested in the 
extent to which the speed of 
thinking during the performance of 
a task affects how respondents feel 
afterwards.  
Please slow down your 
thoughts during filling out the 
questionnaire. Read the sentences 
slowly and think them over slowly. 
This does not mean that you should 
read the questions more than once 
or think harder about your 
answers. All you have to do is try 
to slow down your normal pace of 
reading and thinking. To get you in 
the right mood, we will expose you 
to a video in which the text will 
come in a slow pace. Try to keep 
this pace during the remainder of 
this questionnaire. In the end, we 
will ask you how you experienced 
working at this pace. 
Pay also close attention to the 
content of the video because you 
will also get questions about this. 
 
Then, each experimental group watched a video showing what we consider to be a 
fast/normal/slow pace. The videos contained sentences about a service failure, which was a 
short version of the service failure from study 2. In this short version, we removed all the content 
that could indicate that participants were in a hurry, because we wanted to avoid inducing 
participants from the STS condition to have a sense of urgency, which could speed up their 
thoughts. The purpose of introducing the service failure during the manipulation video was to 
reduce the text that participants had to read between the thought speed manipulation and the 
causal attribution items. This way, if differences in thought speed were unsustained until the 
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end of the questionnaire, at least we were increasing the chance that they could last until the 
attribution items.  
Sentences from the videos were presented in the same speed adopted in studies 1, 2, and 
3 (i.e., 40 milliseconds per letter for FTS and 170 milliseconds per letter for STS condition). 
The speed adopted for the NTS condition was 80 milliseconds per letter, which is the average 
reading speed for Pronin and Wegner’s (2006) sample. This way, the FTS condition is twice as 
fast as the NTS, while the STS condition is twice as slow as the NTS, similar to Pronin and 
Wegner’s (2006) study. In comparison to studies 1 and 2, the interval between sentences 
changed: from 320 to 600 milliseconds in the FTS condition and from 4,000 to 1,400 
milliseconds in the STS condition. The purpose of this changes was to provide extra time for 
participants in the FTS condition – so they could understand the service failure they were 
reading – and reduce the time that participants in the STS condition have to wait for the next 
sentence. We assume that now that participants are aware of the thought speed manipulation, 
the role of the videos is more informative (i.e., they inform the speed that each participant 
should adopt) rather than an unconscious manipulation. Therefore, we believe that the interval 
between sentences has no need to be as extreme as in studies 1 and 2. The interval between 
sentences for the NTS condition was 1,000 milliseconds. 
Different from studies 1, 2, and 3, in which we kept the same manipulation length for 
the experimental conditions by having differences in the content of the manipulation (i.e., the 
FTS condition always had more content than the STS condition), this time we chose to keep the 
same content and vary the video length (25 seconds for the FTS condition, 47 seconds for the 
NTS condition, and 90 seconds for the STS condition). We chose to proceed this way because 
providing more/less information about the service failure across the experimental groups would 
probably influence participants’ perceptions and attributions regarding the failure. Thus, all 
participants read the same 12 sentences about the service failure, which were: 
1) Imagine that you are suffering from serious coughing. 
2) You decide to go to a hospital. 
3) A doctor examines you 
4) and prescribes something for your cough. 
5) You go to the check-out desk, 
6) but there is no service person at the desk. 
7) You have waited for about 30 min, 
8) but no service person has shown up yet. 
9) There is another check-out desk around the corner 
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10) and other patients are making their payments there. 
11) You wonder whether there was any sign 
12) to inform patients of this other check-out desk. 
 
After the videos, participants had to answer the same manipulation check used in studies 
1, 2, and 3 and a multiple choice question about the content of the service failure – whether it 
referred to 30 minutes waiting for (a) paying the hospital bill, (b) being examined by a doctor, 
or (c) buying medication. Measures of behavioral intention – repurchase, complaint, and 
negative word-of-mouth (NWOM) – were included in the questionnaire. The purpose was to 
investigate other potential effects of thought speed now that we expect the differences in 
thought speed to last longer. 
Because the self-integrity scale used in studies 2 and 3 is more trait-related, once again 
we adopted the state performance self-esteem used in study 1, which is sensitive to short-lived 
changes in self-esteem (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). A state measure is more appropriate than 
a trait for this study in which we expect a situational factor (i.e., an induced change in thought 
speed) to affect self-esteem. Besides the state performance self-esteem, we also measured the 
state social self-esteem. Both of them are subscales of the State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES). The 
performance subscale mainly refers to perceived abilities to perform a task, while the social 
subscale mainly refers to social evaluation/comparison (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). Table 52 
shows the measures of this study in the same order from the questionnaire.  
  
Table 52 – Measures from study 4 
Name of the variable, Cronbach 
alpha, source 
Item(s) 
Causal locus attribution, Peterson 
et al. (1982) 
Same item from studies 1, 2, and 3 
Internal locus attribution, Chu et 
al. (2013)  
Same item from studies 2 and 3 
Internal controllability attribution, 
Choi and Mattila (2008) 
Same item from studies 2 and 3 
Repurchase intention, Choi and 
Mattila (2008) 
1) When I need to use a hospital again in the future, I will choose this 
hospital (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
NWOM intention, Choi and 
Mattila (2008) 
1) I am likely to speak negatively about this hospital service to others  
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
Complaining intention 1) It is likely that I will complain to the hospital about what happened  
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
157 
 
State performance self-esteem, 
α=.85, Heatherton and Polivy 
(1991) 
Same items from study 1 
State social self-esteem, α=.81, 
Heatherton and Polivy (1991) 
1) I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure (R) 
2) I feel self-conscious (R) 
3) I feel displeased with myself (R) 
4) I am worried about what other people think of me (R) 
5) I feel inferior to others at this moment (R) 
6) I feel concerned about the impression I am making (R) 
7) I am worried about looking foolish (R) 
Pleasure (at the moment), α=.85, 
Mehrabian and Russell (1974) 
Same items from studies 2 and 3 
Arousal (at the moment), α=.56, 
Mehrabian and Russell (1974) 
Same items from studies 2 and 3 
Dominance (at the moment), 
α=.74, Mehrabian and Russell 
(1974) 
Same items from studies 2 and 3 
Thought speed (at the end of the 
questionnaire) 
Same item from studies 2 and 3 
Obs. Scales were translated into Dutch (participant’s native language) by a specialist (i.e., marketing professor or 
PhD student) who was a native Dutch speaker fluent in English, except for the state performance and social self-
esteem scales, which already had a Dutch translation elaborated by Vermunt et al. (2001). 
 
Because we told in the beginning of the questionnaire that we were interested in the 
extent to which the speed of thinking during the performance of a task affects how respondents 
feel afterwards, we asked their perceptions about it at the end of the questionnaire. More 
specifically, we asked (a) whether they were able to maintain the required reading and thinking 
pace during most part of the questionnaire, (b) whether they liked to read and think at the pace 
they were required to, (c) whether they prefer a different reading and thinking speed, and (d) 
whether the required pace made them concentrate better (1 = totally disagree, 5 = totally agree). 
Just as in studies 2 and 3, the amount of time that participants spent on each questionnaire page 
was measured.  
 
 
5.6.2 Results 
 
Thought speed manipulation was effective (F(2, 102)=25.11, p<.001). Results of LSD 
post-hoc tests show that participants from the FTS condition reported to be thinking faster than 
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participants from the NTS condition (Mfast=6.06, SDfast=1.18, Mnormal=4.68, SDnormal=1.52, 
p<.001), which in turn reported to be thinking faster than participants from the STS condition 
(Mslow=3.30, SDfast=1.88, p<.001). 
Thought speed had a significant effect on locus attribution (F(2, 102)=5.46, p<.01), such 
that participants from the FTS condition reported more external attribution than participants 
from the STS condition (Mfast=2.77, SDfast=1.50, Mslow=4.00, SDslow=1.68, p<.01). This result 
supports H2 just as the result from study 1. Participants from the NTS condition also reported 
more external attribution than participants from the STS condition (Mnormal=3.17, SDnormal=1.41, 
p<.05), but there was no significant difference in locus attribution between the FTS and NTS 
groups (p=.28). 
Thought speed also affected internal locus attribution (F(2, 102)=3.88, p<.05), 
converging with results from the previous paragraph: participants from the FTS condition 
reported less internal attribution than participants from the STS condition (Mfast=3.26, 
SDfast=1.59, Mslow=4.27, SDslow=1.49, p=.01). Participants from the NTS condition also reported 
less internal attribution than participants from the STS condition (Mnormal=3.49, SDnormal=1.57, 
p<.05). And again there was no significant difference between the FTS and NTS groups (p=.54). 
Thought speed also affected internal controllability attribution (F(2, 102)=3.52, p<.05): 
participants from the FTS condition reported less internal controllability than participants from 
the STS condition (Mfast=4.00, SDfast=1.63, Mslow=4.97, SDslow=1.19, p=.01). The difference 
between the NTS and STS conditions was marginally significant (p=.09), with participants from 
the NTS condition reporting slightly less internal controllability than participants from the STS 
condition (Mnormal=4.37, SDnormal=1.58). There was no significant difference between the FTS 
and NTS groups (p=.30). 
There was no effect of thought speed on the remaining variables of the study:  
 Repurchase (F(2, 102)=.13, p=.88) 
 Complaint (F(2, 102)=.43, p=.65) 
 NWOM (F(2, 102)=.39, p=.68) 
 State performance self-esteem (F(2, 102)=.49, p=.61) 
 State social self-esteem (F(2, 102)=.36, p=.70) 
 The sum of the state performance and social self-esteem scales (F(2, 102)=.50, 
p=.61) 
 Pleasure at the moment (F(2, 102)=1.28, p=.28) 
 Arousal at the moment (F(2, 102)=2.23, p=.11) 
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 Dominance at the moment (F(2, 102)=.26, p=.77) 
 
The behavioral intentions were not affected by thought speed, but the theoretical and 
empirical contents of chapter 3 – chapter about the temporal model of perceived control – show 
that behavioral intentions may be affected by cognitive and emotional reactions. Thus, multiple 
regression analysis was conducted to check whether locus attribution, pleasure, arousal, and 
dominance could be related to repurchase, complaint, and NWOM intentions. Results show that 
locus attribution was positively related to repurchase (t=2.06, β=.20, p<.05) – the less external 
the attribution, the higher the intention to repurchase – and negatively related to NWOM 
intention (t=-2.62, β=-.25, p=.01) – the more external the attribution, the higher the intention to 
engage in NWOM. Locus attribution was not significantly related to complaint intention, while 
pleasure, arousal, and dominance were unrelated to any of the behavioral intentions.  
There were differences in participants’ thought speed levels at the end of the 
questionnaire (F(2, 102)=12.17, p<.001). Participants from the FTS condition reported to be 
thinking faster than participants from the STS condition (Mfast=5.94, SDfast=1.18, Mslow=4.33, 
SDslow=1.41, p<.001) and NTS condition (Mnormal=4.80, SDnormal=1.38, p=.001). But there was 
no significant difference in thought speed between participants from the NTS and STS 
condition (p=.13). 
Paired samples t test using the two measures of thought speed (i.e., right after the 
manipulation and at the end of the questionnaire) shows that the thought speed of participants 
from the STS condition became significantly faster during the questionnaire (t=-3.07, p<.01), 
converging with the result from study 3. The thought speed of participants from both the NTS 
(t=-.42, p=.68) and FTS (t=.55, p=.59) conditions did not change during the questionnaire. The 
same happened with FTS condition in study 3. 
Different from studies 2 and 3, the average time that participants from the experimental 
groups spent on each page of the questionnaire varied. On most of the pages, the time spent by 
participants from the STS condition was longer than the time spent by participants from the 
FTS and NTS conditions. There was a marginally significant difference (F(2, 102)=2.72, p=.07) 
on the first page after the manipulation (i.e., the page of the thought speed manipulation check), 
such that participants from the STS condition spent more time on this page (M=24 seconds, 
SD=13 seconds) than participants from the FTS (M=19 seconds, SD=6 seconds, p=.06) and 
NTS (M=19 seconds, SD=10 seconds, p<.05) conditions. There was no difference between the 
FTS and NTS conditions (p=.96). There were differences (F(2, 102)=3.92, p<.05) in thought 
speed on the second page after the manipulation (i.e., the page checking whether participants 
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understood the service failure). Participants from the STS condition spent more time on this 
page (M=18 seconds, SD=12 seconds) than participants from the FTS (M=12 seconds, SD=3 
seconds, p<.05), which in turn spent less time on the page than participants from the NTS 
condition (Mnormal=17 seconds, SD=10 seconds, p<.05). There was no significant difference 
between the STS and NTS conditions (p=.78). 
There were differences (F(2, 102)=10.48, p<.001) in the time spent on the third page 
after the manipulation (i.e., page about causal locus), with participants from the STS condition 
spending more time on the page (M=14 seconds, SD=6 seconds) than participants from the NTS 
(M=11 seconds, SD=4 seconds, p<.01) condition, which in turn spent more time on the page 
than participants from the FTS condition (M=9 seconds, SD=2 seconds, p=.05). There were 
differences (F(2, 102)=8.45, p<.001) in the time spent on the fourth page after the manipulation 
(i.e., page about internal locus and controllability), with participants from the STS condition 
spending more time on the page (M=16 seconds, SD=6 seconds) than participants from the FTS 
(M=11 seconds, SD=3 seconds, p<.001) and NTS (M=13 seconds, SD=4 seconds, p<.01) 
conditions. No difference between FTS and NTS (p=.18). 
There were differences (F(2, 102)=9.85, p<.001) in the time spent on the fifth page after 
the manipulation (i.e., page about behavioral intentions), with participants from the STS 
condition spending more time on the page (M=25 seconds, SD=8 seconds) than participants 
from the FTS (M=18 seconds, SD=5 seconds, p<.001) and NTS (M=20 seconds, SD=7 seconds, 
p=.001) conditions. No difference between FTS and NTS (p=.27). Similarly, there were 
differences (F(2, 102)=7.65, p=.001) in the time spent on the sixth page after the manipulation 
(i.e., page about self-esteem), with participants from the STS condition spending more time on 
the page (M=72 seconds, SD=21 seconds) than participants from the FTS (M=57 seconds, 
SD=12 seconds, p<.001) and NTS (M=61 seconds, SD=14 seconds, p<.01) conditions. No 
difference between FTS and NTS (p=.26). 
There was no difference (F(2, 102)=1.78, p=.17) in the time spent on the seventh page 
after the manipulation (i.e., page about pleasure, arousal, and dominance). But there were 
differences again on the eighth (F(2, 102)=6.84, p<.01) and ninth (F(2, 102)=4.51, p<.01) pages 
after the manipulation (i.e., the pages measuring thought speed at the end of the questionnaire 
and perceptions about the required thinking and reading pace, respectively). On the eighth page, 
the time spent by participants from the STS condition was longer (M=12 seconds, SD=5 
seconds) than the FTS condition (M=8 seconds, SD=3 seconds, p<.001) but equivalent to the 
NTS condition (M=10 seconds, SD=8 seconds, p=.11). The difference between FTS and NTS 
was significant (p<.05). The same pattern was true for the ninth page: longer time for STS than 
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FTS (Mslow=22 seconds, SDslow=7 seconds vs. Mfast=17 seconds, SDfast=4 seconds, p>.01), 
equivalent time between STS and NTS (Mnormal=20 seconds, SDnormal=6 seconds, p=.24), and 
significant difference between FTS and NTS (p=.05). 
We did not compare the total time each experimental group took to complete the 
questionnaire because the manipulation length varied across the groups. Therefore, differences 
in the total time to answer the questionnaire could be due to the differences in the manipulation 
length rather than thought or reading speed. But we did compare the sum of the time spent on 
the nine pages after the manipulation and there were significant differences (F(2, 102)=13.61, 
p<.001). Participants from the STS condition spent more time on the nine pages after the 
manipulation than participants from the NTS condition (Mslow=226 seconds, SDslow=50 seconds 
vs. Mnormal=194 seconds, SDnormal=40 seconds, p=.001), which in turn spent more time on the 
nine pages than participants from the FTS condition (M=173 seconds, SD=31 seconds, p<.05).   
Table 53 compares the time spent on each page by indicating whether participants from  
a given experimental condition spent more (>), less (<), or the same time (=) on the page than 
participants from another experimental condition.  
 
Table 53 – Comparison of the time spent on each questionnaire page 
Order after the 
manipulation 
Time spent on the page 
STS vs. FTS STS vs. NTS NTS vs. FTS 
1st page STS > FTS STS > NTS NTS = FTS 
2nd page STS > FTS STS = NTS NTS > FTS 
3rd page STS > FTS STS > NTS NTS > FTS 
4th page STS > FTS STS > NTS NTS = FTS 
5th page STS > FTS STS > NTS NTS = FTS 
6th page STS > FTS STS > NTS NTS = FTS 
7th page STS = FTS STS = NTS NTS = FTS 
8th page STS > FTS STS = NTS NTS > FTS 
9th page STS > FTS STS = NTS NTS > FTS 
Sum of the 9 pages STS > FTS STS > NTS NTS > FTS 
 
A multiple regression with causal locus as dependent variable and pleasure, arousal, 
dominance, and the two state self-esteem subscales as independent variables revealed that none 
of these latter variables could explain variances in the former (R²=.01, t<|.50|, β<|.07|, p>.60). 
As for the last items of the questionnaire used to check participants’ perceptions about 
the required pace, there were differences in the ability to maintain the required pace during the 
questionnaire (F(2, 102)=4.32, p<.05): participants from the STS condition reported they were 
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less able to keep the pace (M=2.85, SD=1.18) than participants from the NTS (M=3.34, 
SD=1.02, p=.05) and FTS (M=3.61, SD=.99, p<.01) conditions. There was a marginally 
significant effect of thought speed on the extent to which they liked to follow the required pace 
(F(2, 102)=2.86, p=.06): participants from the FTS condition (M=2.94, SD=1.03) reported they 
liked to follow the required pace more than participants from the STS condition (M=2.30, 
SD=1.33, p<.05). There were no significant differences between FTS and NTS (p=.43) and 
between STS and NTS (p=.10). There were differences regarding reading and thinking speed 
preference (F(2, 102)=11.01, p<.001): participants from the STS condition (M=4.42, SD=.66) 
reported higher preference for another thought speed (i.e., different from the one they were 
required to adopt) than participants from the NTS (M=3.56, SD=1.03, p<.001) and FTS 
(M=3.45, SD=1.03, p<.001) conditions. No difference between FTS and NTS (p=.62). Finally, 
there was no difference in the extent to which they could concentrate better in the required pace 
(p=.24). 
 
 
5.6.3 Discussion 
 
Before running this study, we were concerned with the potential implications of the 
chosen manipulation. The first concern was whether the fast pace of the sentences in the FTS 
condition would impair participants’ understanding of the service failure. However, the fact 
that the STS and FTS conditions had basically the same number of incorrect answers regarding 
the content of the service failure (13 and 14, respectively) suggests that the fast pace of the latter 
condition did not impair participants’ understanding.  
The second concern was whether telling participants that they should keep a 
fast/normal/slow thinking and reading pace would generate demand artifact, making 
participants report the required thought speed even if it was not their true thought speed in that 
moment. But there are two evidence suggesting that the thought speed manipulation indeed 
worked: first, thought speed had a significant effect on causal locus, internal locus, and internal 
controllability attributions. Even if the participants wanted to report a given thought speed only 
to comply with the research, it is very unlikely that they could imagine how they should react 
to the attribution questions to comply with this part too. That is to say, it is unlikely that they 
thought something like “if I am thinking fast, I must answer that the cause of the failure was…” 
Thus, the effect on causal locus attribution should be due to real differences in thought speed. 
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Second, there were significant differences in the time that participants spent on the 
questionnaire pages: participants from the STS condition spending more time on the pages than 
participants from the NTS condition, which in turn spent more time on the pages than 
participants from the FTS condition. This indicates that participants were indeed keeping the 
required pace. 
The results from this study indicates that thought speed affects causal locus attribution 
in the direction suggested by H2: FTS leading to more external attribution than STS. This 
direction converges with the marginally significant effect found in study 1. Actually, the fact 
that there was no difference in locus (and internal locus) attribution between the FTS and the 
NTS groups (i.e., only attributions from the STS group differed from the NTS group) suggests 
that STS could be leading to less external attribution rather than FTS leading to more external 
attribution.   
Thought speed had no effect on self-esteem, pleasure, arousal, and dominance, which 
are the variables that were expected to explain why thought speed affects locus attribution in 
this direction. Besides, self-esteem, pleasure, arousal, and dominance had no effect on locus 
attribution, another strong evidence that they could not help to explain the results concerning 
locus attribution in this study.  
Judging by the differences in reported thought speed throughout the questionnaire and 
the time spent on the questionnaire pages, the differences in induced thought speed lasted longer 
than in studies 2 and 3. This could explain why we found the effect of thought speed on locus 
attribution here but not in these previous studies. Another explanation could be the smaller 
sample size from studies 2 (n=84) and 3 (n=53), hampering the observation of significant 
effects.  
In spite of the evidence of longer differences in thought speed in this study, it seems that 
these differences are short-lived and that there is a tendency to return to a normal thought speed. 
Participants’ reported thought speed became significantly faster during the questionnaire in the 
STS condition and there was no difference in reported thought speed at the end of the 
questionnaire between participants from the STS and NTS condition. This, together with the 
fact that participants from the STS condition reported they were less able to maintain the 
required pace than participants from the other conditions, suggests a tendency to return to a 
normal thought speed – at least for participants from the STS condition. To some extent this 
difficulty in keeping the slow pace may be due to the fact that the study was conducted in a 
laboratory with students. These students may be motivated to finish the questionnaire as soon 
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as possible, because the faster they answer the questionnaire, the sooner they will leave the 
laboratory.   
A longer but still short-lived difference in thought speed – and a consequently short-
lived effect of thought speed on other variables – could explain why only causal attribution (i.e., 
one of the first items after the manipulation) was affected by thought speed. Although thought 
speed had no effect on behavioral intentions, it affected locus attribution, which in turn affected 
repurchase and NWOM intentions. This is an extra motivation to care about the potential effects 
of thought speed on locus attribution.       
 
 
5.7 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
While the results from studies 1 and 4 converge about the effect of thought speed on 
locus attribution, there was no evidence of significant effect in studies 2 and 3. We discussed 
during this chapter that the lack of significant effects in studies 2 and 3 could be due to a short-
lived difference in thought speed as well as a small sample size. Therefore, in study 4 we tried 
to make the differences in thought speed last longer and increased the sample size, which led 
to a significant result. 
We have evidence supporting that FTS leads to more external attribution for a service 
failure than STS – or maybe it is the STS that leads to less external attribution, as suggested by 
study 4 – but there is no evidence explaining the mechanism behind this effect. Based on studies 
from Pronin and colleagues, we expected to find higher self-esteem and positive affect for FTS 
than STS and these variables would then explain the effects of thought speed on causal locus 
attribution. But, overall, the four studies do not support findings from Pronin and colleagues 
about self-esteem and positive affect. We deliberately changed the measures of self-esteem and 
positive affect across the studies in an effort to rule out that the explanation for the lack of 
support was the choice of a specific measure. Thought speed affected arousal during the 
manipulation in studies 2 and 3, but not arousal afterwards (at the moment, during the 
questionnaire). Thought speed also affected dominance during the manipulation in study 2 and 
pleasure afterwards (at the moment, during the questionnaire) in study 3, but in both cases, the 
direction of the effect was opposed to the expected based on Pronin and colleagues (i.e., the 
FTS group reported lower levels of pleasure and dominance than the STS group). But there was 
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no effect at all on self-esteem/self-integrity across the studies and on positive affect, pleasure, 
arousal, and dominance in studies 1 and 4. 
While a potential short-lived difference in thought speed or its effects could explain the 
lack of effects on self-esteem and positive affect, it certainly does not explain the inconsistent 
results regarding whether and how these latter variables relate to locus attribution.  For instance, 
self-esteem was significantly related to locus attribution in study 1, in the same direction 
indicated by the self-threat rationale used to formulate H2, while it was unrelated to locus 
attribution in study 4. Self-integrity (i.e., the measure used in studies 2 and 3 to substitute self-
esteem) was also unrelated to locus attribution in study 2, while it was related to locus in study 
3, but in the opposite direction from study 1 (i.e., in the same direction indicated by the rationale 
used to formulate H1). As for positive affect, arousal at the moment (i.e., a substitute for positive 
affect) was related to locus attribution in study 3, in the same direction of the self-threat 
rationale used to formulate H2, but no other measure of positive affect was related to locus 
attribution throughout the studies. Negative affect, in turn, was related to locus attribution in 
two out of the three studies in which it was measured: the higher the negative affect, the less 
external the attribution, which also converges with the rationale behind H2. But negative affect 
was not affected by thought speed. So, it cannot be used as an explanation for the effect of 
thought speed on locus attribution. 
Manipulations were effective in the four studies, leading participants to experience 
faster/slower thoughts during the manipulation. But all studies have results that suggest that the 
differences in thought speed were not sustained during the questionnaire. Even in study 4 – 
which was designed to make the differences in thought speed last longer – there was evidence 
that these differences were becoming smaller during the questionnaire: participants from the 
STS condition reported significantly faster thought speed at the end of the questionnaire, 
becoming equivalent to participants from the NTS condition in thought speed. Therefore, it 
seems unlikely that induced thought speed will last enough time to influence a great number of 
customer reactions after a service failure. 
 
 
5.7.1 Implications 
 
Regarding potential managerial implications, the results suggest that, in case of service 
failures, service providers could benefit from inducing STS among their customers. Since STS 
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seems to lead to reduced external attribution to service failures, service providers could 
stimulate slow thoughts during the service recovery, for example. This could be done through 
visual and auditory stimulus in the service environment, such as videos with slow moving 
images and slow pace music. But we have seen that although customers may think faster or 
slower when watching a promotional material or other visual stimuli, this acceleration or 
deceleration is not likely to be sustained. Therefore, service providers who want to slow down 
customers’ thoughts during service recovery could try to keep a STS stimulus for the entire 
service recovery process (or for as long as they can). 
However, while we do not understand the mechanism behind the effect of thought speed 
on locus attribution, it is difficult to be sure whether it is the FTS that leads to more external 
attribution or the STS that leads to less external attribution. Without this understanding, it is 
difficult to choose between recommending service providers to (1) stimulate a slow thought 
pace, slowing down customers’ thought or (2) stimulate a normal thought pace, avoiding to 
speed up customers’ thoughts. 
From a theoretical point of view, this research contributes by providing evidence that 
the effects of induced thought speed are short lived. This has implications on other findings 
about thought speed. It suggests that all the potential positive consequences of induced thought 
speed (e.g., positive affect and high self-esteem) are ephemeral.  
 
 
5.7.2 Limitations and suggestions for future studies 
 
The fact that the four experiments from this chapter induced differences in thought speed 
that were not sustained for long does not mean that effects of thought speed will be always 
short-lived. Although different manipulations were used, varying the content of the message 
from daily activities of a student and trivia sentences to a promotional material of a car retailer 
and a service failure, only visual stimuli were used. But thought speed could perhaps be 
manipulated with other stimuli. For instance, giving participants a short (vs. long) period of 
time to do a task could make them think faster (slower) due to differences in time pressure. 
Also, an auditory stimulus could be used, such as fast (vs. slow) pace music. Music affects 
customer cognitions, such as perception of waiting time (Oakes & North, 2008), emotions 
(Bruner, 1990), and behaviors, such as the time and money they spent (Milliman, 1982, 1986). 
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Music could also influence customers’ thought speed and its effect could last longer (or shorter) 
than effects of thought speed induced by visual stimuli. 
The empirical studies of this chapter were restricted to differences in thought speed 
induced by the manipulations. But some individuals may naturally think faster than others, 
without any manipulation. There are individual differences regarding thought speed, which may 
affect some of our perceptions, such as the subjective experience of time (Allman, Teki, 
Griffiths, & Meck, 2014). The fact that people think in different paces is clear even in clinical 
literature, as racing thoughts – the acceleration of thoughts to a pathological level – is one 
symptom of mania (Piguet et al., 2010). Effects of individuals’ natural or inherent thought speed 
were not investigated. And while induced differences on thought speed may last for a short 
period, individual differences in thought speed are likely to be sustained if we consider them as 
personal trait or tendency. Future studies could investigate the effects of such natural thought 
speed on causal locus attributions and other customers’ reactions to service failures.  
The empirical studies of this chapter were also restricted to service failure contexts. But 
causal attributions are not meant to be used only in a service or product consumption context. 
They may be investigated in other interpersonal relationships such as problems with family, 
friends, working colleagues, etc. Future studies could investigate the potential effects of thought 
speed on causal attributions for situations that are not restricted to service failures. For instance, 
when participants are paired to each other to do a task and they fail, will differences in thought 
speed influence their causal locus attribution for this failure?  
The current studies manipulated thought speed before and during the service failure, but 
future studies could try to manipulate thought speed after the service failure. If thought speed 
could have any influence on customers’ cognitive, emotional, or behavioral reactions to a 
service failure when manipulated post factum, it could be useful for the context of service 
recovery. Since the effects of thought speed seems to be short-lived, manipulating thought 
speed after a service failure could lead to effects that were not observable when manipulating 
it before the failure.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this doctoral dissertation is to better understand some of the customers’ 
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral reactions to service failures. Because service failures are 
ubiquitous, knowing how customers react to such failures may help to predict and even 
influence customers’ reactions. By understanding what customers think (cognitive reactions), 
how they feel (emotional reactions), and what they do (behavioral reactions) after service 
failures, it is possible to adopt tactics to reduce their negative reactions. Previous research has 
long investigated customers’ reactions to service failures, but this doctoral dissertation 
addresses some elements that have not been considered by previous research, such as a temporal 
model of perceived control, failed co-produced services which causal locus is uncertain, and 
thought speed. Next section summarizes the findings of each chapter.  
 
 
6.1 RECAPITULATION OF THE FINDINGS 
 
Chapter 3 showed a comparison among three different models of cognitive reactions to 
service failure: the causal attribution model, the appraisal model, and the temporal model of 
perceived control. Results show that the temporal model of perceived control – the model that 
has not been used in service research – may outperform the attribution and appraisal models to 
explain some customer’s emotional and behavioral reactions to service failures. But some of 
the emotional and behavioral reactions investigated in the chapter were better explained by 
attributions and appraisals than perceived control. In face of these results, it would be wise to 
neither discard this temporal model nor use it as a substitute of attributions and appraisals, but 
rather combine it with these latter models. 
In chapter 4, failed co-produced services were investigated. It was found that co-
production may influence customers’ cognitive reactions, reducing external attributions for 
services failures. It was also found that co-production may affect customers’ emotional 
reactions, reducing disappointment and dissatisfaction. These findings show that firms that 
adopt co-production have more beneficial results than firms that do not adopt it when service 
failures occur, because the former are less blamed by the customer. Customers have more 
beneficial results as well with failed co-produced services (vs. failed services that were not co-
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produced): they feel less dissatisfied without necessarily being more regretful than customers 
who did not co-produce. Results encourage service firms to adopt co-production. 
In chapter 5, potential effects of thought speed on customers’ cognitive (i.e., locus 
attribution and self-esteem), emotional (i.e., positive affect, negative affect, pleasure, etc.), and 
behavioral (i.e., repurchase, complaint, and negative word-of-mouth) reactions to service 
failure were investigated. Results suggest that slow thought speed leads to less external 
attribution for a service failure than fast thought speed. It was found that the differences in 
induced thought speed are difficult to be sustained for a long period though. There is no strong 
evidence that thought speed could impact other customers’ reactions to service failures. 
 
  
6.2 IMPLICATIONS 
 
Theoretical and managerial implications were presented at the end of each chapter. 
Although the chapters share a common subject – causal attributions for service failures – they 
also approach very diverse subjects such as the temporal model of perceived control and thought 
speed. Therefore, discussing implications at the end of each chapter seems to facilitate the 
comprehension of such implications before changing the mindset to a different research focus. 
Let’s recapitulate implications from each chapter. 
Theoretical implications from chapter 3 refer to broadening the scope of service research 
by showing that it is possible (and useful) to look at the role that customers play in a stressful 
service failure (i.e., customer’s perceived control) in a temporal dimension (i.e., before or after 
the service failure). The temporal model of perceived control may complement the attribution 
and appraisal models in service research to better understand customers’ reactions to service 
failure. Managerial implications refer to the knowledge that service providers have different 
types of control they may influence in order to get the less harmful emotional and behavior 
reactions from customers after service failures. Having different types of control in a temporal 
dimension (i.e., past, present, and future control) probably implies that service providers have 
different moments to increase or decrease customers’ perceived control. Although how and 
when service providers may affect customers’ perceived control has not been empirically 
investigated during the chapter, it seems logical to expect that increasing customers’ perceived 
control before the service failure could impact perceived past control, while increasing 
customers’ perceived control after the service failure could impact perceived present and future 
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control (as well as future likelihood). But some of the results suggest that increasing customers’ 
perceived control may not be such a good idea for every type of control from the temporal 
model. For instance, high perceived future control is associated with high levels of anger and 
NWOM. 
Theoretical implications from chapter 4 refer to benefits of failed co-produced services 
versus failed services that were not co-produced: lower external attribution (benefit for the 
service provider) and reduced levels of disappointment and dissatisfaction (benefit for both 
customer and service provider). Previous studies have shown negative effects of failed co-
produced service, such as higher external attribution (Jong-Kuk et al. 2010; Yen et al., 2004) –  
which is negative for the service provider – and lower customer dissatisfaction (Heidenreich et 
al., 2015) – which is negative for both customer and service provider. Also, the results from 
chapter 4 contradict the literature on causal uncertainty showing that causal uncertainty does 
not necessarily leads to reduced emotional intensity in case of failed co-produced services. 
Thus, researchers should be aware that causal uncertainty may have different effects in case of 
failed co-produced services. Managerial implications refer to the evidence that service 
providers could adopt co-production to reduce customer’s negative reactions to service failures, 
such as blaming the service provider, feeling disappointed and dissatisfied.  
Theoretical implications from chapter 5 refer to (1) the effect of thought speed on causal 
locus attribution and (2) the short duration of thought speed differences caused by thought speed 
manipulation. While studies show that the acceleration of thought speed via reading tasks or 
videos may increase positive mood and risk taking (Chandler & Pronin, 2012; Pronin et al., 
2008; Pronin, 2013; Yang et al., 2014), such benefits of thought acceleration may be short-lived 
as thought speed tends to go back to normal in a few minutes or seconds, as suggested by studies 
from chapter 5. As a managerial implication, service providers could benefit from inducing 
slow thought speed among customers, which tends to reduce external attribution for a service 
failure, as long as they manage to sustain this induced slow thought. This could be especially 
useful in service recovery. The next section recapitulates limitations and suggestions for future 
research. 
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6.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Similar to implications, limitations and suggestions for future research were also 
discussed at the end of each chapter. In chapter 3, it was acknowledged that the studies reported 
did not investigate every possible emotional and behavioral reactions customers may have after 
a stressful service failure – although a large variety of reactions was assessed. Neither was 
investigated every interaction that the temporal model of perceived control could have with the 
attribution or appraisal models (e.g., future control and locus attribution, present control and 
future expectancies, etc.). No modification of the original model was done to adapt the temporal 
dimension to the service failure context, such as measuring what customers could do in the 
present to correct or mitigate the consequences of the service failure. Future studies could 
address such subjects that were not part of the investigations from chapter 3. 
In chapter 4, limitations refer to the fact that the studies do not solve the literature 
inconsistency on whether co-production leads to more internal or external causal locus 
attribution, do not measure some variables that could be explaining the findings from the 
chapter (e.g., customer perceived control and effort), do not investigate effects of uncertain 
locus attribution to both co-produced and no co-produced services, and investigate effects on 
the most obvious emotional reactions (i.e., regret and disappointment). Future studies could 
measure potential mediators and moderators as well as address effects on emotions that were 
not part of our investigation. A meta-analysis could also be conducted in order to solve the 
literature inconsistency.     
In chapter 5, limitations refer to using only visual stimuli to manipulate thought speed, 
investigating only differences in thought speed induced by manipulations rather than individual 
(natural or inherent) differences in thought speed, and restricting the studies to service failure 
contexts. Future studies could address such things that were not investigated in chapter 5 to 
have a better understanding about the potential effects of thought speed on causal attributions. 
None of the chapters investigated whether a specific type of service failure could 
influence the obtained results. There are different classification schemes for types of service 
failures, such as: outcome vs. process; monetary vs. non-monetary; reversible vs. irreversible; 
flawed goods, failed service, and lack of attention (Roschk & Gelbrich, 2013). Future studies 
could investigate whether results from chapters 3, 4, and 5 apply only for some types of failures. 
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